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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Vol. III, No. 4 Summer 1993

This Quarter's Theme:

What Makes a Nation

How Much Commonality Does It Require? How Much Diversity Can It Tolerate?

Does the Nation-State Exist?	Peter Brimelow
The Yugoslav Tragedy	Hermann Wagenbichler
Tibet and the Final Solution	Denis McCormack
Europe Should Keep Its Farmers	Sir James Goldsmith
Multiculturalism Defined Seven Ways	Friedrich Heckmann
America Into Splinters?	Georgie Anne Geyer

PLUS
ESSAYS, OPINION PIECES, REVIEWS AND REPORTAGE ON:
population growth, international migration,
assimilation, culture, and the environment.

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A STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Just over two decades ago, concern over rapidly growing human population led to the development of the so-called "population movement" aimed at reducing the rate of population growth, both at home and abroad. At home, for a variety of reasons, birth rates fell sharply to sub-replacement levels. However, immigration grew steadily due, in significant measure, to the burgeoning population overseas. Today, human numbers world wide expand at about 10,000 per hour, a quarter of a million each day, 90 million a year.

The combined circumstances of low birth rates and high immigration pressures pose for all the developed countries the three most fundamental questions of immigration policy:

1. **How** many people shall we admit, and **what factors** should be taken into account in setting this limit?
2. **Who** should be chosen to immigrate, and **what criteria** should be used for choosing?
3. **How** shall we humanely enforce the rules we decide upon?

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT seeks to explore and illuminate these questions by publishing new material, and also by pulling together and reprinting existing works from many now-scattered sources. Our goal is to provide a periodical devoted to the interrelated topics of:

- **Human population** questions, including its absolute size, rate of growth, and distribution. In nations with low natural increase and high immigration, the latter is a significant component of population growth. (In an ideal world, policy on immigrant numbers would derive from a national population policy.)
- **Immigration policy**, especially as it relates to the three basic policy questions mentioned above: how many, who, and how?
- **Language, assimilation, and national unity** considerations, which in large measure derive from and are driven by immigration and assimilation policies.
- **The balance of individual rights and civic responsibilities** since, as with many issues today, population, immigration and language questions are often framed in terms of 'rights.' What is the proper balance of individual and community rights and interests?

Our method for approaching these connected issues is the time-honored concept of "The Social Contract." Most great public issues are basically moral and ethical ones: What is the right thing to do? How do we decide what we think is right? When 'rights' collide, which ones shall take precedence? The discipline of thinking through these issues in terms of a Social Contract allows one to achieve a balance: of individual and community interests; of the short and the long term; and of utopian idealism and the realities of the world in which we live.

But most importantly, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT is not a detached forum for discussion in some backwater of life. Our issues are all in the forefront of public policy discussions in the United States, which is our primary focus. Our Editorial Advisors are drawn from many of the main organizations trying to influence the course of policy in the issue areas we have chosen. Our journal is one of the tools they use to raise questions, debate themes, and communicate ideas — to encourage vigorous public debate and subsequent changes in our laws and public policies.

We invite you to take part in this Great Debate by reading and contributing to THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.

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What Constitutes A Nation?

Editorial

Here in the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave we've not had to think too much about this question. In the past, we have for the most part enjoyed the attributes of a true nation that the essayists in our feature section describe: a reasonable degree of cohesiveness based on a common heritage (European American), religion (Judeo-Christian), language (English), and, yes, race. These conditions resulted from the accidents of history, not any particular planning on our part. Unfortunately, this lucky set of circumstances has helped engender the idea of American Exceptionalism — the notion that, no matter how we comport ourselves, the United States of America is somehow favored and will be permanently spared many of the problems that plague other societies. Rules apply to others, not to us.

At the time of the Los Angeles riots in 1992, a few observers suggested that the disturbances might be traced — at least in part — to how highly variegated the area's populace had become. The south central part of the city, formerly mostly black, was now heavily Mexican, with a strong Korean component. Maybe the difficulties these groups were having getting along with each other was part of a greater problem? Not so, intoned Vice President Quayle: "Our strength is in our diversity." Yet in Japan, which the then-Vice President had recently visited, they contend the very opposite: "Our strength is in our homogeneity."

Certainly the Japanese have lower transaction costs than we do. They do not have to fight over race, religion, creed or national origin, to cite our traditional litany. Nor do they have to debate about the language in which they are going to communicate. Rather, they can spend their time figuring out how to advance their group solidarity, and how to beat the economic pants off the competition. In the United States we devote increasing amounts of time and money just trying to keep the various groups away from each other's collective throats. Without this effort, the system would probably break down completely. A fair-minded person might suspect that "diversity" is like a good many other human traits: depending on the particular circumstances, it may have its strong points and its weaker aspects. Rational analysis should proceed on that premise, trying to find the balance point between too little — and too much.

With this in mind, in this issue we try to look at the question of national unity and the nation state. Essayist Peter Brimelow leads off by defining the differences between nations and states, and tries to rehabilitate the word 'polity' as a clarifying alternative. Brimelow has a particular concern about the language dimension of national unity, having lived in Canada for several years and written about their problems with official bilingualism.

Next we get a view from the battlefront by Austrian Hermann Wagenbichler who writes on Yugoslavia and the differing conceptions of a nation that dominate thinking in Eastern versus Western Europe. He discusses Johann Gottfried Herder's concept of a nation, which holds sway in the eastern sections, and which helps explain many of the difficulties in the Balkans.

Our Australian correspondent Denis McCormack then looks at the overrunning of Tibet by the Han Chinese and gives us the dalai lama's views on the conditions necessary for Tibetan cultural survival. They do not include breaking down boundaries between the cultural descendants of Buddha and Confucius.

In a piece from a surprising source, English corporate takeover artist Sir James Goldsmith argues that "it is the common culture, identity and traditions which create a nation's heritage and constitute a vital pillar of its stability." He argues against open immigration, against the deracination of Europe's farmers by GATT-type trade agreements, denigrates the GNP as a measure of economic success and, *mirabile dictu*, states that economic considerations don't automatically trump all others!

Much of this debate is about definitions, and definitions of abstract words. One such word that sees a lot of service these days is 'multiculturalism.' Is the coinage 'multicultural nation' an oxymoron, as the earlier essayists seem to imply? Professor Friedrich Heckmann helps us out with definitions of seven different ways this smooth sounding word is used.

Finally, in view of the dictum that language is the carrier of culture, we close out this feature on

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how a nation differs from a state with a Georgie Anne Geyer column on the meaning for our country of the repeal of the Dade County (Florida) Official English ordinance.

While it's relegated to the book review section, we'd like to call your attention to the note on *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History*, by Professor William McNeill of the University of Chicago. He asserts that the relative homogeneity of the nation-states of northern and western Europe from 1750-1920 was an aberration from the usual pattern of polyethnicity, to which the world is now returning.

Two other observations on our topic: As recently as a year ago, this discussion would have been beyond the bounds of propriety. We had reached the "end of history," according to Francis Fukiyama in a book with that title — everyone was going to get along, and embrace liberal social democracy. But world events have caught up with this premature diagnosis. What it takes to get along within and between nations is very much on our collective mind.

Secondly, immigration policy mistakes can be big mistakes — and often virtually permanent ones. For the United States, that means deciding not whether diversity is good, but how much, what kind, where it moves over into division, and if it is wise to add further to our diversity through immigration.

We hope this issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT will give you food for thought on what it takes to make a functional political unit on the national level, and what policies are needed to maintain civility — or regain it, depending on your assessment of our situation.

John H. Tanton
Editor and Publisher

Letters to the Editor

Editor:

Please accept our sincere thanks and appreciation for allowing us to use the information on illegal aliens that was contained in [the Spring 1993 issue of] *The Social Contract*.

We wish you and your organization every success in continuing to inform our citizens of the many problems connected with illegal immigration into the United States.

Thanks again.

Very truly yours,
Thomas J. Dalton, Chairman
Human Services Committee
1992-1993 Orange County (CA)
Grand Jury
Vincent Cauley, Foreman

* * *

Editor:

Your Spring 1993 edition is excellent. The mix of truly scholarly research and notes from activist Barbara McCarthy in the field of immigration reform is the best that I have seen. I deeply appreciate your efforts...

I have made copies of your section on crime and sent it to police officers in [several cities in California]. Please keep up the good work.

Sincerely,
Stan Hess
Novato, California

* * *

[*And in response to a letter asking for a subscription renewal, we received this response...*]

You have to be joking ... to PAY for your propaganda!
Good luck elsewhere.

[*No name given.*]

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Peter Brimelow is doubly an immigrant — first from England to Canada, and then on to the United States. He is the author of The Patriot Game: Canada and the Canadian Question Revisited *(Hoover, 1987) about the conflict of nations in Canada. Mr. Brimelow currently is a senior editor at* Forbes *magazine, and is at work on a book about American immigration policy. His article, "Time to Rethink Immigration," in the June 22, 1992 issue of* National Review *reopened the immigration topic for that segment of American conservatives. The following article was first given as a speech on October 25, 1992 to the National Review Institute, with whose permission it is printed here.*

Does the Nation-State Exist?

By Peter Brimelow

[*Mr. Brimelow opened the speech with comments on then-current developments in Canada's constitution debate, and proceeded as follows:*]

Let us start with a definition. What is a "nation-state"? It is *the political expression of a nation.* And what is a "nation"? It is an *ethno-cultural community* — an interlacing of ethnicity and culture.

In recent years there has been a tendency to emphasize the cultural part of the equation, particularly in the U.S. But this is to miss a critical point. The word "nation" is derived from the Latin *nescare*, to be born. It intrinsically implies a link by blood. A nation in a real sense is an extended family. The merging process by which all nations are created is not merely cultural, but to a considerable extent biological, through intermarriage.

American political discourse on this point is culturally deprived by two difficulties. One is semantic. American editors are convinced that the term "state" will confuse readers unless reserved exclusively for the component parts of the U.S.—New York, California and so on. To describe sovereign political structures, where the British would use "state," the Germans *Staat*, and the French *l'etat*, American writers are compelled to use the word "nation." Thus in the late 1980s, it was common to see the American media referring to "the nation of Yugoslavia," when Yugoslavia's problem was precisely that it was not a nation at all, but a state that contained several small but very fierce nations.

(In my constructive way, I've been trying to introduce an alternative: the word "polity" — defined by Webster as a "politically-organized unit." But it's quite hopeless. Editors always confuse it with "policy." I've also tried "country," which is sometimes an alternative in British English. But they seem to think that's a type of music.)

The second difficulty hampering American discourse is perceptual. Americans are used to being told that they are a "nation of immigrants." They therefore tend to assume that they cannot share a common ethnic heritage. But even on its own term, this is false — at least, it was false until the great wave of Third World immigration unleashed by the 1965 Immigration Act. At the time of the American Revolution, the white population in the U.S. was 60 percent English, 80 percent British, 98 percent Protestant. As late as 1980, it was estimated that the U.S. population would still have been about half its then-current level if there had been *no immigration at all after 1790*. And in 1980, nearly 90 percent of the American population was European, the great bulk of it closely related, from the British Isles, Germany and Italy.

More importantly, however, the fact is that all nations are nations of immigrants. In no known case have the inhabitants sprouted out of the ground. The melting-pot process that produced the American nation is no different from that which produced all the great nations of Europe. The placenames around my mother's home in the north of England reflect the presence of five different language groups, going back over two thousand years. What distinguishes the American nation is not the way in which it was created, but the extraordinary speed.

Nation-State: Modern Reactions

So a nation is the interlacing of ethnicity and culture. And a nation-state is its political expression. Let me now give two distinguished reactions to this phenomenon, which I think epitomize the two

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opposing poles of modern sentiment.

The first reaction is French-Canadian — from Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada almost continuously from 1968 to 1983, the architect of the modern Canadian state (...polity), and probably the greatest leader Canada has produced this century. Let me expand on that: He had to be great to get away with so many stupid things.

To appreciate Trudeau's position, you have to understand that he was and is a very peculiar man. He is a *Quebecois*, that is, a product of the French-speaking province (and emergent nation-state) of Quebec. But he is also a man of the left — much further left, indeed, than has been generally appreciated. As a leftist, his conscious ideology had no place for nationalism: the workers of the world were supposed to unite, dammit! And there was a further factor. To be on the extreme left in French-speaking Quebec in the 1940s, when the province was totally dominated by the Catholic Church and the authoritarian nationalist *Union Nationale* government of Maurice Duplessis, was a very uncomfortable experience. And it produced in Trudeau a special case of a disease, a neurosis, widespread in the Western world today: an absolutely reflexive horror and fear of nationalist sentiment, which he still seems to view as clerical fascism.

This is how he put it in his early collection of essays, *Federalism and the French Canadians*:

> *The road to progress lies through international integration; nationalism will have to be abandoned as a rustic and clumsy tool...*

He described his vision of a bilingual, bicultural Canada which would simultaneously be the political expression of both English and French as:

> *...a brilliant prototype for [the] molding of tomorrow's civilization...*

And in a speech before the U.S. Congress, implicitly appealing for help after Quebec had rejected his vision and elected a separatist government, he claimed that the break-up of Canada into its component nations would be:

> *...a crime against the history of mankind...*

— an extraordinary claim given that it was an American President, Woodrow Wilson, who in effect invented self-determination and imposed it on the dubious European Great Powers at Versailles in 1919.

Note the quaint but telling streak of *Internationale*-style emotionalism and imagery running through these comments. And, in particular, the antithesis Trudeau posits between "progress" and the "rustic" tool of nationalism. It's reminiscent of the passage in *The Communist Manifesto* where Marx and Engels take a moment off from bashing the beastly bourgeoisie to congratulate them for at least rescuing the proletariat from what they described succinctly as "rural idiocy." And it's highly significant. Because it epitomizes a key assumption: that nationalism is pre-modern—that with the spread of education and enlightenment, it must disappear. I will return to this point later.

"For example, [Trudeau's] imposition of official bilingualism ...showed simply no awareness of the profound role language plays in shaping culture and identity."

Incidentally, the idea that Trudeau was an anti-nationalist is probably news to some of you in the audience. His image, especially in the U.S., was often that of a "Canadian Nationalist" and an anti-American. The essential explanation bears directly on the current U.S. political scene: Canadian leftists realized early that to sell socialism they were going to have to dress it up as something else. As one of them, Mel Watkins, put it: "Radicalism in Canada has to mean nationalism." Equally, of course, the American Left has now adroitly dropped efficiency arguments for government intervention and switched to equity arguments, such as the need to redress gender and race prejudice. The disease has changed, but the prescription remains the same: government intervention, directed by them. And if you look closely at the Canadian state (...polity) designed by Pierre Trudeau, essentially artificial and bearing so many similarities to the European Community's attempt to legislate a "European" identity, you find a nationality-free leftist fantasia. For example, his imposition of official bilingualism, which meant the federal government and as many other institutions as it could browbeat had to operate in both English and

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French, showed simply no awareness of the profound role language plays in shaping culture and identity. It made characteristically left-wing assumptions about the malleability of human beings. It had wholly unexpected radical and regressive public-choice consequences. Of course, it was extremely expensive and impractical, there being very few bilinguals in Canada. But we expect that of left-wing panaceas. And it failed. The two language communities in Canada are continuing to separate themselves, the Anglophones being helped out of Quebec by twenty years of ethnic-cleansing legislation passed by both the separatist and nominally federalist provincial governments.

Now at this point, I'm going to proceed on the journalistic theory that an anecdote is worth a lot of words. There's a very significant passage in the novel *Two Solitudes*, which is one of the most famous artifacts of this artificial "Canadian Nationalism," written by Hugh MacLennan, one of the Grand Old Men of Canadian Nationalism, who (naturally) turns out to have flirted with Communism in the 1930s. MacLennan is a real party-line Canadian Nationalist and I'm sure would be highly annoyed by the use to which I put his work. But that's what happens to you when you write books. The title, by the way, refers to the mutual isolation that prevailed between English and French in Canada, which MacLennan, writing in 1945, felt should be broken down. And I think that in this passage he did achieve true artistic insight, which Plato assures us in one of his Socratic dialogues is unrelated to intelligence. It's a very dramatic and moving passage. [See the side bar.]

It's the fourth year of World War I, and an English-speaking girl is picking up her mail at a French-owned store in deepest rural Quebec. And she sees an envelope marked OHMS (On His Majesty's Service). Instantly she knows what it is: notification that her husband has been killed at the front. The French storekeeper and his crony see that she has gone into shock and they guess what has happened. They rush to help her, bring her water, a chair, anything. But she rebuffs them. She's telling herself not to lose control. She keeps affirming that she's all right. Finally, she makes it out the door. The *Quebecois* shake their heads. "And she didn't cry," they say. "Well, maybe she doesn't know how. You can't tell about the English."

It was a day in early July when Janet Methuen stood in Polycarpe Drouin's store with a letter in her hand from His Majesty the King, via the Canadian Ministry of Defence. She read it through, and when she had finished she lifted her head and looked around the store, seeing nothing. She began to walk forward and bumped into the side of the Percheron model, her arms hanging at her sides, the letter in one hand and the envelope in the other.

Drouin came from behind the counter. His voice was soft and kind, his face wrinkled, his eyes friendly. "You are all right, Madame?"

Janet turned her head rigidly and saw his tap-like nose and the wrinkles about his eyes blur and then water into focus. She saw him look at the letter in her hand and immediately she lifted her chin. She was as pale as unbleached muslin.

"I get you a drink, maybe?" Drouin said.

She heard her own voice, like a scratchy phonograph in another room, "I'm quite all right, thank you," she repeated tonelessly.

Her mind kept repeating a phrase she had read months before in a magazine story: "I mustn't let people see it ... I mustn't let..." The words jabbered in her mind like the speech of an idiot.

Drouin looked sideways at the only other person in the store, a farmer who had come in to buy some tar-paper. Their eyes met and both men nodded. The farmer had also seen the long envelope with O.H.M.S. [On His Majesty's Service] in one corner.

"Get a chair, Jacques," Drouin said in French. "The lady wants to sit down." But before the man could get one to her, Janet went to the door and went out. The silence in her wake was broken as the chair hit the floor. Drouin shook his head and went around the counter. "That's a terrible thing," he said.

"Her husband, maybe?"

"The old captain says her husband is overseas."

The farmer scratched his head. "When I saw that letter this morning," Drouin went on, "I said to my wife, that's a bad thing, a letter like that. You never hear anything good from the government in Ottawa, I said."

The farmer was still scratching his head, "And she didn't cry," he said. "Well, maybe she doesn't know how."

Drouin bent forward over the counter in his usual jack-knife position, his chin on the heel of his hand. After a time he said, "You can't tell about the English. But maybe the old captain will be hurt bad," he added, as though he had just thought of it.

— *The Two Solitudes* by Hugh MacLennan (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972)

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To any WASP, of course, this girl's reaction is perfectly normal. What MacLennan is tapping into here is the fact that cultural attitudes to things like bereavement differ profoundly and persistently, much more so than is often realized. And these differences result in incomprehension and sometimes in serious conflict. Which is why the nation-state, where everyone understands each other, is an efficient way of organizing human beings. In economists' jargon, they have lower transaction costs.

But there's a second point. MacLennan has the storekeeper say to his crony:

> *When I saw that letter this morning, I said to my wife, that's a bad thing, a letter like that. You never hear anything good from the government in Ottawa, I said.*

This is the genuine voice of pre-modern Quebec. And Quebec, really until the 1960s, was pre-modern. Goldwin Smith compared it to a frozen mammoth preserved in the tundra. Louis-Joseph Papineau, who led an unsuccessful rebellion against British rule, provided a classic description of this pre-modern way of life in the 1830s:

> *Our people don't want English capital nor English people here, — they have no ambition beyond their present possessions and never want to go beyond the sound of their own church bells.*

The crucial point about a modern society is that it is held together from top to bottom by information flows. In pre-modern societies, frozen mammoths can slumber peacefully. Ethnic groups can coexist because they rarely have to deal with each other. But in modern societies, there are too many points of contact. When people do start to hear something good from their government, in the form of services, or even to hear from it at all, it starts to matter in what language it speaks to them. And in fact one of the first signs that Quebec nationalism was getting assertive was a demand that Federal government pension checks should be bilingual. Ottawa's envelopes don't say OHMS any more, and not only because English Canadian leftists are writing the Queen out of Canada's history just as Columbus has been written out of America's.

Nation-State: A Modern Invention

So here we reach my first conclusion: ***the nation-state is a product of modernization.*** It's far from being a "rustic tool." After all, most nation-states emerged only in relatively recent times — Italy being a case in point. Most human historical experience has been in multiethnic states (...polities) — but they have also been primitive, and tyrannies.

I think, in fact, that the emergence of the nation-state on the world scene is quite analogous to the simultaneous emergence of the corporation in the development of capitalist economies. Both can be traced to lower transaction costs, efficiencies in the transmission of information and the superior economies of specialization.

"Nothing can touch the explicitly anti-nationalist ideology of Marxism in terms of sheer murderousness."

Indeed, this analogy can be carried further. In a developed economy, it is not necessary for individual firms to be vertically integrated — that is, baked bean companies don't have to grow their own beans and operate their own tin mines. All these functions can be performed by specialists, who contract with each other and jointly create the end product. Similarly, in an environment of free trade and freedom from security threat, even quite small entities are viable sovereign states (...polities). They don't need actually to possess warm-water ports, food and fuel supplies, captive markets and all the other traditional preoccupations of mercantilist empires.

In other words, now that Canada has the Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., it's an open question whether provinces like Alberta and British Columbia, both bigger than New Zealand, really need to stay in Confederation. In Europe, with free trade and the collapse of the Soviet Union, who needs Brussels?

It's interesting to note, however, that the U.S. does not seem to be troubled by the sort of regional or subnational secessionist tendencies that we see in Italy and Canada, although there are local-level secessionist movements within, for example, California and New York City. I think this can be

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attributed to four conditions, each necessary but not sufficient: first, the U.S. works economically, whereas Italian and Canadian regions might quite reasonably think they could do better than the central government; second, the U.S. has a real federalism, which protects the interests of the regions from the demands of the metropolitan center; third and fourth, the U.S. has linguistic and cultural unity — for the moment.

For, if the nation-state is a product of modernization, there's also a corollary: ***modernization puts a premium on linguistic unity.*** Open societies are held together by information flows. Anything that impedes those information flows renders them less efficient.

So why is the nation-state in disrepute? One conventional explanation is that nationalism leads to wars, above all World War I — the disaster from which we are only now recovering. But actually the religious wars of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were just as devastating — and did cause a reaction against religion, to which the nation-state was seen as an antidote. Similarly, Robert Conquest demonstrated thirty years ago, and is now being magnificently vindicated, that nothing can touch the explicitly anti-nationalist ideology of Marxism in terms of sheer murderousness. The lesson of history is simply that human beings like war. They will always find an excuse for it.

The key to the contemporary campaign against the nation-state is sociological: the rise of what Irving Kristol has called "The New Class." These are the professionals who run and benefit from the state (...polity) and its power to tax: the bureaucracy; the educational establishment; the media elite, which interlocks with both; and all their various client constituencies, to whom they channel tax monies. The emergence of this class, financially supported by capitalism but alienated from it, was predicted by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. It is a phenomenon at least as significant as the emergence of the proletariat two centuries earlier.

The Nation-State and The "New Class"

So this is my second conclusion: ***the New Class dislikes the nation-state.*** It dislikes the nation-state for exactly the same reason that it dislikes the free market: both are machines that run of themselves with no need for New Class-directed government intervention. Additionally, all self-respecting elites want to distinguish themselves from the peasants. If the peasants are innocently patriotic, the elite will favor a knowing internationalism. And finally, the self-interest of this New Class *is* internationalism: co-operation with the New Classes of other countries above the heads of their populations.

This was brought home to me when I attended a European Council meeting — the name given for the meeting of political heads of the European Community countries. This was in Strasbourg. The meetings were in private, but nevertheless some 3,000 journalists were there, a great sea of them eating catered European Community lunches off china plates with red and white wine — no styrofoam cups of coffee and sticky Danish pastries — and all discussing which restaurant they would favor with their expense accounts that night. And there are four of these things a year. What a boondoggle! And how easy to rationalize with ringing Europhoria!

Just as the European Community represents the New Class collaborating over the head of the several nations, so the Canadian Confederation is now just New Class collaboration over the head of at least two nations and a number of increasingly distinct sections. In fact, the two structures are (or aim to be) remarkably similar, right down to an inappropriate monetary union balanced by massive transfer payments. And, of course, problems with grass roots revolts.

It's interesting to see one way in which the Canadian New Class is coping with this problem of a revolting electorate. At one point, pressure from the Western provinces has forced Ottawa to concede, at least in principle, an elected Senate. But there is talk that proportions of these Senators will have to come from favored factions — women, "native peoples,", etc. Of course, in the U.S. the Democratic Party already selects its Presidential nomination convention delegates in this way. It's a direct imposition of New Class values upon the electorate — what Indonesia's dictator Sukarno used to call "guided democracy."

And this brings us full circle, to the U.S., where intervening on behalf of an increasing list of such favored factions, now extended to include animals and vegetables, has brought federal, state and local

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government presence to record levels at the very moment when socialism has collapsed in the rest of the world.

The Nation-State and Immigration

It also brings me to my third conclusion: ***immigration is potentially much more of a threat to public order than we realize.***

I self-consciously call attention here to my *National Review* cover story of June 22, 1992, entitled "Rethinking Immigration." A key point in my analysis was that the extensive academic literature that seeks to account for economic growth has generally concluded that increases in labor and capital together account for less than half, and sometimes as little as 10 percent, of increases in national output. The rest is due to ideas — better ways of working. This is obvious when you consider the tremendous post-World War II growth of Japan, which has had no immigration at all. In other words, immigration is a luxury for the developed world, not a necessity — particularly the kind of unskilled immigration which the U.S., by a sort of political accident, began to accept after the immigration reform of 1965.

"The impact of this new immigration is only just beginning to be realized. ...introducing diverse populations strikes at the nation-state's Achilles heel: its need for homogeneity."

Clearly, we are now in an era of international migrations of almost unprecedented proportions — comparable, perhaps, to the *Volkwanderung* of the fifth century, when the territories of the former Roman Empire were invaded and transformed by German tribes. The combination of the Third World's demographic overhang and the falling real cost of travel is profoundly destabilizing.

The impact of this new immigration is only just beginning to be realized. In the U.S., for example, the proportion of whites in the population has fallen from nearly 90 percent in 1960 to 73 percent, arguably less, in thirty years. It's easy to construct scenarios where whites will be a minority well within the lifetime of my American son, aged thirteen months. And this is entirely the result of public policy. When I mentioned this in *The National Review* article, someone wrote in and accused me of trying to maintain "Euro-American racial hegemony." Of course, thirty years ago what he meant by "Euro-American" was covered by another word, "American."

From the point of view of the West's New Classes, immigration is manna from heaven. It gives them endless excuses to intervene in society, and it enables them to distinguish themselves from the xenophobic masses.

But introducing diverse populations strikes at the nation-state's Achilles heel: its need for homogeneity. In fact, on the analysis I have presented here, the very concept of a multicultural and multiracial nation is suspect. In essence, it is a contradiction in terms. Of course, nations do contain contradictions, particularly given time to digest them — and American immigration history, incidentally, has been marked by many such pauses for digestion. But mostly, multicultural and multiracial polities are not nations: they are states, empires. And they are not democratic.

And the question is: Why; why all this immigration? What is the purpose of this change? I pointed out just now that there is no economic necessity for it. You have to make a positive political argument.

Pierre Trudeau, as we have seen, did have a positive political argument. It was crazy, but it was an argument. He actually believed in the abolition of national sentiment.

But — and here I come to the other pole of modern sentiment — it's worth considering what Alexander Solzhenitsyn said on the subject in his Nobel Prize speech. Solzhenitsyn, remember, actually grew up under and went to war to defend an explicitly anti-national ideology. His language is religious, but it could just as easily be moral or scientific.

> *The disappearance of nations would impoverish us no less than if all peoples were made alike, with one character, one face. Nations are the wealth of mankind; they are its generalized personalities: the smallest of them has its own particular colors and embodies a particular facet of God's design.* ■

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Herman Wagenbichler is a 1954 graduate of the Karl Franzens University Medical School in Graz, Austria. He has had a life-long interest in the cultural history and politics of the Balkans. He lived in Celje, Slovenia 1942-45, and has visited Yugoslavia many times. This essay was translated from the German by Gustav Uhlich, M.D., a countryman of Wagenbichler's, now living in the United States.

The Yugoslav Tragedy:

Why Multicultural Societies Are Unlikely to Work

By Hermann Wagenbichler

Some 200 wars have been fought since the war that was supposed to end all wars (WWI). Throughout Europe, the current war in Yugoslavia has provoked more consternation and confusion than any war before it — not only because of its proximity, not only because it was preceded by a prolonged period of relative tranquillity and unprecedented affluence, but especially because of the unpredictable course of events and the archaic brutality displayed by all parties involved. What kind of war are we dealing with? It pitches Serbs against Croats, Orthodox Christians against Catholics and Muslims. Is it a civil war, a religious war, or simply a war of aggression? Or, is it a war of incompatible cultures fighting for survival in a region of limited resources, with no virgin land left for peaceful expansion? Questions abound. In a significant way, the war in Yugoslavia ought to draw our attention to problems facing the rest of Europe and the world at large.

In order to find some constructive answers to the many puzzling questions, we must plunge into the enlightening reservoir of history. We cannot hope to grasp the present or shape the future without intimate knowledge of the past.

What Is a 'Nation'?

The war in Yugoslavia was initially perceived as a civil war. Fanaticism and brutality, well-remembered from the Spanish Civil War of 1936, are typical features of this kind of warfare. By definition, civil war is waged by factions of the *same* nation against each other. In this connection, it is important to appreciate two distinct conceptions of "nation."

In the Western Hemisphere (among the French and Anglo-Saxons), the term "nation" includes all citizens living within clearly defined territorial boundaries, irrespective of their ethnic origin and allegiance. The Central and East European concept of nation was formulated by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), a German poet, critic and philosopher, and a close friend of Johann Goethe. In his scheme, primacy is assigned to the ethnic and historic cohesion of a people with little regard for more or less arbitrary, and ever shifting, territorial boundaries ("nations are images of God"). According to Herder, three criteria define a nation: a common language, a distinct culture, and a shared history.

"Nationalism, according to many left liberals, is to blame for many evils and most wars — but this judgment has grown out of a short memory."

Both interpretations of nationhood can be justified and each offers its own advantages. However, the Western concept of nation leads to great confusion if applied to multinational states, and it proves quite unworkable in areas of ethnic gerrymandering or enclaves — as in Bosnia. The multinational state of Yugoslavia never represented a cohesive nation. Only 8% of the population, according to several census tabulations, professed to be "Yugoslavs." These were mostly Serbs who perceived Yugoslavia as an extension of Greater Serbia. Tito (a Croat) made an effort to play down the importance of ethnicity and religion and tried to substitute communism as a basis for Yugoslav identity. He failed as badly as comrade Eric Honecker, who attempted to design a "Socialist German Nation" in East Germany. The civil war model, therefore, rests on shaky ground, although the

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excess of brutality certainly is reminiscent of the grim civil war pattern.

Nationalism, according to many left liberals, is to blame for many evils and most wars — but this judgment has grown out of a short memory. Nationalism evolved as a side effect of the French Revolution two short centuries ago. Were no wars fought before that? In the 17th century, Central Europe was ravaged by thirty years of religious wars. No one seriously suggested abolishing all religion in order to prevent future wars. Neither did the endless dynastic jousting of the dark Middle Ages lead to eternal peace after the decline and fall of the all-powerful monarchies.

The now-fashionable trend of making a convenient scapegoat out of nationalism may be a bit premature. Perhaps the social biologists are right: with no other significant foe left on this earth, man turns more and more towards preying upon his fellow man.

Tempered nationalism is neither good nor evil. It bonds the individual to the social hierarchy at the national level. Too much of it (chauvinism) is just as bad as too little (libertarianism), or too much family loyalty (the mafia), too much race consciousness (racism), or promiscuous humanitarianism (do-goodism).

Efforts to selectively blot out the natural human attachment to one's nation will prove futile at best and outright counterproductive in the conflict at hand. Eastern European nations are strongly attached to their ethnic identities. Foreign domination by Russians, Turks and Germans has, for centuries, overshadowed their history. Only in the 1800s were they able to develop their own cultural elites.

The Religious Crossroads

The gradual immigration of Slavic tribes into the Balkan region in the 6th and 7th centuries resulted in numerous readjustments of secular boundaries, but the religious spheres of influence remained unchanged. One part of the previously homogeneous Slavic people settled in the Byzantine-Orthodox Empire ruled from Constantinople. Their descendants are the Orthodox Serbs. Another part settled in the Catholic domain ruled from Rome. Their descendants are the Catholic Croats. For a while, both Serbs and Croats enjoyed the power and glory of national autonomy. It soon ended with Hungarian and Venetian domination over the Croats and a fateful defeat of the Serbs at the hands of the Turks in 1389.

THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

In Bosnia, Orthodox and Catholics lived side by side with a heretical sect, the Bogomils. The latter, after suffering much persecution, converted to Islam. Their descendants are the Muslims of Bosnia. The Slovenians of Northern Yugoslavia, from the 7th century on, were dominated by German chiefs, kings and emperors. Characterized by their Slavic brethren as prudent, diligent and thrifty, they were propelled into autonomy after they got the short end of the deal in the royal Yugoslavia of 1918 and the communist Yugoslavia of 1945. As an independent nation within the framework of European economic cooperation, their future appears secure.

Are Serbs and Croats two distinct peoples or are they one people representing two different cultures? The answer from Serb and Croat would be the same: two peoples, two cultures — worlds apart from each other.

Is Multiculturalism Possible?

Why does multiculturalism not work in

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Yugoslavia? The concept has rapidly gained the status of a buzz word in the West. Multiculturalism, whatever the term may imply (it's really an oxymoron), is supposed to resolve problems created by the overlap of diverse and often incompatible value systems. Where in today's world can we find a truly multicultural society? On close scrutiny, the answer is: *nowhere*. The necessary prerequisites for such a society do not exist. To see why, let us examine two examples from the European past.

The Muslim, Christian and Jewish population of Moorish Spain (11th-17th centuries) was ruled by able and wise Arab caliphs. Religious tolerance was assured by the teachings of the Koran. Assimilation or conversion was neither required nor expected. This fortunate status of peaceful coexistence of three monotheistic religions resulted in a golden age. Science and the fine arts flourished with outstanding contributions from each culture. With the Christian *reconquista* (recapture) of Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella, all this came to a sudden end.

Let us take note of the conditions that made possible this example of a truly flourishing multicultural society: (1) undisputed authority in the hands of enlightened rulers, and (2) strict segregation along ideological lines. Neither Christian nor Jewish rule would have permitted this kind of "separate and equal" symbiosis.

"If every minority aspires to its own share of ruling, then, in the end, nobody rules. Disintegration and anarchy are inevitable."

Let us examine another example from the past: Siebenbuergen. The central highland of Rumania was populated by Hungarians, Germans and Rumanians - all exposed to persistent threats of Turkish invasion. The Hungarians were of the Catholic or Calvinist persuasions, the Germans staunch Lutherans, the Rumanians Orthodox Christians. Ethnic and denominational borders were identical, assuring strict separation of each cultural group - a situation that could well be described as "apartheid." There was plenty of opportunity for each ethnic group to fully develop its own cultural potential. Again we find a combination of absolute, benevolent rulers (the Hapsburg emperors) and well-defined lines of separation among the ruled.

Quite clearly, these preconditions for a functioning multicultural society are incompatible with the ideals of a true democracy: one man - one vote, many votes equals a majority, and the majority rules. If every minority aspires to its own share of ruling, then, in the end, nobody rules. Disintegration and anarchy are inevitable. The structural framework has recently been torn from under a multicultural society in Greater Russia, and we are witnessing the resulting disorder.

The Balkans Since 1918

The multicultural experiment in Yugoslavia was doomed from the beginning. An artifact of the Versailles peace effort of 1919, it struggled against overwhelming odds. Its ideological foundations, namely Pan-Slavism and later communism, turned out to be delusions on a grandiose scale. A frail coalition of Serbs and Croats, joined mainly to fend off Italian claims for control of the Dalmatian coast, ended with Serbian domination of the kingdom of Yugoslavia. Then a Croatian delegate was murdered during a session of parliament. Frustration escalated into hatred and hostility.

Many Croats welcomed the advance of German troops during WWII and the subsequent establishment of a separate Croatian satellite state, including Bosnia and several Serbian enclaves. The brutalization of the Serbian minority found its counterpart in a murderous guerilla war of Serbs against Germans and Croats, claiming the lives of 1.5 million "Yugoslavs." The atrocities perpetrated by all combatants along the Balkan front exceeded by far the horrors of any other theater of war. And the killing did not stop with the end of WWII. Some 25,000 anti-communist Croatian and Slovenian refugees were turned over to Tito by British troops in Austria after the war was over. Their remains have recently been exhumed - only three persons survived this wholesale slaughter south of Ljubljana.

The new Yugoslavia of Tito was held together by his iron-fisted rule at home and by his skillful foreign policy, playing East against West. His death in 1980 inevitably led to a resurgence of deeply rooted ethnic and religious animosities.

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Consequences of Mass Migration

Another aspect of the Yugoslav tragedy deserves attention. It is the worldwide problem of refugees and asylum seekers. Well-meaning human rights groups, vocal liberals, and an increasing number of church spokesmen are pleading for the indiscriminate and unconditional admission of political as well as economic refugees. In Germany and in Austria, any effort to bring into the debate rational considerations beyond the immediate plight of the victims instantly provokes charges of "racism," "right radicalism," and "neo-Nazism." The clamor should not distract our attention from the long-range consequences of ill-conceived policies.

The current territorial aggression of the Serbs was set in motion by widely spread Serbian enclaves beyond the borders of Serbia and Montenegro. A devastating defeat and subsequent occupation of Serbia by the Turks in 1389 led to a persistent flow of refugees into Croatia and Hungary. Whole villages took up their church banners and, led by their priests, escaped into the neighboring domain of the Hapsburg Empire. They were granted asylum and were resettled along the fortified southeastern defense perimeter of the empire. They were given special privileges in exchange for their willingness to defend their new homeland against the common enemy, the Turkish menace. Gradually the one-time refugees began to outnumber the natives in some areas of Croatia and Bosnia. With the breakup of Yugoslavia came the urge to reunite with Serbia proper. The victims of Turkish aggression had evolved into the Serbian aggressors of today.

What does the future hold for the victims of Serbian aggression? That is a question to ponder!

"Efforts to transform Europe into one multinational congolomerate should be viewed with skepticism."

The exodus of many Serbs from the Ottoman Empire triggered another shift of ethnic borders in the Balkan jigsaw puzzle. The Albanians, original inhabitants of a coastal strip south of Croatia, expanded into the deserted Serbian province of Kosovo, where they now make up 90 percent of the



population. Tito, as a Croat, had granted them considerable autonomy within the communist framework of Yugoslavia. His Serbian successor, Milosevic, revoked autonomy and imposed draconian police measures in an effort to suppress open revolt by the Albanian majority. Another time bomb is ticking away next to Bosnia. The coming explosion can be expected to exceed the terrors of current events in Bosnia.

Conclusion

How will it all end? Are the Serbs going to get away with their reckless pursuit of a Greater Serbia? Is the mass rape of Muslim women and the brutal "ethnic cleansing" to remain just another episode in the bloody annals of war? The rape of some 250,000 German women by the Russian *soldateska* at the end of WWII, encouraged by the notorious appeals of Ilja Ehrenburg, went unpunished. In the most sweeping ethnic cleansing operation of recent times, 14.5 million Germans were driven from their homes in East Prussia, Pomerania, East Brandenburg, Silesia, the Sudetenland, and Eastern Europe in 1945. More than two million innocent civilians perished in the process. Fifty years later, we at least profess outrage over such atrocious behavior. Stopping it is another matter.

The ultimate outcome of the murderous conflict

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in former Yugoslavia is hard to predict. A few sobering conclusions, however, can be drawn from the relentless course of events:

- The era of multinational states seems to have run its course, in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. In any such arrangement, small ethnic groups are politically handicapped and large ones find ruling by democratic principles a strain beyond their capacity. Efforts to transform Europe into one multinational conglomerate should be viewed with skepticism.

- The future feasibility, if any, of multicultural societies, will depend on the degree to which forces of amalgamation and cohesion outweigh those of diversity and chauvinism. The political rhetoric of the day in the United States seems to encourage the latter, and bodes ill for its future.

- The uninhibited migration over the next few decades of millions of potential political and economic refugees poses a serious threat to all existing cultures and to civilization at large.

- Democracy, the preferred model of political organization, seems to work best on a limited scale, and in countries with a reasonably homogeneous population. DeGaulle's idea of a confederation of autonomous national states — a Europe of cooperating fatherlands — appears preferable to the feverish pursuit of a utopian, multicultural Mega-Europe, taking its place in a larger New World Order.

With these thoughts in mind, it seems prudent to keep our attention focused on the prevention of Yugoslav-type tragedies in the rest of the world, rather than rushing into an ill-conceived salvage operation in the Balkans. ■

The Founders on Immigration Policy

ARTICLE IV, SECTION 4
The U.S. Constitution

The United States shall guarantee a republican form of government to every State in the Union and **they shall protect each State against invasion** and on application of the legislature, or the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.

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Denis McCormack of North Fitzroy, Victoria, is the Australia correspondent for **THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.** *Long interested in the situation in Tibet, Mr. McCormack speaks Chinese and taught in rural China.*

Om Mane Padme Hum

Tibet and the Final Solution

by Denis McCormack

Through the years, generations of scholarly orientalists have variously translated and interpreted the well-known mantra, *om mane padme hum.* Commonly associated with Tibet, in short it means: "the jewel in the lotus." *In extenso*, it means: "upon physical release from this world, may your spirit join the cosmos in like manner to an individual dew drop rolling from the cradle of a lotus leaf into the universality of the pond." World events would suggest that most peoples, including the Tibetans, prefer the company of their own kind prior to the post-mortem pond.

Over forty years of worldwide handwringing by all manner of governments, organizations and high-profile individuals has sought Tibet's salvation in the face of the Han Chinese juggernaut. As I write, news bulletins carry reports of the latest unrest in Lhasha. Mass immigration has now created a Tibet of over seven million Chinese and six million Tibetans. Roughly the same demographic ratio applies in Xin Jiang province (the name of which, ironically, means "new border" in Chinese) against the local Turkic Central Asian people to the northwest of Tibet. There, the mass movements of Chinese into the region have taken place for many of the same reasons, and at about the same time.

In 1989, the dalai lama of Tibet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In his acceptance speech, he said:

> *The issue of most urgent concern at this time is the massive influx of Chinese settlers into Tibet... this development, which threatens the very survival of the Tibetan nation, its culture and spiritual heritage, can still be stopped and reversed. But this must be done now before it is too late.*

These sentiments were echoed by actor Richard Gere who politicized his portion of the recent Academy Award presentations with his thoughts on Tibet. He subsequently expanded on them in this way:

> *Now Beijing is facilitating a huge Chinese population influx into the area. Tibetans call it the "final solution". ... If there is no stop to the population transfer of Chinese, the destruction of Tibet and its ancient civilization will be complete.*

Gere went on to castigate U.S. administrations of the last forty years for their complicity in Tibet's demise. He has testified on Tibet before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is a pity he cannot also recognize the same immigration dynamic in the context of the United States, where the firmament is clearly lacking star performers who are willing to speak out on behalf of *its* culture.

"It's a pity [Gere] cannot also recognize the same immigration dynamic in the context of the United States..."

On May 13th of this year, the dalai lama was in London seeking diplomatic support from British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd for a "one country-two systems" Hong Kong-style of government, as he now concedes that full independence is no longer a realistic prospect. He sees the "two systems" approach as an avenue toward respect for Tibet's cultural, geographic, linguistic and racial uniqueness. The Foreign Secretary has agreed to take an assertive line with Beijing over such issues as human rights and the mass movement of Chinese into Tibet. But, few observers will be holding their breath in the hope of any change in Chinese policy. Many believe that irreversible demographic and cultural damage

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has already been done.

Australia's educated and political elite have long supported the dalai lama's cause. It is curious, therefore, that this same respectably veneered class is the mainstay of the push for Australia to be "integrated" with Asia. Mass immigration and its Trojan horse, "multiculturalism," are the openly preferred policy tools toward this outcome. It is beyond dispute that the "Asianization" of their country is highly unpopular with the vast majority of Australians.

Given that the irreversible cultural shifts being brought about by sustained mass immigration are no more sanctioned by the majority of Australians, Canadians, or Americans than they are by the Tibetans, what does this tell us about the legitimacy of the two-party, representational, democratic political systems we all rely on? If who we are, and what we look like, along with our language and cultural biases can be so vulnerable to radical change, are these not the most serious and urgent grounds for reshaping the machinery of government? It matters little whether mass immigration policy is forced at the point of a bayonet from without, or through gradualist, undemocratic, long-term bipartisanship from within — both paths lead eventually to the "pond."

"It matters little whether mass immigration policy is forced at the point of a bayonet from without, or ... from within..."

A particularly blatant Australian example of suppressive bipartisanship came to light recently. Ex-Prime Minister Hawke has been a life-long, self-confessed "high-immigration" man. During the sixties and seventies he rose to power through his presidency of the Australia Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the peak representative body of organized labor. By the late eighties, his personal and political esteem had sunk so low in the eyes of the public that he was deservedly jettisoned from the premiership of his own party.

Hawke spoke at a recent government-funded immigration/ multicultural talkfest titled *The Politics of Immigration*. He told the conference that he could not deny the contention that the major parties had reached an implicit pact to keep immigration off the political agenda. He said that, for most of the post-war period, the parties had maintained bipartisan support for immigration in the face of public opposition. He also stated that "There are no other issues on which the major political parties have been prepared to act in this way, with the common cement of ACTU support, to advance the national interest ahead of where they believed the electorate to be."

Throughout history, mass immigration has been the ultimate weapon of political, ethnic, racial and culture destruction. It remains so today. We cannot undo history, but we can learn from it. What motivates modern "democratic" governments to feign ignorance of these lessons, so clearly documented from ancient times down to the present day?

In 1970, another Nobel laureate, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, said in his acceptance speech:

> *The disappearance of nations would impoverish us no less than if all peoples were made alike, with one character, one face. Nations are the wealth of mankind, they are its generalized personalities: the smallest of them has its own particular colors and embodies a particular facet of God's design.*

Amazingly, neither Solzhenitsyn nor the dalai lama has ever been called a "racist pig" by the one-world/international brotherhood brigade. Who would have guessed the dalai lama to be an immigration reformer? Unfettered by a big business growth lobby, a well-funded minority multicultural lobby, or a gaggle of ecumenical do-gooders, he tells it like it is and lays claim to large acreage on the world's highest moral ground. However, in his case, being morally right does not ensure the ascendancy of his ideas against the overwhelming arithmetic of immigration. Regardless of his capacity to solve it, at least the dalai lama knows what Tibet's major problem is: it isn't the economy, stupid — it's immigration! ■

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Sir James Goldsmith is a British financier of note. This essay is reprinted from the Australian magazine Newsweekly *of April 10, 1993.*

Europe Should Keep Its Farmers

By Sir James Goldsmith

Economic growth is the way to measure success, and science and technology are its principal tools. That is the basis of modern thought, but I question it.

The leading modern society, America, has produced the greatest surge in economic growth and material prosperity in history. In the past 50 years, its gross national product (GNP) has grown in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars from $1.5 trillion to $5.9 trillion dollars. American science and technology have achieved incredible innovations. And yet, American society is deeply ill.

Britain and other Western societies have succeeded beyond their dreams in the past 50 years, but they are in deep trouble. Perhaps success cannot just be measured in economic terms. Perhaps national recovery is not just a product of economic growth.

Sir James Goldsmith

As America is the remaining superpower and most of the world, more particularly Britain, seems to be turning to her as an example, I will do likewise. Many Americans tend to believe that science can unravel all problems and that the whole world is some sort of puzzle that modern technology can analyze and measure. Measurement rather than wisdom has become the preferred tool and this can lead to some serious mistakes.

For example, GNP is the official index of a nation's prosperity. If a natural calamity strikes, the immediate impact is growth in GNP, as industry gears up to repair the damage. If crime explodes, GNP grows as police forces are expanded and more prisons are constructed. So GNP is not a measure of success or contentment; just a measure of activity, good or bad.

American cities that are racked with crime, drug taking, alcoholism, suicide and family breakdown are, according to official figures, considered "richer" than many poorer cities elsewhere in the world which are still rich in stability and contentment.

The Measure of Cultural Identity

My second example of measuring rather than understanding is the belief that a geographic space, once populated, becomes a nation; the belief that you can bring together all sorts of people from all sorts of cultural and ethnic backgrounds and create a nation. In reality a nation is something very different. It is the common culture, identity and traditions which create a nation's heritage and constitute a vital pillar of its stability. And the community of spirit takes a long time to develop.

Not to understand the difference between a populated space, a state and a nation leads to policies which create social breakdown, misery and ethnic conflict. That will be the case whatever the growth in GNP.

My third example concerns geographical mobility. People, it is believed, should move to jobs rather than the reverse. But this shows deep ignorance of how human societies work.

In a stable society, each member of a family has a role in the upbringing of the children, as have their friends. But if, to find work, the mother, father and children are forced to move, then the influences that help to educate the children are transformed and the function of relatives is diminished. Often this function is transferred to schools which, themselves, are in deep moral crisis.

The elders who have been left behind regroup in

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special retirement cities, and the children become more anonymous within impersonal communities. Society begins to disaggregate. In particularly severe cases, when the families break down, the children seek alternative families and find surrogate relatives in urban gangs.

People who speak of reducing urban crime just by increasing the size of the police force confuse causes and symptoms. The police, no matter how good, can only control the symptoms. We create the disease by failing to understand the longer term results of our own actions.

Some Practical Solutions

The whole of our culture has been deformed by the modern method of thought. Let me try to propose some practical solutions.

First, when assessing new ideas, new plans and political programs, go further than just attempting to analyze their effects on economic growth. You should also try to understand their longer term effects on the stability of society. Of course, we need economic prosperity, but economic growth is valuable only if it contributes to the stability of a community.

Second, protect the nation and do not let anyone transform it into a populated space in the face of ever-increasing pressures to open the gates. Article 123 of the Maastricht Treaty states: "It shall aim ... to increase their geographical ... mobility within the Community." This is not just allowing mobility, but actively encouraging and subsidizing it. It is not the way to create Europe, but to destroy it.

Outside Europe, population is exploding and vast numbers of people are being uprooted. Tragically, we are responsible. Ill-conceived international treaties like GATT will have devastating consequences on the stability of society. The dual effects of exploding population and its systematic uprooting will lead to mass movements of peoples which will engulf those nations too weak to protect themselves.

People who confuse Europe with the United States of America forget that that great state was formed by immigration. They were starting from scratch; we [in Europe] are the opposite. Our populations have deep national roots, which is a wonderful strength as long as we do not attempt to shuffle people like a pack of cards.

Europe must build on the strength, cultures and traditions of each nation and each must retain the overwhelming majority of its existing power to govern itself. The powers that are transferred to the center must be principally those necessary to coordinate defense, diplomacy, environmental protection and trade. That was what "subsidiarity" was supposed to be all about: transferring to the center only those responsibilities which could not be assumed at national level.

Alas, "subsidiarity" has become, to some degree, a disguise behind which lurks the centralizing lust of the European bureaucrat. To centralize would be disaster. Vast groupings of international peoples governed by great central administrations are not stable, as we have seen in the Soviet Union and to some degree in the United States. Brussels should not be either the Kremlin or Washington.

Perhaps the major centralizing dynamic of the Maastricht Treaty is the proposal for a single currency. Its damage goes far beyond the economy. To understand the effects of a single currency imposed uniformly on both rich and poor regions, look at Italy and Germany.

"Instead of generating employment, the subsidies generated corruption. They also failed to stem migration..."

The economy of northern Italy is highly competitive where that of the south is not. The unemployed southerners move north to seek work and to stem this migration, Italians subsidized investment in the south to create jobs there. To do this, they formed special institutions such as the *Cassa del Messogiorno* and its successors, through which were channelled massive transfers of funds to the south. The policy failed. Much of the investment went into useless bureaucratic mega-projects and much was stolen or diverted for political purposes.

Instead of generating employment, the subsidies generated corruption. They also failed to stem migration, which continued to deracinate southern communities and to overpopulate and destabilize those in the north.

This fiasco caused a great resentment in northern Italy, resulting in the formation of the

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Lombardy League, a political party whose platform is to separate the north from the remainder of Italy. It has become the leading party in its region, with similar leagues emerging in Tuscany and Venice.

The subsidies and migration have taken place within the same nation. Nonetheless, they have aroused strong separatist passions. Imagine how much more resentment would be generated if they took place in entirely different nations such as between Greece and the Netherlands or between Spain and Germany.

It must be obvious that the imposition of a single currency would unleash centrifugal forces that would tear Europe apart. But, alas, our centralizing bureaucrats are unable or unwilling to understand.

Migration from Farm to Slum

My fourth and last point concerns the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which looks as though it is just promoting world trade and economic growth, but which inevitably will cause immense harm. The GATT negotiations, as they affect agriculture, propose that nations would be prohibited from limiting the volume of imported agricultural products. The idea is that the inefficient agriculture of some countries would be forced either to modernize or to be replaced by the products of other nations which already have implemented modern and "efficient" methods.

It sounds all very logical, but we need to define and understand what is meant by "efficient." It is generally accepted that large, mechanized farms using modern scientific methods produce more food, more cheaply, for the benefit of the economy and of people throughout the world. But this conclusion is based on one-dimensional thinking.

When people leave the land, they gravitate to the cities. If there are insufficient jobs, there will be increased unemployment. And if there is insufficient infrastructure — such as schools, houses and hospitals — then there will be a need for substantial new capital expenditure. These costs must be taken into account when calculating the financial benefits of so-called intensive agriculture.

But there is a deeper price. When people are forced to move from the countryside to the towns, both the countryside and the towns are destabilized. The famous *favelas* of Brazil, the slums of such mega-towns as Rio de Janeiro, did not exist before the Green Revolution which was supposed to eradicate hunger throughout the world by applying science to agriculture and thereby increasing output.

Change often produces unexpected results. Large mechanized, scientific farms did produce more food per person directly employed, but those no longer employed were chased into towns, creating vast urban concentrations with their attendant slums. As they were uprooted not only from their homes but also from their cultures and families, the refugees and their children were reduced to dependence on welfare and crime.

Now the mega-towns and their slums are blamed for the economic and social collapse of whole nations. We have forgotten that we created them.

The GATT proposals would do even greater damage. By preventing nations from protecting their farmers, rural communities throughout the world would be washed away as if by flood. Whole populations would be uprooted and swept into urban slums. In the world as a whole, the rural population consists of about 3.1 billion people. Let us suppose that as a percentage of total population, it were to be reduced to the levels that already exist in the "new" farming countries such as Australia and Canada.

The result would be migration from the land to the towns of about 2.1 billion people, figures which worsen as the world's population grows. As the affected nations become ungovernable and impoverished, so their people will be forced to seek refuge elsewhere. Mass migration will follow, and do not think that any nation would remain unaffected by vast movements of uprooted and tragic peoples. In our one-dimensional search for growth in GNP, we systematically undermine societies, create unemployment and then spend our time dealing with the symptoms. Money, although necessary to alleviate pain, solves no fundamental problems. It deals with symptoms not causes.

As Professor Walter Williams of George Mason University has pointed out, the money spent in the U.S. on poverty programs since the 1960s could have bought the entire assets of the 500 largest companies in America "plus virtually all the U.S. farm land. And what did it do? The problems still remain and they are even worse." ■

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Friedrich Heckmann is Professor of Sociology at the Economic and Political Polytechnic in Hamburg, Germany. He held a Fulbright Scholarship in sociology at the University of Kansas, 1965-67, and is also a co-founder of the European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS).

Multiculturalism Defined Seven Ways

By Friedrich Heckmann

With large-scale immigration into Western and Northern Europe, "multiculturalism" has become a major topic of political and intellectual discourse. The terms "multiculturalism" and "multicultural society" are being put forth strongly as concepts that could help clarify the confusing picture of European immigration, both in a descriptive-analytical and in a politico-normative sense. Many are recommending the concept of a "multicultural society" as a new model for societies whose populations have become increasingly multi-ethnic through immigration.

In this brief note, I will try to show that the terms "multiculturalism" and "multicultural society" in their present usage not only cannot help clarify the discourse, but may very well contribute to its further confusion. As I analyze the discussion, there are at least seven different uses of the terms in Europe:

(1) First, "multiculturalism" or "multicultural society" are used as indicators of social change, referring to the *changing ethnic composition of the population*; an allegedly rather homogeneous population has become more heterogeneous. In this sense, "multicultural society" is a descriptive category.

(2) Secondly, the terms are used in what might be called a *normative-cognitive way*. This use could be circumscribed as follows: we should recognize the fact that we have become a country of immigration, that we need immigration, at present and in the future, and should accept the social and cultural consequences.

(3) A third use describes both an *attitude* and a *norm*: multiculturalism as tolerance toward others; as friendly and supportive behavior toward immigrants; as a liberal and democratic attitude which is based (among other things) on learning from the errors and fatal consequences of nationalism, chauvinism, and ethnic intolerance.

(4) Fourthly, multiculturalism is an interpretation of the *concept of culture*: there are no "pure," original cultures. Each culture has incorporated elements of other cultures; cultures are the result of interaction with one another; culture is continuous process and change. In this sense, the cultures of immigrants are seen as opportunities for the enrichment of one's own culture.

(5) Fifth, on a more superficial level, multiculturalism is an *attitude* that looks upon some aspects of the immigrants' culture (folklore, food, for example) and sees these as possible enrichment of "our" culture. Very often, in a socio-romantic view, the immigrants are viewed as people with qualities that "we have lost" (emotions, stable social relations, spontaneity, etc.); we could learn from them.

"The unifying and homogenizing effects of the nation-state are looked upon as an achievement that should not be easily given up."

(6) Multiculturalism as a *political-constitutional principle* is a sixth meaning in the discussion, referring to ethnic identities as a major basis for political and state organization, for the distribution of rights and resources; it means the reenforcing of ethnic pluralism, ethnic autonomy, and speaks out against acculturation or assimilation, against one "state language."

(7) A seventh, different meaning: as a *critical category*, multiculturalism is regarded as a well-intended, but illusory concept which overlooks the necessity for a common culture, language, and identification to enable societal and state integration and stability. The unifying and homogenizing effects of the nation-state are looked upon as an achievement that should not be easily given up.

A concept with such a multitude of meanings hinders a rational discourse instead of helping to

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clarify it; "multiculturalism" and "multicultural society" are concepts which blur the core questions:

- Under what conditions and in which numbers does immigration enrich or erode the material, social, and cultural conditions of a country?
- How can the further material decline of the former communist countries and of Third World countries (and thus the push-pressures of immigration) be halted?
- How important is cultural and ethnic integration for an immigrant-receiving country? How important are acculturation and assimilation?
- What are the conditions for the stability of multi-ethnic states (with territory-based ethnic minorities)?
- How can the cultural needs of ethnic minorities be met?
- What should be the legal status of immigrants? Should they have political rights without citizenship?
- How can "asylum" as an international institution be saved from misuse?
- What can be done to help war refugees?

When giving a list of questions, I do not pretend to have ready answers to all of them, but these questions should be at the center of political and intellectual discourse. For purposes of clarity, it is advisable to discuss these questions separately instead of mixing them in a discussion of "multiculturalism" as is being done in Europe at the present time. ■

June *Chronicles* Focuses on Immigration

Readers of *The Social Contract* will find the June 1993 issue of *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture* to be of special interest. Under the theme of "Bosnia, U.S.A.," it includes a collection of articles and reviews exploring various immigration-related topics, most of them written by authors who, coincidentally, have also appeared in *TSC*. Among the articles are: "A Story of Days to Come," a sobering review of Census Bureau population projections, by Samuel Francis; "Middle American Helots," by Thomas Fleming;"The P's and Q's of Immigration," by Garrett Hardin; "The National Question," by Peter Brimelow; "Cultural Diversity and Unity," by Claes Ryn; "Therapeutic Democracy," by Paul Gottfried;"Crossroads America," a review of nine new books on immigration, by Wayne Lutton; and "Going Down Slow," a review of Virginia Abernethy's new book, *Population Politics* by John Tanton.

Single copies of the June 1993 issue of *Chronicles* are available for $5.50; an annual subsciption costs $24. Write to: Chronicles, The Rockford Institute, 934 North Main Street, Rockford, IL 61103.

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Georgie Anne Geyer's columns appear regularly in well over 100 papers. Here she gives her views on the rescission of the Dade County (Florida) English language ordinance.
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America Into Splinters?

By Georgie Anne Geyer

When in years to come Americans look back on the night of May 18 in Miami, those residual beings of the North American Continent will see that at that moment the United States first became a "colony" of the world.

On that night a mere 13 people — the Metropolitan Dade County Commission — voted to repeal a 13-year-old ordinance declaring English the official language of local government. And the United States began a journey: that of becoming no longer an independent and sovereign country.

While we talk soberly in Washington about the crushing need to simplify government and cut the deficit that is choking the nation, Dade County will spend millions of dollars to translate county documents, court records and other complex papers into Spanish, Creole and French and God only knows what other languages that will be demanded.

Nor was the vote of the newly elected, racially and ethnically mixed panel made with any real pretense of humility in the face of the terrible problems the country faces. "This is not a question of language but a question of respect," Miami Beach Mayor Seymour Gelber was quoted as saying. And many on the commission, including Hispanics, laughed when "Anglos" at the meeting complained that their very way of life was being destroyed.

Well, I don't personally know the Miami Beach mayor, but I know what he really meant about the vote being a "question of respect." It is akin to what the old First Ward aldermen in Chicago meant when they cunningly redistricted wards and somehow managed to get dead men up on their feet to vote. Those "dose an' dem" guys were at least honest — they didn't pretend they wanted to get the keys to City Hall to write poetry.

What will now happen is clear in Dade County, where citizens and noncitizens of Cuban and, more recently, Nicaraguan origin now predominate. County jobs will go to Hispanics. Spurious Hispanic groups, often with no membership but driven by guilty foundation money and publicity, will demand more and more. Payers of high taxes, whom they call "Anglos," have been moving out, leaving the county to become even more hopelessly Third-Worldized. Now the syndrome will worsen.

What this will mean in our larger society (dare we still use the word "nation"?) is even more depressing. This vote is the bellwether of larger agendas being pushed by ethnic and special-interest activists with ever greater vigor under the sympathetic Clinton administration. It is an agenda of linguistic division of the country, of bilingual education and ballots, of noncitizen voting, of illegal aliens being counted for redistricting and being included in the national health plan and, eventually, the death of citizenship in America as we know it.

"It is clear that ... we are allowing to be set up not only a parallel Spanish-speaking 'America' but a tragically splintered America that will continue to fall further and further behind..."

Two examples only of the scope of the linguistic problem alone: in New York City, students are being taught in 81 languages, including Kpelle, Nyanja, Twi, Gurma, Ewe and Cham; and in Los Angeles County, only 54.6 percent of those 5 years and older speak English at home.

It is clear that — because of the unquenchable ambition of the activists who gain through division — we are allowing to be set up not only a parallel Spanish-speaking "America" but a tragically splintered America that will continue to fall further

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and further behind the unified, disciplined countries of the world until it becomes just a piece of land that people with no commitment to it scavenge over.

Former Sen. Eugene McCarthy, author of the compelling book *A Colony of the World: The United States Today*, presciently sees America, through its own indifference, as culturally colonized. "Culture colonialism is being imposed through demands by newly empowered immigrant groups for acceptance of their native languages and cultures as coequals with the language and culture of those who built the society," he has written. And this is "the very hallmark of colonialism."

Two last observations:

If you happen to think that these ambitious activists are somehow well-meaning, think of their constant negative use of the word, "Anglo." As a matter of fact, most English-speaking Americans and even most white Americans are not "Anglo-Saxon." This is as deliberately derogatory a use of a word as is "nigger," "kike" or "honky."

Finally, let us look where the impetus for "Spanish first" is coming from. Almost all of the foreign-born in this country have come from impoverished, failed and/or violence-torn countries. Most often they were desperate to come here, as are untold tens of millions around the world.

But now they repay the adopted country that helped them and even saved them by refusing even to learn its historical language, which held the nation together. I seldom use the word "shame," but there are times when it alone has the right ring. ■



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THE NATIONAL HISPANIC ALLIANCE
230 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 300
Chicago, IL 60601
June 22, 1993

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Clinton:

We, the undersigned members of the National Hispanic Alliance, write to you to urge you to undertake a positive and strong action in regards to the immigration issue.

I am attaching a preface that outlines the problems and some of the possible solutions to the increasing illegals entering the country.

There is evidence that citizens across America are becoming unrestful and feel the time has come to make immediate changes on the issue.

The Alliance is advocating an immediate moratorium. It is the way our country will be able to put its economic base into proper perspective. The Immigration and Naturalization Service must be reformed and overhauled if we are to deal with the immigration crisis.

One of us will contact you in the very near future to ascertain willingness to work with us and to implement a change in the immigration laws and policies.

We thank you for your consideration and hope we will hear from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Jack C. Terrazas The National Hispanic Alliance	Joe Pullen Black Political Agenda
Luis Martinez National Mexican American Association	Manuel Puerto Latino Peace Officer Association
Jorge Velasco Mexican American Unity Federation	Daniel Ortega Hispanic Minority Business Council
Carlos Marion Hispanic USA Corporation	William Lucy Coalition of Black Unionists

Sam Park
American Korean Political Action Group

Polls repeatedly have shown that Hispanics, contrary to what some of the Hispanic acitivist organizations would have us believe, are similar to other Americans in their strong desire to bring immigration under tight controls and limits. Here's some fresh evidence:

Hispanics For A Moratorium

By Roy Beck

In letters to President Clinton and all members of Congress, the National Hispanic Alliance is urging a three-to-five-year moratorium on all immigration.

Jack C. Terrazas, president of the Chicago-based Alliance, said the organization is trying to pull together grassroots Hispanic groups to give added voice to what several opinion polls have shown to be the majority Hispanic view on immigration issues. The alliance endorsed a moratorium more than a year ago. It came to its position *before* a Roper Poll first revealed that a majority of all Americans favor a temporary halt in newcomers and *before* the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) began a national campaign for a moratorium.

Terrazas is publisher of Hispanic USA, an eight-year-old monthly magazine with a nationwide circulation of 119,000 among Hispanic professionals and business owners. His company also publishes several other trade magazines from its office in downtown Chicago.

"Our businesses are concerned that too many people are coming and there aren't enough jobs: then the people turn to crime," Terrazas said in an interview. The Alliance also recently mass-mailed letters to solicit support for its moratorium effort from the estimated 4,000 Hispanic associations and 400,000 Hispanic businesses nationwide.

"The immigration issue is one of the most important national issues affecting every Hispanic and every other nationality, in terms of housing, education and family values," the Alliance stated in the letter. "There are just too many people in the United States ... It just doesn't make sense to keep allowing aliens to come here and create poverty."

"We need your help to help force Congress to

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bring about a close-to-zero immigration policy. Write your Congressman now to get approval on a House Bill that will curtail all immigration for a period of three to five years and give America an opportunity to get back on its feet both economically and in family, social norms." Worker displacement by immigrants is devastating to native blacks, Hispanics and the "white under-class" in the urban areas of the country, the Alliance stated.

"Hispanics as a whole believe there are too many immigrants and most (contrary to popular belief) believe there should be a moratorium."

In a six-page background paper mailed to all members of Congress, major ethnic associations and major newspapers, the Alliance acknowledged that "certain Hispanic groups" have been among the special-interest lobbies keeping Congress from acting on a phenomenon that is damaging Americans' jobs, education and lifestyle. But those pro-immigration Hispanic groups actually represent the opinion of only a small minority of American Hispanics, the paper indicated. Terrazas said some individuals at the top of Washington-based Hispanic groups "get to thinking of themselves instead of the grassroots" and oppose majority Hispanic opinion, instead seeking to build their own power by higher immigration.

"Hispanics as a whole believe there are too many immigrants and most (contrary to popular belief) believe there should be a moratorium," the National Hispanic Alliance paper stated.

"The congressional agenda should heed the requests of the growing response of the large Hispanic population ... The administration needs to focus on fixing the deportation problem, refugees and asylum issue, and keeping illegal aliens from penetrating the U.S. and its work force ... A study by the respected National Bureau of Economics Research indicates what our Alliance has been saying for a long time — that as much as one-third of the decline in the relative earnings of native-born high school drop outs can be attributed to competition from low-skilled immigration."

Terrazas said people should not be surprised at Hispanic-American citizens' immigration views. Most Hispanics are fully assimilated into society and "have a strong sense of American pride and love for the United States." To avoid ethnic exclusivism, Terrazas said, the National Hispanic Alliance has included leaders of African-American and Korean-American groups, as well. ■

[*Copies of the more extensive background paper can be obtained from the National Hispanic Alliance, 230 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 300, Chicago, IL 60601.*]

A Prediction of Things to Come

"Only a few decades remain to complete the era America will have known as a nation. ... The United States is now about to join other nations of the world which were once prepossessing and are now little more than bounded terrain. Like them, the United States will continue to be inhabited by human life; however, Americans will no longer possess that spirit which transforms a people into a citizenry and turns territory into a nation."

— Andrew Hacker
The End of the American Era
(New York: Atheneum, 1968)

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Lindsey Grant is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment and Population. This essay first appeared in NPG Forum, *a publication of Negative Population Growth, Inc. Reprinted with permission.*

Missing Airline Passengers

By Lindsey Grant

Last year, two very wise commentators discussed the idea that anomalies — the things that don't fit comfortably into our view of the nature of reality — may point the way to the next stage of understanding.[1] They took their examples from astronomy, geology and biology. One might well start with the more mundane example of the aircraft manifests.

To begin with the facts...

All commercial and private aircraft entering or leaving the country are required to submit summaries of their passenger manifests (Form I-92), along with the individual arrival/departure forms (I-94) that are required of arriving and departing aliens. These are collected by the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS), and the summaries are processed by a contractor for the Department of Transportation (DOT). The data are not published, but they are available.[2] The traffic now exceeds 30 million annually in each direction. The totals since 1978 are shown in Figure 1 and the net excess of arrivals over departures is highlighted in Figure 2.

Cutting through the confusion about immigrant vs. non-immigrant vs. American, the second graph shows that about one to two million more people fly into the U.S. each year than fly out — and the number has been rising. Remember, this is just commercial and private air traffic; it says nothing about land arrivals and clandestine movements by land or air or sea. The popular image of illegal immigration is of Mexicans or Central Americans running across our land border, or of Cubans and Haitians in tiny boats. Even Census Bureau efforts to estimate the total numbers of "undocumented aliens" (as they delicately call them) has focused on Mexican migration by land. Here is another ball game, and a less dramatic one, that has been largely ignored.

We can run the series back for thirty years (Figure 3).[3] The gap between arrivals and departures has widened from less than four million in the '60s to nearly 16 million in the '80s.

How the Evidence is Gathered

The totals should be pretty solid for arrivals. Incoming alien passengers are required to fill out Form I-94, and the carriers must complete Form I-92 summary reports. INS itself collects the I-94 forms.

The data are broken down by region and country, and by "Aliens" vs. (U.S.) "Citizens" (resident aliens are included in "citizens"). These breakdowns are of dubious validity, for reasons that will become clear.

Since INS is little interested in departures, it simply asks the carriers to collect the forms in their behalf on outgoing flights, which the carrier may or





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may not do. The carriers have very compelling operational, legal and financial reasons not to falsify their total payloads, which should therefore be fairly solid. Not so the country-by-country and citizen/alien breakdowns. The carriers are supposed to report them on Form I-92, but in practice they frequently simply submit the total number. The local INS office then tries to reconstruct the breakdowns using the I-94 forms collected from passengers on the flight. Every visiting alien whose I-94 form is not turned in is automatically counted as an American. This, says INS, gives "the false impression that many more visitors overstay their period of admission than actually do."[4]

The common wisdom thus is that the failure to collect all the I-94 forms leads to an undercount of departing aliens and an overcount of departing Americans. This would be a convenient way of explaining all those disappearing "visitors", except for one problem: it doesn't explain the overall gap. Even with the alleged overstatement, the statistics show fewer U.S. citizens leaving than arriving, in every decade from the '20s through the '70s, by a grand total of over two million.[5] The discrepancy has mounted. In 1990, it was 351 thousand. Over time, this comes close to a mathematical impossibility. Where do all the incoming "Americans" come from? There aren't that many American citizen babies born overseas. Is the passport fraud business that large?

The Statistical Confusion

By contrast with the annual gap of over two million in the data from the manifests, the Bureau of the Census uses a figure of 200,000 per year for illegal immigration, most of it by land from Mexico. They started using that figure in 1986. Before that, they had made no allowance for illegal immigration, because they had no good data. Perhaps they changed because they were stung by the charge that they had been "using the only figure that was sure to be wrong." Census statisticians have put the likely total of illegal immigrants in the U.S. between two and four million, while admitting that any estimate of this figure is particularly conjectural. (One key Census report on illegal immigration was described as an effort to "count the uncountable.")[6]

The 1980s debate about the number of illegal immigrants was a response to some very high estimates by government officials, including an INS Commissioner, and I wonder if perhaps the subsequent estimates may have reflected a human impulse to debunk the high guesses and reassert their own statistical authority.

The problem is not with the Census Bureau, which is a highly professional organization. It is with the lack of basic data. Since illegal immigrants are unlikely to check in unless they are caught, the estimates are necessarily based on statistical inference rather than direct evidence, and the calculations are based on estimates of residuals, which tend to magnify any inherent errors.

"There are large and growing holes in the data needed for any estimate of net immigration, legal or illegal."

Aside from clandestine border crossers, those who overstay nonimmigrant visas are presumably the principal source of unrecorded immigration. INS stopped trying to count emigrants in 1957. In 1980, they stopped collecting the data needed even for an estimate of total emigration.[7] At the same time, they stopped publishing estimates of the rate at which nonimmigrant visitors departed the country. Without departure statistics for migrants or nonmigrants, the government has little direct evidence on which to calculate net legal migration or clandestine immigration through that second loophole.

During the 1970s, before it stopped reporting them, the INS figures for departing aliens ran far below arrivals, suggesting that a lot of them were simply staying here. (In FY 1976, the gap was nearly 2.7 million; in FY 1977 it was over 3.2 million.[8]) This was, naturally enough, a source of embarrassment to the INS, and it probably helps to explain the decision to stop publishing the figures.

There are, in short, large and growing holes in the data needed for any estimate of net immigration, legal or illegal. Quite a mess. Our immigration statistics are bad and getting worse. In this murk, it would seem prudent to make use of whatever direct information is available, and the figures from passenger manifests should be a principal source.

In the case of movement between the U.S. and Puerto Rico, the Census Bureau in fact has been

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using the data from air passenger manifests as their principal source — though with considerable misgiving.

Can the Gap be Explained?

There is a ready explanation for part of the gap between arrivals and departures. Many legal immigrants arrive by air, and are expected to stay. INS compiles unpublished statistics for the ports of entry of each year's immigrants.[9] The data are no longer explicitly broken down between air and land arrivals (legal arrivals by sea are negligible); but one can arrive at an approximate figure for arrivals of immigrants by air, by breaking out the traditional airports of entry. In FY 1990, the figure was 365 thousand. The figure will rise as the immigration act of 1990 increases the flow.

"We must still face an apparent gap approaching nearly two million each year, and growing."

In 1990 (Figure 2), the overall gap from the manifests was about 2.4 million. This calculation reduces the unexplained gap to about two million.[10]

There is another, somewhat more obscure, explanation for part of the discrepancy. The official statistics for gross legal immigration were fairly steady, rising from 531 thousand in FY 1980 to 643 thousand in FY 1988. These figures aren't what they seem. About 1/3 of those "arrivals" are actually "adjustments". In other words, they are people who arrived illegally or stayed illegally in earlier years, and who have managed to get their status legalized. Whether or not they were supposed to be immigrants, they have immigrated, and upon "adjustment" they enter the statistical system. This phenomenon is particularly dramatic right now. The official figure for immigration jumped to 1.09 million in FY 1989 and 1.54 million in FY 1990, but about half of each of those figures represented legalizations of illegal resident aliens under the 1986 amnesty.

With the data available, there is no way to match the adjustments with their year of arrival, but be it noted that some part of the gap — perhaps something like 100 to 200 thousand per year on a long term basis — is eventually regularized in the immigration statistics.

That is some help, but not much. We must still face an apparent gap approaching nearly two million each year, and growing.

How Solid are the Figures from the Manifests?

Some private planes may carry unmanifested passengers from — or more likely to — the U.S. (Anybody who has seen the lineup of executive jets at the airport at Eagle Pass, Texas, a poor little border town, must suspect that there is considerable activity going on that doesn't get into the statistics. Sample radar searches in connection with drug control activities have suggested that there are hundreds of unrecorded flights across U.S. borders daily.) Compared to the scale of the recorded movements, however, this movement is unlikely to be statistically important — and, if anything, it probably adds to the net inflow.

Military flights are not covered. They will introduce some element of error, in a period when we had about a half million military personnel and their civilian support staff overseas. Most of those who leave by military aircraft generally return the same way, but there are exceptions, plus some wives acquired and babies born overseas. Again, however, they are more likely to increase than to decrease the true net inflow.

For the bulk of the traffic — airlines, charters, private planes not breaking the law — I have suggested that the regional and citizen/alien breakdowns are very shaky, but that the overall numbers should be pretty solid. There are probably some transcription errors in typing up the summaries, but it is hard to believe this is an important source of error.[11] I can identify only two significant potential sources of error:

- Perhaps there is an asymmetrical triangular traffic, with many people arriving by direct flights from overseas and then departing by land via Mexico or Canada, and with fewer people running the triangle in the opposite direction. This is an ingenious hypothesis, but not a very convincing one. It could be checked out. However, the U.S. Government does not maintain sufficient records to

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prove or disprove this hypothesis, and it would be difficult to sort out such movement from the background noise (there are literally hundreds of millions of land border crossings per year.) There is another variant: the "gap people" may have been leaving by air via Canada, since the collected manifests do not cover air traffic with Canada. Daniel Vining (see Note 3) looked at Canadian air traffic records and found little support for that hypothesis.

• Departing aircraft (charters, in particular) may perhaps sometimes fail to submit I-92s. This could be an important source of error. Departing aircraft are required by statute to submit passenger manifests, but INS considers the requirement to be met by the submission of any I-94 forms collected. Apparently, neither INS nor DOT has any procedure for checking airport departure logs to assure that the requirement has been met, nor is submission of the I-92 required in order to get airport clearance for departure. They do check the Airline Guide to see if a flight was missed. When they find one, they make an estimate (based on samples a decade old) of the number and characteristics of the passengers. This is said to happen in about 15 percent of departures.



We have here another annoying residual. If 3 percent of departing aircraft in 1990 failed to report, it could have led to a 40 percent error in the apparent gap. It wouldn't take many such failures to explain the gap. This is an important potential source of error, and an easily corrected one.

Because of tight budgets, the tabulation of data from the manifests is already nearly two years behind. There apparently is some current discussion in DOT of doing away entirely with that process, and relying on periodic reports directly to DOT from the airlines. One such system, using the "T-100" form, was instituted in 1990. No data have yet been published. A report on 1990-91 is in process, but I am told it will give only gross traffic totals, not arrivals and departures. DOT considers more detailed information to be confidential. Airline-by-airline data may indeed be privileged information, but the totals and the regional patterns should not, and it may be another useful check.

The question would still arise: how complete are the data? If prior experience is any indicator, a shift to reliance upon the periodic reports would be a backward step. IATA (the International Air Transport Association) collects such data on a voluntary basis, and their own evaluation is that it is not complete enough to be a useful guide to total net flows.[12]

I have suggested that there is a possibility that incomplete reporting of departures could explain some or even all the apparent gap. This is, however, no excuse for ignoring the data from the manifests, as is presently the case. It is one of the few sources of hard data available. If there are errors, they could easily be corrected. There is no substitute for enforcing the law and making the submission of manifests or I-92 summaries a condition for airports' departure clearance.

The Intractable Gap

How do the government's statisticians explain the gap? In short: they don't. In a number of conversations with the hands-on technicians, I found most of them puzzled and somewhat embarrassed by it. Since it flies in the face of conventional wisdom, some of them attempt to minimize it, but the explanations do not go beyond the discussion of potential sources of error above.

I myself am overwhelmed at the apparent size of the gap. The experts in Census have the same problem. They point out that so large an influx should turn up in other statistics. Specifically, they argue that there is no sign in the 1990 decennial census count of something like 10-15 million

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unexpected residents. (They do admit to a probable undercount of about 5 million, some of whom presumably are illegal entrants.) The census numbers, they say, are broadly consistent with what was known about the earlier population, plus recorded births and estimated net immigration, and minus known deaths.

This is all very well, but the argument encounters two serious problems.

The first one, again, is that problem of residuals. Birth and death records in the U.S. are thought to be very good, but no effort is made to match individual births and deaths. Even if there is indeed a large illegal population that does not want to be found, births and deaths among that group would not change the overall data in a way that would make it possible to count them with any precision. (In fact, a larger population base would help to explain the circumstance that our urban birth and death rates seem unusually high, compared with other industrial countries.)

The second problem is related to the first one. The specialists argue that those people must live somewhere, and that the Census Bureau knows where the housing is and would find the inhabitants. This reasoning is questionable for two reasons. For one thing, Census may not know where all the housing is. The traditional definitions are changing. Some years back, the authorities suddenly discovered that many garages in Los Angeles had been covertly converted into rental housing; the people who lived there would be unlikely to volunteer to be counted. Warehouses in New York City are being converted to dormitories, sometimes occupied on the "hot bed" system, where people may occupy a bed in shifts. This practice was long known in — for instance — Hong Kong. Developed in a time of less desperate population pressures, our census system may be behind the curve in recognizing what now constitutes a place to live. The 1990 effort to find the homeless may be the tip of the iceberg. Our cities certainly *look* a lot more crowded, and with a greater variety of racial types and accents, than the Census Bureau's modest 200,000 figure would suggest.

More important is the assumption fundamental to our census system: that people are willing to be counted. In 1990, one-fourth of those people in identified housing units didn't send in their forms. There is provision for personal follow-up, and there are post-enumeration surveys to test the undercount. They are ingeniously devised, and they succeed in finding some of the people. Still, a person who didn't want to be counted the first time probably doesn't want to be counted the second time. If people are unwilling to open the door, the census counters use "imputation". They assume that the occupants of that unit are identical in number and characteristics to those enumerated in a comparable unit nearby. If the person who responded in that other unit was less than candid, the undercount is simply doubled.

"These remarks are not meant as criticism of the beleaguered Census Bureau. It is forced to work with limited and questionable data."

Undercount, apparently, is most serious among Black males. Why? Laws make mores. Our principal welfare program (AFDC) has a "man in the house rule." If there is a male breadwinner, the women and children are not entitled to welfare. This makes it prudent to conceal any evidence of a man's presence, and certainly to avoid telling an official enumerator of any sort that a man lives there. Who is likely to open doors during the daytime in poor neighborhoods? Single welfare mothers, who are not away at work.

If that syndrome works among citizens, how much more powerful it must be for those who live in fear of being sent back to, say, Haiti, or Somalia.

The census is designed by the middle class. I wonder whether many of us understand the visceral urge to stay away from government, except perhaps to apply for welfare, that motivates people who have long been in an uneasy relationship with the law. During the 1990 census, posters blossomed in the poor neighborhoods of Washington DC, warning people to avoid being counted or they would be drafted. This doesn't make it easy.

Until we are prepared to cordon off sample areas to conduct surprise counts — and I hope that time is far away — this problem will be with us. The present approach will not tell us much about that gap in the manifests.

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"Most important, from my perspective, is the connection between immigration and population."

These remarks are not meant as criticism of the beleaguered Census Bureau. It is forced to work with limited and questionable data. They do very sophisticated demographic analyses, but the analyses are built on a pyramid of assumptions and judgments, and on data sources that are themselves questionable. The cumulative error can become formidable. I hope that the professionals would leap at the chance to spend more time developing hard data, even at the expense of time spent on the theoretical models. In the particular case of the manifests, they haven't leapt yet.

Is It All Really That Important?

In modern societies, relying as they do on statistics, bad data almost insure bad policies. Governments are surprised by urban riots that may be generated in part by worse crowding and more desperate conditions than the official figures — fed by bad immigration data — suggested. Infrastructure investment, the planning for schools, the allocation of funds among the states and cities, all can go awry if they are based on bad data. Our expectations concerning per capita resource use, income, environmental impacts, are all skewed by bad demographic data.

Most important, from my perspective, is the connection between immigration and population. We stand already at 250 million, and current fertility and assumed immigration levels could take us past 500 million within the next century. Immigration constitutes something like half of present growth (depending on how one counts it), and the proportion is rising. This is one of the few issues truly central to our national future, and it is fundamentally important to know whether we really do understand what is happening.

This essay cannot begin to go again over the grounds for believing that such growth is thoroughly bad for us. The arguments have been set forth elsewhere.[13] Perhaps I can summarize it in a well-worn formula:

I=PCT.

The impacts that a society inflicts upon its environment and its resource base (I) are determined by the size of the population (P) times the consumption levels (C), times the technology coefficient (T). (The equation is really a rule of thumb. It does not account for thresholds and non-linearities, but they usually make the problem worse rather than better, and it is a useful rule.)

Of those three variables, population is perhaps the most fundamental and difficult one to address. Small wonder, then, that it becomes a matter of deep concern if we cannot correctly estimate the size of a principal determinant of population change.

This is not to say that, if we can find unadmitted immigrants, the source should be closed. For example, about 300,000 of the annual "nonimmigrant" arrivals are students. Many students, notoriously, do not go home. However, those alien students constitute a large proportion — more than half, in some scientific fields — of our current crop of graduate students. It may be a sad commentary on the state of American education, but we need those skills. Perhaps, with better counting, we would have a better fix on just who makes up the immigrant stream, and adjust our quota system according to a clearer vision of who is migrating, and who we want.

We need the best information we can get, not simply to limit immigration, but to fit it to our national needs and priorities.

What Can Be Done About It?

If the nation thinks it important to know how large it is or how fast it is growing, the time perhaps has come for a serious look at the way it collects information — before the 2000 census leads to an even larger proportion of statistical dropouts.

At the simplest level, a serious effort should be made to check out the validity of the gap in the manifests. Let me offer a caveat: the study should involve but not be controlled by the Census Bureau. The Bureau has staked out its position. Specialists tend to circle the wagons when they are challenged, particularly by an outsider. I know. I used to be a specialist. This is too important to be brushed off.

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If the gap proves real, it will change our fundamental thinking about a component of immigration that has been almost ignored, and perhaps it will lead to a new look at the even more complicated statistical problem of judging illegal immigration by land.

If the gap proves illusory, the data should be improved. Here, after all, is one of the few potential sources of solid data about one major element of U.S. demography.

"If the gap proves real, it will change our fundamental thinking about...immigration..."

The information in the manifests would be less important if we made better use of available technology in logging people in and out of the country. We should perhaps take a hard look at the way INS collects data on the international movement of people. From the outside, the system seems thoroughly antiquated. It is, after all, a question of inventory management, and there are sophisticated systems throughout the private sector that can do that job remarkably well. One can visualize an integrated, computerized system keeping track of movements, starting with the issuance of visas, continuing through arrival in the U.S., and completed with the logging out of departures, and capable of summarizing the results in a way that can be used by Census. It would probably be cheaper and require fewer hours of hand work than the present process. In 1993, should we still be manually logging I-94s, in and out?

For anybody still professing faith in the present system, consider the total breakdown when President Carter asked INS to locate the Iranian students, or the frenzied efforts last spring to find the passengers who had disembarked in Los Angeles from an airplane that turned out to be carrying passengers from Latin America with active cholera.

If the "manifest gap" or some part of it is real, as I suspect it is, we come to an even more fundamental question: what price do we pay for the peculiarly American aversion to asking people to identify themselves?

There are 30 million annual arrivals by air and hundreds of millions by land. Keeping track of them, and persuading the visitors to leave eventually, would be a formidable task even with better information systems. The solution is not to try to halt the flow and retreat into a sort of Fortress America. We gain too much from the flow of people and ideas. On the other hand — as I have suggested — we have powerful reasons not to surrender our national right to decide who — and how many — shall acquire the right to live here.

If as a nation we should really decide to control the traffic rather than simply counting it, there is an elegant and straightforward solution: better identification, coupled with laws that permit only those admitted to reside here to hold jobs, obtain professional licenses, or do the other things that only residents should be doing. The required identification presumably would be a Social Security card or a call-in system comparable to those used by credit card companies, but using Social Security numbers.

The "right to anonymity" is not enshrined in the Constitution. In that simpler time, anonymity was hardly a realistic possibility. In practice, we expect to be identified. We voluntarily forego anonymity in all sorts of transactions every day, and we rely on documentation — usually Social Security cards or drivers licenses — to prove who we are.

The civil rights advocate warns that Big Brother will be watching you, and indeed there is a tradeoff, but it is only one of many tradeoffs required as our society becomes bigger and more complex. In fact, the Social Security number is already mandatory, and it is widely used as an identifier. The proposed new use is hardly revolutionary.

Big Brother is watching you, anyway, and the person most likely to profit from the ability to manipulate false identities is unlikely to be doing much good for society. Like million-dollar transactions paid in cash, it is usually an adjunct to some sort of anti-social activity, from the trucker obtaining a new driver's license in another state when he has been convicted of DWI in his own state, to the drug trafficker.

History does not suggest any particular correlation between mandatory identification systems and personal freedom. Despotism has flourished with and without identity cards. On the other hand, most other modern industrial societies have some identity system without infringing on individual rights.

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This proposal has been treated at greater length in other papers.[14] For the purposes of this essay, the point is that, with better identification, the flow into and out of the U.S. could continue unimpeded, but the restrictions on employment and perhaps other activities would prevent most would-be back door immigrants from converting an ostensible visit into permanent residence. The information from the aircraft manifests would then be simply a useful check against the computerized log-in log-out process, and perhaps a warning signal when a gap re-emerged.

Until we reach that happy stage, we would be well advised to make better use of the information that lies, unused, at hand. ■

NOTES

[1] Alan Lightman and Owen Gingerich, "When Do Anomalies Begin?", *Science*, Vol. 255, February 7, 1991, pp. 690-695.

[2] Unpublished data through CY 1990 are available through the Center for Transportation Information, DTS-44, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Kendall Square, Cambridge, MA 02142, (617) 494-2450. Traffic to and from Canada and Puerto Rico is not included.

[3] Professor Daniel A. Vining, Jr., University of Pennsylvania, in 1982 published a study of net migration suggested by INS/DOT and International Air Transport Association (IATA) passenger manifest data: "Net Migration by Commercial Air: A Lower Bound on Total Net Migration to the United States", published with a rebuttal and counter-rebuttal in *Research in Population Economics*, Vol. 4, pp. 333-360. The pre-1978 data in Figure 1 are drawn from his work. I should, however, note that he went on to the formidable task of attempting an estimate of net migration by air; my purpose is the simpler one of calling attention to data that are dramatically at variance with the current wisdom concerning immigration levels.

[4] *1989 Statistical Yearbook of the INS*, September 1990, p. xxxvi.

[5] *INS 1977 Annual Report*, Table 11, p. 58. The figures do not include traffic with Canada.

[6] The Bureau at the same time raised the estimate of annual emigration from 36,000 to 160,000, thus cushioning the arithmetical impact of recognizing the fact of illegal immigration. The judgement process that led to the selection of the 200,000 figure is detailed in Robert Warren and Jeffrey S. Passel, "A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census", *Demography*, Vol. 24, No. 3, August 1987, pp. 375-393. See also Jeffrey S. Passel and J. Gregory Robinson, "Methodology for Developing Estimates of Coverage in the 1980 Census Based on Demographic Analysis: Net Undocumented Immigration", Preliminary Evaluation Results Memorandum No. 114, Bureau of the Census, September 1988.

[7] INS Bulletin #5, April 1990.

[8] *INS 1977 Annual Report*, Table 2, p. 34 and Table 11, p. 58. Internal evidence suggests that the gap was created in part by incomparable series, with "aliens admitted" including certain aliens entering by land and "aliens departed" limited to form I-94 holders leaving by international common carrier, but the documentation is unclear and INS cannot clarify it.

[9] INS, "Detail Run 422. Immigrants Admitted by Port of Entry," assembled annually by fiscal years.

[10] Note that the manifest data are for calendar years; the INS figures are by fiscal years.

[11] I have noticed at least one internal inconsistency. It is negligible in the gross data but (because of the problem of residuals mentioned above) it amounted to about 5 percent of the net gap. This is not sufficient to alter the basic proposition that there is a massive and unexplained gap, and I assume that any errors are more or less random.

[12] Telephone conversations on April 9, 1992 with Terry Denny, IATA-Montreal and Peter Morris, IATA-London.

[13] A list of *NPG Forum* papers is available from Negative Population Growth, Inc. The papers bearing on environment and population are included in Lindsey Grant, *Elephants in the Volkswagen*, (New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1992).

[14] David Simcox, *Secure Identification: The Weak Link in Immigration Control* and *Sustainable Immigration: Learning to Say No* (*NPG Forum* papers dated 1988 and 1990, Negative Population Growth, Inc.).

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McKenzie Wark lectures on communications at Australia's Macquarie University. This op-ed piece appeared in The Australian *on April 21, 1993, and is reprinted by permission.*

Let's Economize on Economists

By McKenzie Wark

Let's have a real free market in economists. This is a simple proposition which will theoretically add immeasurably to the common wealth through the Promethean increases in productivity it will unleash.

It is a concrete experiment to show the nation, indeed the world, the true and righteous path. Since it is consistent with their doctrine, I expect a stampede of support from the "economic rationalists" in higher education. The only surprising thing is that they haven't already thought of it themselves.

It works like this. First, we remove all restrictions on immigration for economists. In economic terms, restrictive immigration practices are really only a form of protectionism. Next, we put all economists on one-year contracts. At the end of the year all such positions are tendered internationally. The positions go to the best-qualified candidates who will do it for the least amount of money.

Think of the savings! There must be thousands of economists around the world who would gladly work in our universities at minimum wages. The competition will drive them to work at maximum productivity so they can reapply for their jobs at year's end and have a hope of beating off fresh and eager challengers.

Think of the efficiency gains! No more tenured dead wood. No more expensive seniority payments. No more super and fringe benefits overheads. Just let 'er rip; no social nets.

It may be possible eventually to dispense with the expensive business of producing our own economists altogether. There are other countries with an obvious comparative advantage in the economist industry, such as India and Hong Kong. Both have good universities where English is widely spoken. Surely it would not be difficult for them to produce economists of sufficient quality for our market.

Local economics departments that want to compete will just have to make cheaper, better economists or get out of the market. Since economics is a rational science, there can be no reason for preferring a local to a foreign-produced economist, so let's just get a good cheap supply of them from the free market and give up feather-bedding this industry.

Naturally, one feels a twinge of compassion for all those economists who will join our manufacturing workers on the dole queues. Like Dr. Hewson, we can publicly shed a tear for their families and get on with the job of weeding out the slackers.

"All in all they will make the best-behaved bunch of chronically unemployed people you could hope for."

Economists won't feel as bad about it as the rest of us do in such circumstances. They know it is the iron law of the market that is at work here, and that this is still the best of all possible worlds. They know it's not a personal failing. They won't get suicidal or violent. They won't turn to drugs or petty crime. All in all they will make the best-behaved bunch of chronically unemployed people you could hope for.

This is only the simplest version of the scheme. Even more exciting is the idea of performance criteria for economists. Since economists tell us these days that efficiency is both an objective thing and quantitatively measurable, it can't be too difficult for them to work out a Performance of Economists Efficiency Rating, or PEER.

For economists this will replace the judgment of one's peers as a measure of professional success, being of course much more objective. Every economist in the land will get a PEER assessment every quarter. Those that don't contribute to the efficiency of the economy will have their positions terminated at two weeks' notice. This way, a

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reduction in the overall number of economists can be added to a reduction in their unit cost.

Worked at maximum efficiency, there is no reason why a first-rate economist of the future couldn't do the job of two or three of our present over-priced, over-protected units. This will help fix a true market price for economists. Once we have a market value for the contributions economists actually make to the economy, we can begin to pull away the artificial State subsidies to the profession. There seems little reason for the Government to support a profession whose members seem by consensus to believe there isn't much role for the Government at all. Henceforth, the funding of the profession of economics as a free and unprejudiced inquiry into the nature of the economy can be left to private patrons of the art, such as the banks.

The other disciplines will soon see the merits of this scheme when wealth and jobs and prosperity for all start to trickle down. Most scholars, no matter what their discipline, are also professional skeptics and will surely respond to a case proved by rigorous experiment. This is why I think this modest proposal for a bold experiment is in order.

Economists will, I'm sure, volunteer in droves to be their own guineapigs. In the great tradition of 19th century science that they uphold, they should experiment on themselves, and prove to the world that the rest of us have got it all wrong all along. ■

A New Journal on the Migration Topic

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Huey Johnson was Secretary of Resources for former Governor of California, Jerry Brown. He founded the Trust for Public Land and once headed the California chapter of the Nature Conservancy. He is now a columnist for the San Francisco Examiner *where this column appeared on February 23, 1993. Reprinted by permission.*

Immigration Era Is (Probably) Over

By Huey D. Johnson

Governor Wilson is standing tall, leading the state and nation on the nastiest of political issues, immigration.

California is particularly crunched by the recession-driven shortage of tax dollars. So when Wilson thinks about immigration, he thinks first of the enormous financial costs.

Since it is the federal government that enacts and administers immigration laws, Wilson went to Washington, D.C., to seek $1.5 billion to help pay our increasingly steep tab for all those new people. While our budget deficit and population grow larger, he is still waiting for an answer.

Half the number of immigrants entering the United States each year head for California. Since 1980, California has grown by 6 million people; 37 percent of those are foreign immigrants. There are 1.3 million undocumented adults living here.

In Los Angeles County public schools alone, 250,000 kids of undocumented parents stretch the capabilities of our education system. I'm talking about decline by exceeding limits. And the crash in the quality of education in California is but one part.

Politicians have ignored the stress from population increases. They have simply stretched limited money further and further, which thins out everyone's quality of life.

Not facing up to the environmental limits to our air and water quality and soils adds to the difficulty.

There is a larger problem.

In his new book, *Around the Cragged Hill*, George Kennan, a respected genius and former diplomat now in the winter of his years mulls things over at Princeton.

He observes that migration and population growth from migration are a danger to nations.

"Just as water seeks its own level, so relative prosperity, anywhere in the world, tends to suck in poverty from adjacent regions to the lowest levels of employment. And in taking in the migrants often changes its whole makeup," he writes.

The stress on current residents, particularly those struggling daily, is great. Many react with anger. In booming economic times, there is seemingly room for everyone. But in times of economic downturn, it is hard to accommodate new people who will work for a lot less.

I remember meeting with Hispanic political leaders on the subject of immigrants from Mexico in the early '80s. They surprised me by saying that the legal Hispanic residents were trying to buy homes and become part of America. But they are being displaced in the job market by the migrants.

"It is devastating," one of them said, "and we don't know what to do about it."

"There is literally no place in the world where mass migrations of humans can be accommodated."

The issue is at its nastiest politically when our federal policy, which is described as open-door, fumbles badly on fairness. It reflects a prejudice when we welcome some nationalities like the Irish and Cubans, but send Haitians back home.

The sad truth is that although each of us here now has benefitted from the open-door policy at one time or another, the historical era of immigration is over. There is literally no place in the world where mass migrations of humans can be accommodated.

As there has been a huge crushing wave of migration into the United States and California, there has also been a large one in Europe.

The drought in Africa caused a huge exodus of people in African and Middle Eastern countries to Europe. And the migration from Eastern Europe to the West has intensified the conflict in countries like

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Germany and England.

I talked to a teacher in The Netherlands this month who suddenly has 35 nationalities in the grade school where he teaches. New immigrants make up 80 percent of the children in the school. The Netherlands, like California, has liberal benefits for newcomers. With the relaxing of the borders between nations for trade reasons, a huge, unexpected deluge of people arrived in the already overcrowded nation.

One can predict the same migration into California and Texas and Arizona if the North American Free Trade Agreement is ratified.

To his credit, Wilson has honestly approached that hot potato, too. He has asked neighboring Mexico to help limit its emigrants to those who have legally applied.

The practice of nations to ignore their carrying capacity has become increasingly disastrous. Wilson deserves support and congratulations for facing up to the many problems, starting with migration.

He may be the first to bring a factual base to the population dilemma by talking about the real costs. ■

Dear Attorney General Reno:

In a recent and otherwise good letter, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) saw fit to add the following bullet-marked paragraph toward the end:

> • *Legal immigration to America can and must remain a viable dream of people around the world.*

This is profoundly wrong. The sights of people should not be set on trying to escape conditions they don't like, but trying to change them. In today's world, people must stand and fight, not cut and run. The reason is simply that we are coming to the end of the age of international migration as a solution to human problems.

Migration worked well as a problem solver, even up into the early decades of this century. Between 1850 and 1930, about 60 million people left Europe and moved to North and South America and Australasia. Europe got rid of its surplus population; it gained access to new stores of resources, and a new markets for its manufactured goods.

But today there are no more empty lands into which people can move. Some areas could arguably take more, but polling the current residents will show that few of them are anxious to have more added to the local population. This is particularly true if they are different as to language, religion, culture, race, and other factors. Exponential population growth has brought us to this impasse; much as we may lament it, we now must face it. The same situation will be even more true in the future, as world population continues to grow 10,000 an hour, 250,000 a day, 90 to 100 million a year.

It's just as irresponsible to encourage the mass of people in dreams of being able to move to the United States as it is to encourage a youngster of the inner city to quit school in hopes of pursuing a career in professional basketball. Certainly a few people will be able to migrate, and there will be a few basketball stars; but the vast majority of people will never be able to move, and had best set their sights on staying in school or plodding ahead step by step to a better life. We'll have to bloom where we're planted.

That is the new reality that must supplant the 19th century dream of picking up and moving on and leaving one's problems behind.

John H. Tanton

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Harold Gilliam has been an environmental writer for the San Francisco Chronicle *for 30 years and has written several books on environmental topics. This feature appeared in the "This World" section of the* Chronicle *on February 21, 1993.*

Bursting at the Seams

By Harold Gilliam

The saga of Zoe Baird has focused attention on immigration, but the hullabaloo about the hiring of illegal aliens for domestic work is diverting us from a far more critical matter: the overwhelming impact of immigration on population growth.

Consider Governor Pete Wilson's recent report that the people flowing into the state, both legally and illegally, are costing Californians more than $1 billion at a time of fiscal desperation and 10 percent unemployment.

The time has come to risk being politically incorrect, to take off the blindfolds, to think the unthinkable and speak the unspeakable: There are too many people coming into California. Immigration must stop.

As a result of immigration, the state's population has been increasing at the rate of 700,000 a year, equivalent to 10 more San Franciscoes every decade. This is one of the biggest migrations in history, and if it continues, the state is likely to go broke and suffer a steadily declining standard of living.

Yet no one in authority has been able to confront publicly the fact that population growth, in this state as well as on the planet, cannot go on forever. It will come to an end either by conscious control or by catastrophe.

There are now about 1.3 million undocumented or illegal immigrants in California and more than 6 million legals. Many who entered illegally were granted amnesty by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

Their children are in a school system bursting at the seams; California's educational system has slid from top among the states to the bottom. (The decline started with Proposition 13 — long before the avalanche of immigration reached its present proportions — which resulted in decreasing expenditures per student.)

In some school districts, two-thirds or more of the students cannot read or speak adequate English to absorb what they are supposed to learn. How can education of other students take place under these circumstances?

All students now in the schools, the children of immigrants as well as non-immigrants, deserve the best education the state can give them. As Terri Lobdell and Lewis Butler of the nonprofit educational organization California Tomorrow point out: "The cost of educating these students is primarily an investment in human capital. If properly nurtured and educated, these young people are the workers, producers and taxpayers of tomorrow. They will be supporting the taxpayers of today (including massive numbers of baby boomers) in their old age."

But quality education does not seem possible if schools are swamped by illegal immigrants coming across the borders and being smuggled from overseas by the boatload at the rate of about 100,000 a year. And there are twice that many incoming *legal* immigrants.

Further immigration at this rate will place an intolerable strain not only on California's school system but on its water supply, soil productivity, health services and taxpayers' ability to pay.

Wilson reports that Medi-Cal health care for people who entered illegally (but may now be legal) costs the state $534 million a year. AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) for children of illegals costs $278 million. Illegals in California prisons cost the state $250 million. These and other costs add up to $1.4 billion per year, the governor reports.

Wilson wants to bill the federal government for that amount, the cost to the state resulting from the federal government's misleadingly named Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. But by far the largest share of the immigration costs — for education — must be paid by Californians, since states traditionally bear the expenses of schools. Immigrant children and the California-born children of immigrants number in the hundreds of thousands

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at an annual cost of $4,000 to $5,000 per student.

Figures on what the immigrants cost the state are ball-park statistics only; they do not take into account the amounts paid by immigrants in taxes (most of the taxes go to the federal government, not the state). Many immigrants are self-supporting and add to California's productivity and tax revenues.

But to admit more legals and illegals by the hundreds of thousands — at a time when the state has lost 800,000 jobs and one in ten workers is unemployed — is hardly the wisest policy.

We cannot deny health care, education and other services to those who are already here. But the state cannot afford to watch its costs rise indefinitely to pay for further waves of immigrants overwhelming our social systems and infrastructure.

It is time to consider a moratorium on immigration until we have provided a lamentably lacking element in our governance — a population policy. We need to determine the carrying capacity of the state.

Fiscal problems aside, how many people can our dwindling natural resources support at a reasonable standard of living?

Consider water, for example. As we have learned recently, the filling of the reservoirs by this year's rains will not solve the long-term water shortage. Even with reservoirs at capacity there is not enough water to satisfy present demands, much less an unending demand for more. The population grows; the water supply does not. And tree rings tell us that previous droughts have lasted much longer than the recent ones.

How can we increase the supply of water to keep up with the growing demand? The major dam sites are already occupied, except for the proposed Auburn Dam on the American River above Sacramento, which has been stalled primarily for seismic and environmental reasons.

Do we import water from the Columbia, from the Yukon, from the Mississippi? Will the residents of those regions willingly part with their water? Can we afford the costs? Do we desalt sea water at an astronomical expense in dollars and energy?

Conservation of water can extend existing supplies, but you can only tighten the belt up to a point. A continually growing population will overtake all efforts at conservation.

Another declining resource is topsoil. Already the exploding population has taken over hundreds of thousands of food-growing acres as cities cover the countryside. A few decades ago Los Angeles County was the top agricultural county in the United States; the sprawling city has long since preempted the available topsoil. Where once there were miles of orange groves beneath snowy mountains, there are now miles of besmogged suburbs, and the mountains are seldom visible.

Central Valley cities are Los Angelizing. From Bakersfield to Fresno to Sacramento and beyond, countless acres of priceless topsoil have been urbanized and removed from food production by the booming population.

During the 1980s, about 30 percent of the people moving to California were from other states. This number has diminished, and more people are currently moving to other states than are entering, resulting in a net outflow of about 41,000 a year.

"...most of the births that increase the population are attributable to immigration."

Half of the state's population increase comes from net births (the excess of births over deaths). But most of the births that increase the population are attributable to immigration.

Among non-immigrant Californians, the average birthrate in the past decade has been near the replacement level — two children per couple. Immigrants tend to have much larger families, running in some groups close to double that number.

After they have been in California for a generation or two, their birthrate declines, but meanwhile large families immigrate, swelling the population further. The implications are that without further immigration, California's population would approach stability at slightly above the current level.

Demographers tell us that at current rates of increase, the state's population is projected to rise from 31 million (10 times as many as were in the state when members of today's older generation were born) to 40 to 50 million in the next 25 years. (For detailed population statistics, see *Fifty Million Californians?* by Leon Bouvier, published by the Center for Immigration Studies, 1815 H Street, NW,

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Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20006; $9.95).

At these rates, in the lifetimes of today's kindergartners, California would have a population of 80 million to 120 million — all with no consideration, so far, of how many people the state can physically support. If we are having a hard time supporting the present number, in terms of both finances and resources, how can we keep quiet when confronted with projections of a population several times larger?

The answer to that one is easy. We are keeping quiet because we are afraid of being accused of racism. Most of the future immigrants would be Hispanics and Asians.

As an Anglo, I have compunctions about closing the door on more immigrants, most of whom would be non-Anglo. Being anti-immigration is to risk being classified with "hate groups," despite the fact that I believe in racial and cultural diversity and their benefits to America.

But those benefits will continue with the ethnic and cultural diversity that exists now. Immigrants now in this country have a strong stake in minimizing further immigration, which increases job competition in a shaky economy. A recent Latino National Political Survey poll found that 79 percent of Mexican-born U.S. residents believe there are too many immigrants crossing the borders, and a Wall Street Journal-NBC poll found that 71 percent of the general public feels the same way.

There are undoubtedly bigots who want immigration stopped for racial reasons. They would make the immigrants who are here now scapegoats for all of California's problems. But opposition to racial bigotry should not blind us to the facts: There are limits to population size, in a theater or in a state, in a phone booth or on the planet.

We are all descendants of immigrants (even Native Americans' ancestors migrated from Asia, according to anthropologists). No one with an ounce of compassion can avoid feeling sympathy for potential immigrants who would come to this country, as our ancestors did, to find a better life for themselves and their families.

But we need to ask whether we can solve the problems of all the overpopulated, underdeveloped countries of the Earth by keeping our borders open to unending waves of newcomers and by supporting them and their children with schooling and health services after they get here, considering our declining resources of water and air, topsoil and forests.

We might like to do so if we could, but the law of limits suggests otherwise.

The best way for the U.S. to help those countries is by supplying them with population planning assistance on request, by increasing support for the United Nations' family-planning program, by providing public and private technical help that enables them to increase their own means of earning a living (such as by sustainable agricultural practices) as we simultaneously set an example in the United States by reducing our own prodigal waste of resources.

"...a moratorium on immigration seems imperative."

Legal immigration to the U.S. can be halted by Congress, if enough members of that estimable body can overcome fears of being labeled "racist."

There are no easy ways to stop the illegal immigrants from coming. No matter how tightly we try to seal the borders, there will always be leaks. All we can do is give the border patrol and the Coast Guard whatever they need to keep leaks to a minimum. The cost would probably be far less than the fiscal and environmental costs that would be incurred by future immigrants.

Exceptions should be made for political refugees facing persecution at home. But this country cannot absorb them all; we need to persuade other nations to accept their share, particularly countries that share the same language as the refugees.

In any case, the heart of the matter is not racism or immigration, it is population: how many people can California support with our limited resources? We may have already exceeded the permanent sustainable carrying capacity of the state.

Until we have a population policy that addresses limits to growth and determines what a sustainable population would be, a moratorium on immigration seems imperative.

Obviously the problem is complex, and there are many pros and cons, but nothing can be gained by denying that it exists. We will jeopardize the future of our children and our country if we continue to keep our eyes closed. ■

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As this issue goes to press, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has just been held up by court action which calls for an environmental impact study before any such treaty can be concluded. Should there not be an environmental impact study on immigration as well? Dr. Meredith Burke is a California-based demographer and economist who thinks there should be. Reprinted with permission of The Wall Street Journal *© 1993 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All rights reserved.*

An Environmental Impact Statement for Immigration

By B. Meredith Burke

The Clinton-Gore administration is viewed by both friends and foes as far more environmentally friendly than its predecessor. Among its goals is safeguarding and passing along an ecologically healthy and physically attractive environment. Yet to date (an admittedly early one) none of its members has linked this goal with its necessary precondition, an environmental impact statement for population growth.

Lacking such a reference map, the Clinton administration may unwittingly compromise America's demographic future by regarding population growth, especially that due to immigration, as simply a matter of dollars and cents. Earlier this year, when President Clinton told the California Economic Summit that the federal government should help states burdened by immigration, he clearly had financial aid in mind. But just as until December the Census Bureau discounted immigration's effects on fertility and population growth, so, too, elective and appointed officials have ignored both the localized and the qualitative effects of immigration.

Realistically, the U.S. as a whole does not receive immigrants. California, New York, Texas, Illinois, Florida and New Jersey do: 82% of the total. These states have long passed the point where additional population is desirable. Lake Okeechobee, Florida's largest lake and the heart of South Florida's natural free-flowing drainage system, is now encircled by a dike, assaulted by more than 1,500 miles of canals and levees, and the daily recipient of 1.5 tons of phosphorus waste from cattle-raising, hastening its biological death. The Everglades is dying from both drainage and human construction. The National Agricultural Lands Study projects that at the current rate of conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses, Florida will lose all its prime agricultural land by the year 2000.

In the 1950s Los Angeles County led the nation in the value of agricultural production; its four neighboring counties were agriculturally based. Today this irreplaceable fertile land is asphalt-covered. While pollutants emitted per car have been cut in half, the doubling of the population in the past 30 years has wiped out nearly all the potential air quality gains. Its current residents look out upon a degraded natural setting unrecognizable as the beautiful combination of beach and mountains that enchanted the servicemen and factory workers of World War II.

In the past four decades the San Francisco Bay Area has lost one-third of the total pasture and crop acreage that once existed. The Greenbelt Alliance predicts there will be virtually no fertile cropland left in this area by the year 2000.

"While pollutants emitted per car have been cut in half, the doubling of the population in the last thirty years has wiped out nearly all the potential air quality gains."

Texas lost more than 600,000 acres of prime farmland to permanent nonagricultural uses just between 1977 and 1982.

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Yet foes of immigration control, and the demographically ignorant, erroneously attribute high levels of popular support for tighter immigration limits to xenophobia and short-term economic interests. They deem citizen concerns about the quality of life for themselves and their children self-indulgent. Consider the keynote speaker at a recent World Affairs Council immigration conference in Palo Alto, California. An official in the State Department's Bureau of Refugee Affairs, he ignored the disproportionate effects of both refugee and immigrant admission upon California and shrugged off audience concerns about the environment. I asked, "What size population would you consider too much for California?" (Its 1970 population of 20 million has grown to more than 30 million.)

"Oh, 100 million or so," he replied airily. "Look," he instructed me, "eventually it will get unpleasant enough that people will start to move out and the situation will resolve itself. That's the free market solution."

"...inhabitants of an industrialized country are responsible for pollution at locales far from their homes."

I deplore several assumptions embodied in his reply. One is the "slash and burn urbanization" tenet: It is OK to despoil one area and just move on. Staying put and fighting to preserve one's habitat is questionable behavior.

Another fallacious assumption is that the resource problem is solved through dispersal of population. He fails to see that inhabitants of an industrialized country make demands upon resources and are responsible for pollution (by products they consume) at locales far from their homes. The activist group Population-Environment Balance defines "carrying capacity" as the number of people who can be sustainably supported in a given area without degrading the natural, social, cultural and economic environment for present and future generations. When migration becomes imperative, clearly the base population has exceeded this capacity.

His reply also places a much lower value on access to rural and wilderness areas than does the American public. Perhaps as an attribute of a society that so recently enjoyed a "frontier," Americans cherish small towns and open space and stubbornly resist high-density housing. But undeveloped coastline and wilderness areas are crumbling under population pressures. Ironically, were it not for the post-1970 immigration input, population in California and other high-growth states would soon be leveling off.

We know from Immigration and Naturalization Service figures where immigrants of different origins settle. If Vice President Al Gore and Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt are serious about protecting American's physical fabric, they should work for legislation requiring Congress to estimate the environmental and public goods burden of proposed immigration quotas. In no other manner can we impose demographic accountability on our national legislators, who so far have found it impossible to withstand the importunings of individual pressure groups. Any legislator who can straightfacedly tell Californians, New Yorkers, Floridians and so forth that their carrying capacities can indefinitely absorb tens or even hundreds of thousands of new immigrants annually should be challenged.

Results from the 1990 Latino National Political Survey (which also surveyed non-Hispanic whites) were recently released. Three-quarters of both Anglo and Mexican-American citizens agreed there were too many immigrants, as did 73% of Cuban noncitizens and 84% of Mexican noncitizens. Only our popularly elected legislators resist the people's message that the time has come for a demographically mature America to narrow if not close its gates. If Messrs. Clinton and Gore can acknowledge this reality, they will both reassure the populace that "Washington listens" and take a giant step toward the environmental future to which Americans aspire. ■

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Australia is far ahead of the United States in the production of a "population report" — something which has not been done in the U.S. since 1972. Katharine Betts is a senior lecturer in sociology at the Swinburne University of Technology in Australia. Excerpts from her book Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987 *were published in* The Social Contract, *Summer, 1991, pp. 163-175.*

Australia's New Population Report:

Its Background and Recommendations

By Katharine Betts

Immigration is the issue that will not go away in Australian politics. It cuts across left and right, and it may even help to cut down political leaders. But for most of the post-war period bipartisanship has kept immigration off the party-political agenda and protected a large program, and its supporters, from an increasingly alienated electorate. From mid-1990, this protection began to fray. Critics of immigration and multiculturalism gained a more open hearing and the political forces seem to be realigning. Early in 1992, the leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, promised a smaller program if he should be elected and, in May, 1992, the Labor Government reduced the planned intake from 110,000 to 80,000. (The Labor Government has been in power since 1982. It was led by Bob Hawke until December, 1991. The current Prime Minister is Paul Keating.)

Both Hewson and Keating claim that their reductions are only to hold for the duration of the recession; that in the long run, high immigration is good for Australia. But, in terms of practical politics, it seems that a new bipartisan support for a smaller intake, however temporary, is forming.

In February, 1992, the Government released a report on immigration, the Withers Report. This was the result of an inquiry which reflected some of the recent changes in the climate of acceptable opinion and some of the tensions and inconsistencies which accompany these changes. The report, *Population Issues and Australia's Future*, was prepared by the Population Issues Committee, a six-member sub-committee of the National Population Council. Both of these bodies were chaired by Glen Withers, a Melbourne professor of economics. (The National Population Council was a body appointed to advise the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs; it was formed in 1984 and dissolved in mid-1992.)

The Withers Report revisits the question of the economic effects of immigration. This question is central to the current debate in Australia. Answers to it are, at present, most often sought within econometric models. But the report also has a special focus on the environmental consequences of immigration and population growth, a topic long absent from official inquiries.

The Withers Report comes as the latest in a procession of Government inquiries into population and migration: the Borrie Reports of 1975 and 1978; the Green Paper of 1977; the Committee of Review on Migrant Assessment chaired by Charles Price in 1982; and the FitzGerald Report of 1988. Why was this new report commissioned? This is something of a puzzle. To understand why this is so, we need to go back to the immediate predecessor of the Withers Report, the FitzGerald Report.

The FitzGerald Report owed its origins to ethnic leaders' dissatisfaction with trends in immigration policy in 1986 and 1987, trends which represented a slight shift in emphasis from family reunion to skilled migration. They had hoped that a new immigration inquiry, sponsored by a Government sympathetic to organized ethnic interests, would reinforce support for family reunion and multiculturalism. In fact, the FitzGerald Report criticized the influence of ethnic leaders and the effects of extended family reunion and also recommended that multicultural policies be replaced by an ethos of commitment to Australia. Neither the ethnic activists nor the Government had reckoned on the independence of the committee of inquiry. Two members in particular had a decided influence: Helen Hughes, a forceful personality who combined enthusiasm for

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free market economics with skepticism about the role of special interests, and the chairman, Stephen FitzGerald. FitzGerald had been Australia's first ambassador to China and was a respected Sinologist. He supported high migration, but his strong sense of Australian nationalism affected his opinion on the form that it should take. Together with its emphasis on commitment to Australia, the FitzGerald Report argued for larger numbers, close ties with Asia and a clear emphasis on skilled migrants with reduced privileges for relatives. (The report also said that more research was needed and that a well-funded research bureau should be established.) Ethnic leaders were dismayed and the Federal Opposition, at that time led by John Howard, saw the report's criticisms as a splendid opportunity to attack the Government.

"Just as the FitzGerald Report owed its existence to pressure group politics, so may the Withers Report have done. This time, however, the impetus seems to have come not from the ethnic lobby, but from the conservation movement."

After many months of delay and debate, the Hawke Government accepted the larger numbers and the continuing Asian focus, balked at the shift from family reunion to skilled migration, and clung to multiculturalism. Howard also welcomed the increased numbers, but he endorsed the criticism of family reunion and the emphasis on skilled migration, and approved of the rejection of multiculturalism. A public perception formed that he also wished to slow the rate of Asian immigration (a policy that would have been counter to FitzGerald's emphasis on non-discrimination in selection). Howard's criticism of family reunion and multiculturalism produced a storm of protest from ethnic organizations and other community groups, while the hinted possibility of racial discrimination lost him support in the serious media. Not long after, he also lost the leadership of his party, a sequence of events which can be interpreted as cause and effect.

While the Government had hedged on many of FitzGerald's recommendations, it moved swiftly to implement his ideas on research. The Bureau of Immigration Research was established in Melbourne in 1989 with a staff of 50 and an annual budget of $1.5 million for commissioned research. The Bureau also took over responsibility for the Immigration Department's annual publication, *Population Trends and Prospects*. Given all the academic firepower concentrated within the new Bureau, why was a further report, outside of its immediate jurisdiction, considered necessary? The puzzle is accentuated by the fact that Hawke announced the new inquiry at the Bureau's first National Outlook Conference in November, 1990, a three-day event attended by more than 600 delegates, and graced by 94 papers, almost all of which supported high migration.

Just as the FitzGerald Report owed its existence to pressure group politics, so may the Withers Report have done. This time, however, the impetus seems to have come not from the ethnic lobby, but from the conservation movement. But another question lurks behind this answer to the puzzle of origins. Did the conservationists who lobbied for this report really want a basis for action, or were they engaged in a political maneuver to contain tensions within their own ranks and to defer, or avoid, action?

There is a plethora of environmental groups in Australia but the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), a national body with its headquarters in Melbourne, is the largest and most influential. It had pursued a firm policy of challenging population growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This strategy weakened in 1984 and 1985 with the rise of a new faction within the ACF's governing Council. This faction was made up of people committed to internationalism and the struggle against racism, commitments which led the new councilors to feel uncomfortable with any policy that involved restricting immigration. In 1985, a new ACF population policy was formulated and it gave a higher priority to humanitarianism in immigration policy than to the problem of ecological sustainability. People with influence within the Foundation were adopting positions on questions of anti-racism and internationalism that were inconsistent with working for reform of a large and ungainly immigration program

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driven by special interests.

The shift in feeling within the Council was strengthened by the appointment of a new executive director, Phillip Toyne, in 1986, and the election of a new president, Peter Garrett, in 1989. Garrett has a high profile as a rock singer; this has helped the ACF broaden its appeal among the young and a range of social groups that they might not otherwise reach. Garrett is also an intelligent and committed environmentalist, albeit an environmentalist uncomfortable with any view that sees population as part of the environmental problem. Phillip Toyne was a barrister who came to the ACF from the Northern Territory, where he had worked as an advocate for Aboriginal interests. He shared his Council's antipathy to immigration reform, arguing that cuts in the program were unnecessary, and that the ACF could be seen as being racist if it were to ask for them. The Government appointed him to the National Population Council and he became a close associate of Bob Hawke, a politician who cultivated support among a mixed group of environmentalists, ethnic leaders, and other community activists (as well as millionaires and trade unionists). But Toyne's strategy of ignoring the problem of population growth eventually led to growing tensions within his organization.

Conservationists who were concerned about population growth had not been eliminated from the ACF, merely out-voted. In mid-1989, the ACF abandoned its amended population policy, the void being filled by a newspaper article written by Toyne himself. Toyne and Mark O'Connor from Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population debated the question on national television. Was this decision to ignore population growth a "victory for the moderates," or was it "cowardly"? Population reformers continued to exert pressure on the reigning faction and, by 1990, the organization was clearly divided on immigration. Many councilors and members were afraid of being seen to be giving comfort to isolationists, or of compromising humanitarian goals, and they resisted the reformers. Tempers ran high and claims were made that the organization had been infiltrated by racists. But the question of a sustainable population for Australia continued to be debated. Was the ACF serious about population and ecological sustainability, or was it only concerned with remote wilderness areas?

By September, 1990, two months before the inquiry was officially set up, Toyne was fielding questions about the ACF's population policy by saying that any new policy should wait upon the Withers Report. Hawke's desire to appease the "green vote" and Toyne's need to find a way of coping with the tensions within the ACF point to an explanation for the problem of origins. In April, 1992, Toyne told me that he had wanted an "intellectually robust context" to allow the ACF to develop a new population policy in "credible circumstances" and that he was convinced that his lobbying played an important part in establishing the inquiry. (He himself was a member of the committee.) Other factors were at work too. There was pressure from other government departments to establish immigration policy within a broader framework and to review its impact within the context of research on ecologically sustainable development, research that was already going on in a number of areas. But these pressures could have been accommodated within the research structure provided by the Bureau.

"The origins of the Withers Report reflect continuing political tension over migration within Australia."

The origins of the Withers Report reflect continuing political tension over migration within Australia. The composition of the committee reflected them too. Though Toyne was a member, pressure of other business prevented him from playing a very active part. Robert Birrell, a strong critic of immigration on environmental and economic grounds, was included and he did make a substantial contribution. But Withers brought to the role of chair a strong conviction that, provided the program brought in a fair number of skilled people, substantial immigration was economically beneficial or at worst "benign." This conviction rested on econometric studies.

Does his report add to the political uncertainty? Or can it offer useful guidance to politicians and policy elites struggling to negotiate the tensions of immigration politics? So far they do not appear to be putting it to the test. The May, 1992, decision on a

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smaller intake was not based on the report and it may be that the Government is simply setting it to one side. Moreover, there is no Department of Urban Affairs to follow through on its urban policies. If Hawke commissioned it, not because his Government needed the results but because he wished to satisfy the ACF, this silence is understandable, especially with change of leadership from Hawke to Keating late in December, 1991. Nevertheless, if a disinterested group of politicians were to turn to this document for advice, would they find it helpful?

Some Recommendations of the Withers Report

Whatever its intrinsic merits or failings, the FitzGerald report had a consistent argument. The Withers' team was not as well-funded as FitzGerald's and its members had less time to devote to their task. Maybe this is why the report is more obviously the work of a committee, patchy and inconsistent, but very good in parts. Unlike the FitzGerald Report with its focus on economics and culture, this one takes the question of the broader impact of population growth seriously.

"...as immigration is the only demographic variable that may, in the authors' opinion, be directly altered, lower population growth would mean lower immigration."

The joint authors set their analysis in the framework of four national goals: economic progress, ecological integrity, social justice, and a responsible international involvement. While it may lack internal consistency, the report does have a clear intellectual framework. And it takes a long and sober look at the question of the environmental impact of immigration-fueled growth and its effects on Australian cities. (FitzGerald had dismissed the natural environment in a mere 205 words, while the consultants commissioned to look at the economic effects of growth had declared that it was beyond their capacity to include the impact on the cities.)

The new report makes two recommendations that catch the reader's attention. The first is clearly stated: Australia should have a population policy (which encompasses immigration). The second needs to be coaxed out of the text. For environmental and urban reasons, this new inclusive population policy should, or perhaps should not, aim for a lower rate of growth. But, as immigration is the only demographic variable that may, in the authors' opinion, be directly altered, lower population growth would mean lower immigration. The text suggests that the program could be halved from its 1991/92 level of 110,000 to a core of 55,000 (consisting of immediate family, refugees, and some skilled and business migrants for whom there is a demonstrated need). Such a program would lead to a population growing to 22 million in 2030 and then stabilizing. While governments might wish to add to this core for various reasons, the report says that: "Ecological integrity would be best served by no additional numbers." But the force of this suggestion is immediately negated by the claim that a program of between 80,000 and 160,000 (gross) optimizes economic goals (pp. 109-110). And the final recommendations state, somewhat equivocally, that the Committee concludes that a population policy developed along the lines that it has indicated would "understand that national ecological integrity and equity in funding of urban growth may be advanced by lower population growth" (p. 123).

The Environment

Chapter four of the report argues strongly that immigration-fueled population growth threatens the country's ecological integrity and compounds urban problems, and chapter five raises a number of concerns about the effects of this growth on questions of social justice. The report acknowledges that, though the size of the domestic population has had an immediate impact on forestry, fisheries, and tourism, it has not been the cause of Australia's major environmental problem: the degradation of agricultural land. This is largely the result of the practices of the few. And, given the significance of exports in agriculture (and mining), the rural environment will be only indirectly affected by future domestic population growth. But the indirect link is real because growth can add to the pressure to increase primary production, in order to export more commodities and thus offset increasing imports.

The authors also concede that market pricing

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can play a part in mitigating the effects of population pressure on scarce resources. But their chief area of concern lies with those aspects of environmental quality which are beyond the reach of market forces: the problems of stemming the loss of bio-diversity, of controlling pollution, and of managing the disposal of wastes.

They also point to the dramatic implications of a larger population for the emission of carbon dioxide. Under the Toronto agreement, Australia is to reduce her total carbon dioxide emissions by 20 per cent between the base year of 1988 and 2005. With projected natural increase, but zero net migration, this would mean a per capita reduction of 29.6 per cent; if migration were to run at net 100,000 per annum during this thirteen-year period, per capita reductions would have to be 35.7 per cent. The political challenge of reducing per capita consumption of fossil fuels rises disproportionately with population growth. If the intake were 200,000 per annum, for example, per capita reductions would have to be 42 per cent.

The text also draws attention to worrying trends in urban pollution (both of air and water), the increasing cost of housing, growing problems with disposal of wastes, and the loss of recreation areas within reach of city dwellers. And the authors mention, but do not pursue, the problem of the loss of prime agricultural land to urban growth. In almost all of these areas difficulties are already pressing and market forces offer no guidance to direct the common good.

Despite this, the Withers Report is positive about the economic effects of population growth, accepting the controversial proposition that the economic effects of population growth are at worst neutral and at best benign, depending on the skill level of the migrants. It is on these grounds that it endorses the higher intake figures (80,000 to 160,000 rather than 55,000), saying that in "economic terms the target rate of immigration can be set by other criteria anywhere within such a range without making much difference to average material living standards" (p. 110). This higher intake would produce indefinite growth at rates of between 1.1 and 1.6 per cent per annum, leaving unassailed Australia's pre-eminence as the country with the highest rate of population increase in the developed world.

The Economy

The report's economic optimism seems to rest on the notion that material living standards exist in some abstract sphere unconnected with natural resources and urban stress. Australian research on the economic effects of population growth is indeed usually of this type, restricted to the aspects of our material well-being captured in the national accounts, the economist's bread and butter. The limitations of an approach where clean air and water are only valuable when we have to pay for them, and a sustainable biosphere counts for nothing, are now well known. This report agrees that such an approach is limited, but does not qualify its conclusions accordingly.

Most of the studies used to prop up claims for the beneficial economic effects of growth not only ignore the problems of pollution, species loss, and urban stress, but also are generally deficient in data of any kind. Rather they are based on computer models of the economy, heavily dependent on theory, with their results largely determined by the assumptions they begin with; they also find only very modest positive effects. Birrell has pointed out elsewhere that the ORANI model, a favorite with Australian econometricians, is based on premises that ensure that immigration will produce positive outcomes. It is also a model that has failed many times in its economic predictions.

"This concern that the economic gains induced by population growth are not being used to pay for the appropriate infrastructure is a strong theme in the report."

In essence, dependence on computer models boils down to a faith in theory, or worse still, dogma. It has disquieting implications for the economy as a whole and for the labor market in particular. The Withers Report asserts that there "is an abundance of evidence that migrants create as many jobs as they take when unemployment is at more normal post-war levels" (p. 23). Unfortunately, it does not provide any references for this abundance of evidence. Elsewhere it claims that migrants "tend to create at

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least as many jobs as they take because of the demand effects they generate..." and states that the "Committee considers that migration normally pays its way in terms of provision of public revenues." But though the committee believes that population growth has historically "expanded economic output in similar proportion and has thereby provided the broad capacity to fund infrastructure and investment in this area as in others," its members are concerned that "an insufficient share of population-driven output growth has been devoted to infrastructure requirements in Australia." This concern that the economic gains induced by population growth are not being used to pay for the appropriate infrastructure is a strong theme in the report. But no evidence is supplied for the claim that the extra people do indeed induce the extra funds. Perhaps the ORANI scenarios are now so well-established among the economic priesthood that they need not mention them.

The Labor Force

The claim that "migrants create as many jobs as they take" has been made so often in Australia that it has become a political slogan separating the economically literate who can appreciate the benefits of growth from the suspicious troglodytes who cannot. At a conference in Sydney in April, 1992, Michael Stutchbury, economics editor for the influential *Financial Review*, said that "most of the reputable studies show that immigration has no effect on unemployment." These studies are based on econometric models which assume that labor markets correct themselves; jobs, in theory, are created through lower wages. Is this a desirable outcome, and does it in fact happen? Stutchbury responded to this question by saying that he was "not an econometrician," but that he had a "gut feeling" that the outcome was positive. If the economics editor of Australia's leading financial newspaper lacks the expertise to analyze the findings of the econometricians, it is possible that important principles of public policy are being formed by a small group of theorists and programmers operating without critical peer appraisal.

One curious aspect of the conventional wisdom on job creation by migrants is that the market, blind to so many aspects of human society, appears to be able to distinguish between legal and illegal migrants. The Minister for Immigration is convinced that illegal migrants do take more jobs than they make. In December, 1991, he told the public that a tough line on illegals was justified because they "are clearly taking jobs away from Australians" and that it was important to rectify this situation, especially during the present difficult economic conditions.

"... disputes about whether the migrant intake is more or less highly skilled than the existing population rest on the question of whether clerks should count as skilled workers..."

The Withers Report does, however, acknowledge that the conventional wisdom may be inadequate during a deep recession, saying that the labor market impact of migrants in these circumstances "is a matter for urgent research." Fortunately by April, 1992, Withers and a colleague, David Pope, had run some more assumptions through their model and established that all was well.

The Report also claims that the skill level of the intake has long been higher than for the total labor force. Here it draws on Withers' own work (p. 33 — unfortunately his reference is omitted from the bibliography). Research for the FitzGerald inquiry by Graeme Hugo, former president of the Australian Population Association, clearly showed that this was a contentious point. In essence, disputes about whether the migrant intake is more or less highly skilled than the existing population rest on the question of whether clerks should count as skilled workers or not. If they are included as "skilled", the gross intake has a higher skill profile than the existing population; if not, it has a lower one. (Hugo also showed that skilled and professional migrants are much less likely to stay in the country, so that regardless of how we make the distinction between skilled and unskilled, the net intake is less skilled than the gross.)

The ability of the clerks and other people with some training to speak English is also unclear from the Withers Report. Fifty pages after the claims on the skill level of the intake, it describes the growth in the proportion of migrants with poor English

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ability during the 1980s (p. 83). It seems probable from this that a number of people who are counted as "skilled" would not be able to use their talents. Doubtless, different people wrote these two sections; it is a pity that they did not have more time to talk to each other. But the earlier material in the text does acknowledge that migrants' experience of formal training overseas is not well-reflected in their earnings in Australia and concludes that this "means both a lesser contribution to overall economic growth for Australia and high personal costs for those individuals" (pp. 34-35). This conclusion casts serious doubt on the economic benefits claimed for a migration program emphasizing skilled entrants. If the migrants cannot attract a salary commensurate with their presumed level of skill, then these skills are not being utilized by the economy.

The report offers the higher set of intake figures on the grounds that such an intake maximizes the economic benefits, or at least has a neutral impact (pp. 19, 110). The authors have not explained how it is that empirical research supports these claims and, in any case, a close reading of the text suggests that they (or some of them) do not believe the claims themselves. Nor does this economic optimism mesh with the report's analysis of the effects of growth on natural capital and urban infrastructure. An approach based on the need for an industry policy might have filled the gap between the economic and environmental sections of the report. Indeed, the authors implicitly acknowledge this, saying "if the benefits of skilled migration are to be maximized, the skills brought to Australia must address labor market needs" (p. 36).

Framework for a Population Policy?

Any work on a major question of public policy written under pressure will contain some errors and confusions. But the major problem in this report lies with the contradictions produced by two divergent approaches: the one clearly oriented towards the broad perspective of the interaction between human activity and the natural and built environments, the other narrowly focused on the economists' theoretical models. In a sense, we have two texts here, not one. But the structure provided by the initial statement of national goals, and by some of the policy recommendations, should help the authors of the inevitable next report to produce a more coherent account.

The document's most striking recommendation is that *Australia should have an explicit population policy*. To help implement this, the Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs should be replaced by a Department of Population and Local Government, and the Bureau of Immigration Research by a Bureau of Population Research. A Population Office would be set up in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and a Commonwealth-State Ministerial Council for Population and Urban Affairs should also be established (pp. 109-110, 124).

"One could contrast the tight focus on economic policies among Canberra's politicians and bureaucrats ... with the amateurish and ill-informed approach so often taken with population and migration."

Is saying "population" where one used to say "immigration" any more than a cosmetic change? Yes, if only because it makes it clear that policy makers should be talking about the nation and putting immigration into a national context, rather than responding to special interests, and because it focuses public attention on the interaction between demography and the whole range of social and economic policies. As Berelson pointed out nearly twenty years ago, all countries have population policies, in that they have a range of social and economic policies that affect demographic variables, including the variable of immigration. The difference is that some "population policies" are explicit and coordinated, and others implicit and ad hoc. So far in Australia we have had the latter kind.

The report emphasizes the lack of coordination on population policy between the federal and state governments and between different federal government departments (pp. 115, 22, 73, 108, 118). One could contrast the tight focus on economic policies among Canberra's politicians and bureaucrats, and the detailed attention that these policies receive from media critics, with the amateurish and ill-informed approach so often taken

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with population and migration. For example, the Director of the Ethnic Affairs Commission of Victoria, Franco Schiavone, declared that the Withers Report demonstrates "a clear bias." This is because the projections it uses show that the population will increase to 19 million in 2031 with zero net migration, and to 25 million if present rates continue. In Schiavone's opinion, the "first figure seems debatable, the second excessive." Population projections are arithmetical calculations based on a set of demographic assumptions. The arithmetic may be wrong, or, what is far more likely, the assumptions may prove to be mistaken. But Schiavone's reaction shows that he does not know how population projections are derived and consequently does not know how to begin to appraise ones that he instinctively dislikes.

"Most political analysts would agree that Immigration was not a key [government] department. The only group of officials likely to be knowledgeable about demography do not belong to the group that counts."

If a leading public servant demonstrated that he did not understand the consumer price index, he would lose credibility. But demography is a side issue, not part of the main game. Members of the press write about immigration in terms of human interest, migrant welfare and racism, while lobbyists talk of family reunion, multiculturalism and the housing industry. In any event, the policy elite is only half interested. A recent study of a section of the Australian power elite, Michael Pusey's *Economic Rationalism in Canberra*, has provoked an excited reaction in the serious media and among political scientists. But Pusey saw no need to include members of the Immigration Department in his study of key "economic rationalists" affecting national policy. This is not Pusey's bias. Most political analysts would agree that Immigration was not a key department. The only group of officials likely to be knowledgeable about demography do not belong to the group that counts. An explicit population policy could help pull demography into the center of policy formation.

It would also bring Australian families into clearer focus. Though the report recommends that all Australians should have access to contraception and as much choice as possible in family planning, it renounces any desire to manipulate births (or deaths) (pp. 91-92). Rather, it recommends that population agencies monitor other policies for their effects on family well-being. Women's concerns are taken seriously here; they are part of the mainstream, not an add-on option for fringe groups (pp. 84-86). A population policy set within clearly defined goals could have much to recommend it to the majority of Australians, and to the politicians who need clear guidelines based on national welfare to support them in their daily confrontation with lobbyists and special interests.

Impact of the Withers Report

A population policy should also help conservationists troubled by an apparent conflict between human and ecological interests. The Report makes it clear that immigration is not a fair and effective means of distributing international aid: rather than supporting immigration as any "solution" to global problems, it emphasizes the need to increase foreign aid, especially for family planning services and for help with environmental problems (pp. 94-101). The Australian Conservation Foundation has now written a new draft population policy drawing on this, and on the material on the environmental consequences of population growth in Australia, recommending that the intake should be set at 60,000 per year, leading to a stable population of 22.2 million in the year 2031.

Has Phillip Toyne's goal of finding a way out of the morass that conflict over immigration was creating for the ACF been achieved? The answer to this question is still unclear. There are reports that the draft ACF population policy has been weakened and that the next annual general meeting will see more debate, and possibly more conflict, between immigration reformers and others within the organization.

The response of the Government is also uncertain. Though the Report was published in February, 1992, by October there still had been no official response to it. But in November, at the

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Bureau's second Immigration National Outlook Conference, the Minister for Immigration, Gerry Hand, assured an audience of some 500 people that the Report had not been forgotten and that its authors would soon see some significant Government initiatives based on it. These same authors would have been more reassured by this were it not for the fact that some of them already held leaked copies of an internal Departmental Minute. This document rejected many of the Report's recommendations, including the crucial recommendation that Australia adopt a population policy. Was the Minister being less than frank? His speech was funny, intelligent and at one point passionate. He said that he knew that he sometimes made mistakes, and people were very right to point these mistakes out to him. But, he said, he never prevaricated and those who questioned his integrity would feel his anger. Rather than drawing a veil over reality, was he signalling his intention to override the decisions of his staff to reject the key recommendations of the report?

The big questions that immigration politics pose for the Australian people and the future of their nation continue to demand serious attention. The program has been cut, but the cuts are temporary and pressures to bring more people into the country are strong. The smaller questions of how particular groups, factions and politicians are responding to aspects of the larger picture will all play their part in shaping the final outcome. ■

NOTES

List of reports referred to in the text:

The first three (Borrie, the Green Paper, and Price) are out of print. Copies may be borrowed through inter-library loan.

W.D. Borrie, *First Report of the National Population Inquiry*, (two volumes), The Government Printer, Canberra, 1975 (*Supplementary Report*, 1978)

Australian Population and Immigration Council, *Immigration Policies and Australia's Population* (a Green Paper), Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977

Committee of Review on Migrant Assessment: Statement of Findings (chair C. Price), Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1982

Copies of the FitzGerald Report and the Withers Report can be ordered, though there are not many of the FitzGerald Report left. The Australian Government Publishing Service sales department suggests that requests be faxed to them and they will fax back a quote, which includes postage (surface or air mail). Prices here are in Australian dollars and do not include postage and packing.

Australian Government Publishing Service
Sales Department
GPO Box 84
Canberra
Australian Capital Territory
AUSTRALIA 2601
FAX 616-295-4888

Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies (chair Stephen FitzGerald), *Immigration: A Commitment to Australia*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988.
There is a main report and a volume of consultants' reports. (There are only a few copies left of each.) The consultants' reports are interesting, but one gets the drift of the report without them.

FitzGerald - main report, catalogue no. 8804221, $9.95
FitzGerald - consultants' reports, catalogue no. 8805273, $44.95

Population Issues Committee (chair Glen Withers), National Population Council, *Population Issues and Australia's Future: Environment, Economy and Society*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992

As with FitzGerald, there is a main report, the document reviewed in this article, and a volume of consultants' reports which serve to support the main text.

Withers - main report, catalogue no. 9121275, $11.95
Withers - consultants' reports, catalog no. 9215988, $39.95

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William Ryerson is executive vice-president of Population Communications International, which works through the mass media in Latin America, Africa and Asia to promote conscious decision-making on family size. His population-related work of the past twenty years has taken him all over the world, providing the background for the views expressed here.

What's Needed to Solve the Population Problem?

By William N. Ryerson

The world is now growing by about 95 million people per year. Ninety-five percent of this growth is in the poorest countries that are the least equipped to feed, educate or employ these additional people.

While poverty may contribute to rapid population growth, it is also a consequence — in what amounts to a self-reinforcing syndrome. There are, however, cases in which population growth has been slowed significantly without any prior improvement in the standard of living, and cases in which improving economic situations have been accompanied by higher fertility rates.

On the other hand, since World War II, no country has gone from developing status to developed status without first reducing birth rates and population growth rates. The reason is simple. Reduced family size enables couples and nations to save a higher percentage of their income and invest it in education, government, and industry — all of which lead to increased productivity of the economy, greater employment, and higher incomes. Countries with large families tend to spend all of their income on immediate consumption needs of food, housing and clothing and have little left over to invest. As a result, fast-growing countries tend to suffer from economic stagnation — as is evident from many countries in the developing world.

Providing family planning contraceptive services has helped reduce fertility rates, particularly in Asia and Latin America. But meeting unmet demand for contraceptives is only part of the solution. The countries that have most successfully reduced population growth have emphasized changing attitudes of the people regarding the role of women, ideal family size, age of first pregnancy, and the benefits of using modern contraceptives.

Throughout the rest of the world, we've done the easy part — providing contraceptive services to those who want them. Access to services is still not perfect, but it's far better than it was even a decade ago in much of the world. But use of effective family planning methods will not result in population stabilization if desired family size is five, six or seven children. Access to family planning doesn't solve the problem of husbands who prevent their wives from using contraception.

Recent Demographic and Health Surveys have found that, among the reasons given for not using contraception by women who are not pregnant and do not want to become pregnant, lack of access to contraceptives is mentioned infrequently; in many countries it is mentioned by less than one percent of the women as their reason for non-use. The top reasons generally are lack of knowledge, concern with the medical side effects of contraceptives, and opposition from the husbands.

"...family planning methods will not result in population stabilization if desired family size is five, six, or seven children."

Mass media programs that model new forms of behavior are a neglected part of the answer. So are efforts to raise women's status, and provide mandatory education for children.

Research to measure the effects of such non-medical interventions is not yet taken seriously enough. Far more research is also needed to obtain a comprehensive, worldwide picture of family size

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preferences, both among contraceptors and non-contraceptors.

The broadcast media have a particularly important role to play in accelerating acceptance of family planning and small family norms since they reach large numbers of people very cost-effectively. Particularly important are entertainment programs which attract the largest audiences. Serial dramas are especially well-adapted to showing an evolution of key characters from traditional attitudes towards modern attitudes regarding family communications, the role of women, family size decisions, and the use of family planning.

An illustration of the importance of motivation is the fact that the contraceptive prevalence rate in Brazil is slightly higher than it is in Denmark (66 percent vs. 63 percent), but total fertility per woman in Brazil is more than twice that of Denmark.

"It's time to focus some significant effort on motivating the roughly 50 percent of the population who are not using contraception..."

The primary problem is no longer lack of access to contraceptive services. The idea that there are 300 to 500 million couples not practicing contraception despite a stated desire to stop childbearing has been debunked within the last two years by demographer John Bongaarts, Vice President of the Population Council. His analysis leads to the conclusion that, at most, there are between 87 and 100 million women in the developing world outside of China whose reproductive desires differ from their actions — in that they would like to *delay* their next pregnancy but are not using a *modern* method of contraception. He points out that many factors account for this gap, of which lack of access is only one.

In fact, according to Charles Westoff of Princeton University's Office of Population Research, half the women categorized as having *unmet need* for contraception have no intention of using contraceptives even if they are freely available at their doorstep. The desire to delay or terminate childbearing is not adequate to bring about a reduction in fertility rates if women believe their lot in life is to take whatever God (or their husbands) give them, if couples cling to the tradition of producing large families, or if people are misinformed about the relative safety of modern contraceptives compared to the physical ordeal of bearing, say, ten children.

In an analysis of worldwide data, UNICEF, in a publication entitled *The State of the World's Children — 1992*, made the following statement: "If all women were able to decide how many children to have and when to have them, the rate of population growth would fall about 30 percent."

If this statement is true, the stunning significance of it is that, if all women everywhere had full access to contraceptives and used them with 100 percent efficiency to have only the number and spacing of the children they want, the rate of world population growth would drop only 30 percent.

The world needs to focus major attention on the remaining 70 percent of the problem. It's time to focus some significant effort on motivating the roughly 50 percent of the adult population who are not using contraception to begin practicing family planning for the purpose of achieving small family size. Equally important are the desired family sizes of the users of contraception. ■

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Roy Beck, Washington editor of The Social Contract, *reports on several recent conclaves in Washington, DC and New York City. Parts of this report on administration officials Babbitt and Browner were included in an article by Mr. Beck previously published by Negative Population Growth, Inc.*

Washington Notepad:

More Confirmation of Immigration Problems But Symptoms, Not Source, Get Attention

By Roy Beck

The problems of immigration-driven U.S. population growth are receiving increased attention — and confirmation — in the capital city. But Diogenes would find an honest man in Washington more quickly than he would find a major voice asking whether one way to deal with those problems would be to slow or stop the growth.

In a number of recent incidents, an observer could see government agencies, officials, private think tanks and academics figuratively fishing drowning people out of the river but almost never going upstream to do something about the folks throwing the people into the river in the first place.

In short, the underlying assumption throughout the city continues to be that high immigration-population growth is inevitable and beyond the scope of government action. Thus, the only role of public policy is to manage the effects of growth.

Incident One

RAND: Urban Schools Reeling From High Immigrant Levels

A new RAND Corporation study indicates that the growth of immigrant populations in major cities is wreaking havoc in the school systems.

"Education failure is the norm," according to Paul Hill, one of the authors of "Newcomers in American Schools: Meeting the Educational Needs of Immigrant Youth." He revealed key findings at an Urban Institute briefing in March.

A major problem, Hill said, is that the million or more newcomers a year tend to move into school districts that already are experiencing severe problems and declining funding.

Not only are the immigrant children ill-served, but the school systems are unable to educate the natives. In those schools, the European-heritage natives have a high school dropout rate approaching 50 percent, Hill said. More than 25 percent of the African-American males who stay in school are placed in special education classes, in part because the "handicapped" designation draws more funds into the district, he said.

Immigrant students pose many problems for a school district, Hill said:

- **Language**. The number of non-English-speaking children has so outstripped the supply of bilingual teachers, and other resources, that the old debate about whether to maintain kids in their original language is "a dead issue."

- **Weak academic preparation in home countries.** "Much lower than past immigrant waves."

- **Random arrival and mobility**. Like other poor Americans, immigrants move a lot just before the rent is due, constantly changing schools. But, also, many foreign-born students disappear before Christmas to go to their countries of origin for visits, often not returning until around Easter.

Hill said the survival of inner city communities is at stake. Fewer than one of two kids going into these high schools comes out employable. Black students are especially at risk because they are concentrated with the Latin American immigrants.

The "size of the wave and the chaos of the situation are too great" to have the resources to keep poor natives in school, Hill said.

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Answer: More Federal Programs

But the RAND study showed no sign of considering the immigrant-induced student population growth as a factor that could be changed or controlled. Proposals centered around better and bigger federal programs to help the school districts accommodate the immigrant children.

Michael Fix, the Urban Institute's director of immigration policies, called for the nation to make major structural changes in education to handle the influx. When a person in the audience asked why primary and secondary education are a federal responsibility, pointing out that local entities traditionally have handled it, Fix answered that the federal government as gatekeeper on immigration has a higher responsibility for immigrant children than for American children.

During a reception afterwards, David W. Stewart, director of Program Development at the American Council on Education, related the RAND study to his own new book, *Immigration and Education: The Crisis and the Opportunities*. "No governmental action has had more effect on American education in the last 30 years than the 1965 Immigration Act," Stewart said.

Incident Two

Ford Study: Communities Tense, But Immigration Not Real Cause

Troubled by news reports of rising tensions among natives and immigrants in various U.S. communities, the Ford Foundation funded a study begun in 1987 and concluded this year, using dozens of researchers and professors. They examined how high immigration changed communities, and the effectiveness of various attempts to mold inter-ethnic relations.

In a crowded room at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in June, Robert Bach, principle author of the 72-page "Changing Relations: Newcomers and Established Residents in U.S. Communities," outlined the findings about six cities: Miami, Philadelphia, Houston, Chicago, Garden City, Kan., and Monterey Park, Calif.

Researchers said they were pleased to learn that after the largest immigration since the turn of the century, only infrequent "dramatic episodes of violent conflict" were occurring. But they noted more prevalent relations among natives and newcomers that involved competition, tension and opposition. "If a single source of conflict stands out, it involves the use of different languages, one of the most contested issues in relations found in all six of the research sites," the final report says.

Natives Feel Loss

Researchers found that the large-volume immigration was "an essential ingredient in the transformation of community life," leaving many natives with a sense of loss. Although the immigrant-fueled population growth leads to increases in overall economic growth, there is a dark side, the report states. The growth in an area like the Los Angeles region, which includes Monterey Park, can be uneven and lead to "the diminution of living standards for many. Rapid expansion has also been accompanied by class polarization and widening differences between high- and low-income groups." In Garden City, "migrants strained the availability of housing, increased school enrollments dramatically, and raised the demand for medical services."

The Ford study noted that Latino immigrants in Miami are becoming the authority figures in native black neighborhoods which often see them as the cause of black deprivation and powerlessness. And conflict between native blacks and Haitian immigrants has been so intense in one school that it was closed several times. Anger and resentment are common among established residents — particularly in black communities — who feel increasingly vulnerable to the Latino immigration and feel there is nothing anyone can do to slow or stop it.

About Monterey Park natives' opposition to the "encroachment" by immigrants, the report said it is not sufficient to dismiss the feelings as racism, xenophobia or intolerance. "It is not only the established Anglo groups who articulate anxiety and opposition, but the established Mexican and Japanese communities as well. All established residents experience a dramatic change in the nature, the feel, and the meaning of community life."

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Groups Co-Exist By Separation

The reason there is not more overt conflict in communities with large immigrant population growth is that "newcomers and established residents coexist primarily by maintaining their distance from each other ... separation, not integration, characterizes the divided world..."

In Philadelphia, working-class whites are described as experts at passive resistance. They admit that they do not speak up in community organizational meetings about the problems they perceive for fear of being accused of racism. "This attitude stems from pervasive assumptions in the media and among the middle class that whites are inherently racist and that the first step in cultural understanding is for them to admit their racism. Rather than risk ridicule by going against the dominant (pro-immigrant) tone of the meeting, whites gradually dropped out, using excuses of lack of time or illness, leaving the original issue unresolved."

Researchers were struck by the resentment of Houston blacks who used to work at the ship channel. The researchers said the jobs were lost due to mechanization and the economic downturn in the 1980s, but the blacks believe discrimination is the reason few blacks work there now, while a lot of Latinos are there.

Problem: Too Much Homogeneity

Having uncovered all those problems, the Ford Foundation report concludes that the cause is not immigration, but Americans' and their institutions' weaknesses in being able to adapt.

"Immigration itself is not the difficulty," the report states. "The problem that many observers claim faces America — the potential for fragmentation — is not produced by immigrants or by their diversity."

Author Bach, professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton, offered at the Carnegie presentation that "the problem in America may not be diversity but homogeneity. Most people in this room were raised in an America with the highest homogeneity in history." By growing up in a time of low immigration (when the nation was at its "most insular and provincial," in the report's words), today's leaders were ill-equipped to respond to the internationalization of U.S. communities during the '80s and '90s, he suggested.

One sentence of the Ford report (on page 21) does acknowledge that a question could be asked about whether the United States might address the challenges in its communities by changing the volume of immigration. But in the next sentence, it dismisses the thought by noting that "these are issues largely settled by recent congressional debate and passage of the Immigration Act of 1990." If indeed the floor is closed to more questions about immigration numbers, the Ford Foundation helped close it. Groups funded by Ford were integral to the lobbying that led to passage of the 1990 act that increased legal immigration by 40 percent as the nation moved into an economic recession.

Accommodation, Not Assimilation

"The nation frequently forgets its responsibility for immigration; movement to America occurs primarily by invitation... American employers fuel the immigration, American foreign policy embraces it, and American family values maintain it," the new report states. Yet, nowhere does the report allow discussion of whether America should consider changing its invitation.

"Groups funded by [the Ford Foundation] were integral to the lobbying that led to... increased legal immigration..."

Because the government invited the large numbers of immigrants, Americans have a responsibility to change in order to reduce tensions that may arise, the report states. Old ideas of assimilation by immigrants into a dominant American culture fail to take into account new internationalist realities, it says.

"In many places where immigrants concentrate, the reference for adaptation is no longer an image of white, Anglo-Saxon America... Notions of Anglo conformity or assimilation to a single culture simply have no immediate relevance in situations in which newcomers and established resident racial and ethnic minorities interact as dominant groups. These mixed settings further legitimize diversity and provide role models that depart from any idealized notion of what America means."

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"Accommodation" of natives and newcomers to each other is the preferred model. The Ford report suggests one tool to accommodation is that while immigrants learn English, natives need to be learning the immigrants' languages.

Ford Study's Solutions

Among the Ford study's other recommendations to lessen tensions in U.S. communities:

- Phase out legal distinctions that result in differential treatment for immigrants based on their country of origin (especially Cuba), whether they are refugees or immigrants and whether they are in American legally or illegally.

- Avoid "get-tough" policies that oppose current levels of immigration into a community or that seek to get rid of illegal immigrants.

- Extend the legalization program of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act to more newly arrived illegal aliens. Bach said legalization has been a "wonderful federal tool" for bringing ethnic groups together in communities as they help illegal aliens gain legal status.

- Non-citizen immigrants should be enabled and encouraged to participate in local elections.

- Existing community organizations, which tend not to be very responsive to their new internationalized settings, need to seek ways to cross group boundaries and widen their membership.

- Local leaders should find common problems which all ethnic groups can address through unified activity that will forge new bonds.

"Immigration presents the nation with a challenge to interpret democracy both as a political doctrine and as a social and economic creed," the Ford study concludes.

Incident Three

Babbittry Of A Different Kind

In a brief informal moment after an April luncheon at the National Press Club, Bruce Babbitt revealed himself to be perhaps unique among all top officials of the Clinton administration. His special trait? He indicated his awareness — and concern — about the consequences of massive U.S. population growth.

Thus, news early in June that the president was considering moving Babbitt from the U.S. Department of Interior to the Supreme Court threatened to extinguish the only flicker of hope thus far that the new administration might pay some attention to U.S. population questions.

The Secretary of Interior must manage the highly controversial rationing of the federal government's vast holdings of natural resources. Babbitt was handed a U.S. population with more than 50 million additional Americans competing for those resources than his predecessor had to deal with in 1970.

During the luncheon, he addressed the Washington press corps about the difficulties of rationing, but did not once refer to the population pressures. After the session, however, I cornered Babbitt, reminding him of the 1972 Rockefeller Commission recommendation for population stability and asking whether he is planning how to ration Interior's holdings with a U.S. population of 383 million forecast for 2050?

"That's just it," Babbitt immediately replied. "That (population growth) is at the root of all of our problems." Could he be counted on to raise that issue at the high reaches of the administration? Babbitt, who was trying to leave the room, turned back and answered, seemingly a bit reluctantly, "Yes. Thanks for the admonition."

Babbitt could do worse than concentrate on educating Vice President Al Gore. While environmentalists are impressed with Gore's seriousness about reducing U.S. contributions to global problems, Gore has yet to show any recognition of how the U.S. role is exacerbated by adding nearly three million U.S. residents a year. Gore and Babbitt have a standing appointment to meet for breakfast every Thursday on environmental matters.

At the least, the Interior Secretary's recognition of population issues is a form of "Babbittry" far different from the compulsive love of growth for its own sake exemplified by George Babbitt, Sinclair Lewis' fictitious character. And it's a far different perspective than one finds at the Environmental Protection Agency — past or present.

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Incident Four

Impossible Dream? An EPA Population Expert Or Desk

During the Bush administration, I called EPA's public affairs office, asking to be directed to an official or researcher who could talk about how population growth has affected efforts to achieve environmental goals.

I was bounced around from phone to phone, office to office and city to city over a couple of weeks. An official in the "mobile source air pollution" area told me: "We don't talk much about growth. We do talk about the number of cars. I think it generally is true that the (Bush) administration doesn't like to talk about population growth." When I asked incredulously if there wasn't at least somebody stuck away in a basement cranny who remembered the earlier ideas of controlling pollution through population stabilization, the official huffed that she certainly remembered "ZPG and all of that two-child family talk" but the idea of controlling population "just doesn't fly in a democratic country. Americans don't want you messing with their freedom."

"...a perfect opening for raising the issue of population growth which may be the most important 'upstream' contributor to negative environmental impact."

I gave up my Diogenes-like search for an EPA population expert.

But a few months later, there were signs of interest in population coming from the general counsel of Bush's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). The counsel met with representatives of the Sierra Club Defense Fund, Negative Population Growth and Carrying Capacity Network about beefing up CEQ requirements so that Environmental Impact Statements would have to assess the effect of a project on population growth, and that growth's effect on the environment. Such an assessment was implicit in the 1969 National Environmental Protection Act that set up both the CEQ and the Environmental Impact Statements. But the record has been spotty in translating it into action.

Incident Five

New EPA Chief Shows Little Interest In Population Factor

With the arrival of the Clinton-Gore supposedly dream green team, I was eager to hear how new EPA chief Carol Browner would continue the tentative positive direction of the Bush CEQ on the population issue.

During a May evening with Washington's environmental and science writers, Browner explained that "end-of-the-pollution-stream" enforcement had achieved most of the big gains possible. Although EPA will need to see that those gains are maintained, "we need to move upstream to prevent pollution from taking place in the first place."

That seemed to be a perfect opening for raising the issue of population growth which may be the most important "upstream" contributor to negative environmental impact. With Clinton talking about abolishing the Council on Environmental Quality and giving its duties to the EPA, I asked Browner if she had plans to require population impact assessments?

Browner appeared confused by the question, indicating no knowledge of the issue and finally stating, "I don't feel qualified to answer that."

Probing further for a sign of commitment on the population issue, I told her of my futile search for an EPA population expert and noted that some organizations have called for an EPA population department or desk.

"I can't imagine what a population desk would do," Browner said.

I would have been glad to offer the vision of a population desk that could have played a major role in 1990 by giving expert testimony to Congress about the population and environmental effects of the Immigration Act of that year, and how it's passage would undercut the Clean Air Act that Congress

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approved the same week. But Browner's answers point to yet another administration that "doesn't talk much about growth." For a person who worked closely with then-Sen. Gore, who has mixed with environmental groups for years and who led the state of Florida's efforts to protect the environment under the onslaught of unrelenting population growth there, Browner's lack of population insight is a sad commentary on all the environmentalists with whom she has worked through the years.

Incident Six

Refugee Advocates Indicate Ties To High Population Growth

In March, participants of Amnesty International's conference, "The Global Refugee Crisis: Rethinking Policy and Methods of Empowerment," expressed no disagreement with the assessment that the United States does not have a population problem and can grow much larger without any effects that would deserve consideration.

Some 20 to 30 refugee and human rights groups were represented among the more than 200 participants at New York University. With the United Nations counting some 40 million refugees and displaced persons worldwide and discounting resettlement as a useful option for more than a tiny percentage, the refugee advocates nonetheless spent most of the conference focused on continuing the United States' historic high refugee quotas and on increasing them.

All Immigration Supported

Refugee advocates were feeling beleaguered by the high-visibility media reports about the asylum and visa fraud dimensions of the killings at CIA headquarters and the bombing of the World Trade Center, as well as by President Clinton's publicly popular decision to continue President Bush's policy of turning back Haitian boat people. They were concerned that Americans are becoming more "xenophobic" and less hospitable to refugees.

As an invited speaker for one session, I suggested that Americans might be less concerned about the impact of more than 100,000 refugees each year if there weren't another 800,000 legal immigrants also driving rapid U.S. population growth.

But nobody at the conference was willing to de-link refugee advocacy from high-population-growth immigration. In fact, no refugee advocate voiced a willingness to oppose even *illegal* immigration. Both legal and illegal immigration are essential to provide alternative channels for foreign citizens who are denied the right to come to the United States as refugees, several leaders said. They said they oppose employer sanctions because the law makes it difficult for illegal aliens to get U.S. jobs.

Mark Handelman, executive vice president of the New York Association for New Americans, which he described as the country's largest Jewish refugee group, acknowledged that refugee advocates in the past have been "fearful of raising the profile of immigrants and resettlement in this country for fear that if too many people knew too much about what was going on there would be a restrictionist backlash against immigration." Now, as a result of highly skilled public communication by groups like the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), Handelman indicated, Americans have become quite familiar with the volume of immigrants and refugees, and indeed are backlashing. Handelman called on the refugee groups to vigorously counter the backlash by learning the communication skills of their opponents and telling the "success stories and the stories about the contributions that immigrants and refugees have made in this country." There are no rational concerns about current levels of immigration that could drive an American into xenophobia (irrational fear of foreigners), he said.

"...no refugee advocate voiced a willingness to oppose even illegal immigration."

Cathi Tactaquin, director of the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, focused on California and decried the steadily growing success of "anti-immigrant organizations" in persuading environmentalists that immigration is to blame for the state's pollution, smog, traffic

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congestion and generally overcrowded conditions. Fortunately, she said, many environmental groups continue to insist that overconsumption, not overpopulation is the problem.

Little Strength In Their Diversity

The advocates of high refugee and immigrant numbers did not appear to be finding great strength in their diversity. Some people there were clamoring for refugee work to place more emphasis on worldwide gay and lesbian concerns. Another group pushed the "women of color" agenda, while another just wanted a lot more priority given to "gender issues." There were people rooting for different continents and different countries. Nobody was much concerned about getting belligerent because nobody has to prioritize under any real ceilings. But it was difficult to see a unified agenda emerging from the meeting. "We have to start to coordinate our efforts," Handelman said. "We are a very fragmented field. Unfortunately, because we are multi-interest groups with different slants on each theme, we have difficulty at times in getting together and finding common ground and really taking a very strong public position, which is a disadvantage in this debate."

Several leaders called for increased efforts to mobilize recent immigrants and turn them into aggressive advocates for high-admissions policies, while countering the process through which many immigrants reach the point that they tell pollsters they favor lower immigration.

Incident Seven

Growth Seen Threatening Slime, Spineless Species

The bio-diversity within U.S. borders is under intense assault from the expanding population, said Thomas Lovejoy of the Smithsonian Institution to more than 200 participants at the second National Carrying Capacity Issues Conference in June. The three-day event was a rare occurrence in Washington where the implications of population growth were confronted openly.

The most frightening environmental threats of population growth are not the publicized ones to vertebrates like the spotted owl ("people tend to be vertebrate chauvinists") but to "spineless plants and organisms" on which the planet really runs, Lovejoy said. Preservation of species does not involve favoring nature over humans, but is primarily for the sake of humans, he showed.

"The real pharmaceutical factory of the planet is in nature," Lovejoy said. "Things that happen in nature could never occur in the minds of scientists in their wildest imaginations."

He noted that some slime found at the bottom of a pool in Yellowstone is so full of pharmaceutical wonders that "it is driving billions of dollars of diagnostic activity... If there is anything without limits, it is the ability of biological diversity to do things for humans."

China Size Possible Here

Former Sen. Gaylord Nelson, founder of Earth Day in 1970, noted that people legitimately can argue that it is possible for the United States to have a far higher population. China, with 1.1 billion people, has about the same amount of land mass as the United States with 258 million. Thus, U.S. land probably could support four times as many people as it contains now, Nelson said. Apparently that is an assumption that nearly all the people mentioned previously in this article are making as they willingly accede to U.S. policies that propel the country toward a Chinese population density.

"Nelson suggested pressing Congress and the president to undertake a study of the carrying capacity of the country."

However, Nelson has thought about the practical implications of that assumption and reminded the conference that to accommodate all those additional people, Americans would have to make a rather significant sacrifice — they would have to adapt to the quality of life of the average Chinese. "But who would want to?" he asked.

Nelson gave the keynote address of the conference involving nearly five dozen speakers who confronted the effects of current U.S. population

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policies and the chief cause of growth — immigration. Nelson, head of the Wilderness Society, said President Clinton can compensate for all other failures if he becomes the president who successfully sets the nation on a path toward environmental sustainability. To do that, he will need to avoid a growing tendency to consider environmental matters in mainly global terms. "It depends much more on what we (Americans) do than what the international community does," Nelson said.

To move U.S. policy toward environmental pragmatism, Nelson suggested pressing Congress and the president to undertake a study of the carrying capacity of the country. He decried Clinton's plans to eliminate the Council on Environmental Quality, noting that it had been one entity showing some helpfulness in recognizing carrying capacity questions.

Everglades Dead Without Curb on Humans

Several speakers painted a picture of an America much more likely to let the environment slip than to cut material lifestyles to compensate for population growth.

That is particularly true in the treatment of the Everglades, according to Lovejoy, a conservation biologist who originated the debt-for-nature swaps in the Third World and is credited with bringing the problem of the tropical rainforest to public attention. He had just returned from a two-day task force that is looking at the natural wonder: "It is a nightmare what we've done to the Everglades eco-system the last 50 years. It is a dying eco-system."

Incredibly, the federal government has tended to ignore population growth in its assessment of the Everglades' fate, responded Virginia Abernethy, an anthropology professor at Vanderbilt University and a board member of the Carrying Capacity Network which sponsored the conference. She said she had served on a federal advisory committee on the Everglades that was to look at how to protect the eco-system from the effects of the population, without addressing issues of growth — "But [the] truth is you can't save the Everglades if the population continues to grow."

"I'd agree with that entirely," Lovejoy said. And across the country, nobody really knows the extent to which expanding human settlements are threatening species, he said. He advocated a massive project that would "biologically map" the entire country to find where all the species are and to learn what sized natural fragments must be saved to preserve the species.

If It Ain't Broke, Fix It

David Pimentel, entomology professor at Cornell University and a CCN board member, noted that U.S. agricultural land greater in size than the state of Ohio was covered with blacktop or concrete from 1945 to 1975. In 1975 blacktop covered land the equivalent size of Ohio *and* Pennsylvania, he said. He didn't have figures for how much more land has been lost during the last 18 years.

Another sign that U.S. population exceeds environmental carrying capacity is that the country "is mining groundwater 25 percent faster than it is recharging," Pimentel said. "Humanity ought to make a decision: do we want to see how many people we can cram into the world? I see an optimum population of 200 million in the United States and 2 billion in the world, in contrast to 258 million and 5.6 billion today."

Ric Oberlink, head of Californians for Population Stabilization (CAPS), pointed out that California now has a population growth rate that is higher than India's and that sometimes exceeds even that of Bangladesh. California's chief population problem is the number of immigrants entering each year. But those immigrants' fertility habits also have led to a new baby boom. While Catholic Italy has the lowest fertility rate of 1.3, Oberlink said, California's fertility rate has soared to nearly double that, between 2.4 and 2.5.

U.S. policies promoting high population growth through immigration are allowed to continue because policymakers are too tied to the motto "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," said Garrett Hardin, retired ecology professor at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Although California increasingly is looking "broke," most of the country is not yet experiencing catastrophe from population growth. Unfortunately, if you wait until catastrophe hits, there isn't much to do to reverse it, Hardin explained.

"You have to fix it in advance of trouble," Hardin said. "You have to have restrictions and limitations in advance." ■

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Don Feder is a nationally syndicated columnist with The Washington Times.
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Granddad and the New Tide

By Don Feder

The typical immigrant of the 1990s isn't my grandfather. (Which is probably just as well: who wants to see the nation overrun by Jewish tailors?) Having reached that painful conclusion, it's easier to rethink my position on immigration.

In the past, I confess, my thoughts on the matter were clouded by emotion and tinged with nostalgia. What if they'd kept my family out? Images of savage hordes swamping the nation were dispelled by memories of a decent, gentle man who worked hard all of his life and struggled to become a good American.

That was then: this is now. Chinese wading ashore in New York and HIV-infected Haitians released from Guantanamo Naval base may elicit sympathy, but are symptomatic of a crisis that must be confronted.

Unlike past immigrant waves, those currently walking, wading and floating to these shores are a net economic detriment. By and large, they are impoverished, unskilled, poorly educated and far less-assimilable than their predecessors.

We are fast approaching the point where generosity and blind allegiance to the "nation of immigrants" mystique verges on national suicide. With 4.7 percent of the world's population, we take in half of its emigrants.

They arrive at a rate of a million a year (legally), perhaps twice that number in illegal immigration. Annually, new arrivals equal 16 percent of native births.

Even coming from the *shtetls* of Eastern Europe, my grandparents were closer culturally to turn-of-the-century Americans than are current newcomers to today's population. Of the 11.8 million legal immigrants who arrived in the past 19 years, 85 percent came from the Third World, most from societies culturally conditioned to failure.

The nation's racial-ethnic composition is being transformed overnight, against the will of the majority. Since 1970, the Hispanic portion of the population has doubled, from 4.5 to 9 percent.

There were crime problems with the old immigrants (witness the Black Hand), but not to the extent of the present invasion. In 1987, 20 percent of the total arrests in our six largest cities were foreign nationals. Nearly a third of the first 6,000 arrested in the L.A. riots were illegal aliens.

When Grandpa opted for the American dream, you worked or went hungry. Many of today's immigrants prefer the dream of the Kennedys and Clintons. While the number of Supplemental Security Income recipients grew 38.5 percent between 1982 and 1992, the number of immigrants partaking of this welfare program rose 370.2 percent. Economist George Borjas estimates that each year immigrants receive $1 billion to $3 billion more in welfare benefits than they contribute to the system.

All immigrants don't go on the dole, but those who work are a problem, too. They tend to be low-skilled and far more likely to take jobs than create them. In 1992, nearly 1.3 million foreign workers were certified for employment here, more than net job creation that year.

"We are fast approaching the point where generosity and blind allegiance to the 'nation of immigrants' mystique verges on national suicide."

How can our economy create enough new jobs for our own growing population, while straining under this burden?

Immigrants of the late 20th century are far less likely to assimilate than those who came before. In terms of past immigration, our genius was taking motley masses and turning them into little WASPS, in an ethnic sense. If not them, certainly their children.

Now, thanks to bilingualism, multicultural

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education and easy welfare, far too many immigrants remain part of an alien subculture.

In South Florida, Southern California, Texas and parts of New York City, there are millions of people who want to live here, but have absolutely no desire to learn our language, history or culture — who may never develop the commitment to the American ideal that led my grandfather to lie about his age in an effort to enlist in the U.S. Army at the outset of World War I.

Is it racist or xenophobic not to want to see one's country become the Balkans of the Western world? A nation is more than a geographic entity, or a conglomeration of disparate, disputatious groups that happen to share two rooms and a bath—something the proponents of de facto open immigration seem not to understand.

I began thinking, as opposed to emoting, on this highly emotional subject when I read a piece by Peter Brimelow, a Brit by birth, published in the *National Review* last year. Asks Mr. Brimelow rhetorically: "How can X be against immigration when the nativists wanted to keep his own great-grandfather out? This, of course, is like arguing that a passenger already on board the lifeboat should refrain from pointing out that taking on more will cause it to capsize." Which is where I came into this debate. ■

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John Lukacs is both an historian and an historical philosopher of international repute. His books include, A History of the Cold War, Historical Consciousness, *and* The Last European War. *Evelyn Mackenzie has a Ph.D. in history. She lives in Louisville, KY where she works as a local historian.*

The Triumph of Nationalism

A Book Review by Evelyn Mackenzie

THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
AND THE END OF THE MODERN AGE
By John Lukacs
New York: Ticknor & Fields (Houghton Mifflin) 1993
291 pp., $21.95

Nationalism, the defining political force of the twentieth century, is likely to remain the most prominent feature in the political landscape of the twenty-first. From under the rubble of collapsed communism, old nations and old feuds are struggling back to life, while myriad tribal wars are being fought by peoples seeking a piece of land to call their own.

All of this is the inevitable reaction against the artificial boundaries carved out in the aftermath of two world wars and held in place despite and not because of natural ties that create and bind a "people." What we are witnessing, then, is the triumph of the natural over the unnatural.

Yet for author John Lukacs, veteran commentator on Europe's shifting sands, the natural is not automatically right or desirable. At best ambivalent, he is more often downright gloomy when contemplating the probable victory of resurgent nationalism. The book can be read as his own struggle to put the historical events he describes into a moral context.

Lukacs argues that even the great historical forces generally thought to be driven by ideology are really expressions of national character. For example, he quickly dismisses the notion that the twentieth century has been dominated by the struggle between Democracy (U.S.A.) and Communism (U.S.S.R.). The Cold War was nothing but a "reciprocal misunderstanding": Stalin and his successors had such great difficulty absorbing Eastern Europe that the West mistook their digestive problems for hunger pangs, while the Soviet Union was deluded by the idea that the U.S. wanted to challenge its hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Lukacs' repeated insistence that American patriotism has been identical to anti-Communism and is "the ideological cement that bound the American 'conservative' movement and the Republican party together," will infuriate some, as will his belief that the Soviet Union was not pushed by the West, but fell naturally. This latter point bolsters Lukacs' arguments about national character — eventually the Russian people would cast off an alien ideology held in place by artificial political restraints.

Lukacs well understands that "the character of a people molds their institutions" and not vice versa. No government can endure unless it recognizes that there is little difference between the cultural and the political, that is to say, when we speak of our country we are also speaking of our people.

Yet, for a man who sees this, Lukacs often fails to understand those engaged in nationalist struggles. While he points out that if there were no Serbs in "Croatia," there would be no civil war in the former Yugoslavia, he later argues that the whole sorry mess came about "because of tales told by national idiots, full of sound and fury, fighting for an 'independence' signifying nothing." When is a nationalist not a nationalist idiot? That is the question with which Lukacs wrestles for much of the book.

"If America wants to survive as a nation ... it must define and maintain itself as a people."

As a self-described "participant historian," Lukacs includes much of the personal in this book, quoting extensively from his prior works and including large extracts from his journals. Lukacs' own experience shows that nationalism springs from the soul. One's national identity is a part of oneself

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that cannot be changed like a passport or a country of residence.

In 1946 Lukacs fled Hungary, which he calls his mother, for a matrimonial alliance with his wife, America. Although the union has lasted for the better part of half a century, Lukacs does not feel American enough to say "our" with ease. "I am Hungarian and American. But I am a European American and a European Hungarian."

"There can be no sovereignty without the control of one's land."

Lukacs believes that Europeanness is worth preserving. Nevertheless, it cannot be founded on currency union or a common market. If Europe is to survive, it must have an all-European immigration policy. Without this, he writes, "there can be and there will be no 'Europe' worth anything. No reality, no 'fact' in this world, has any meaning except by its contrast with other facts. *If there is a 'Europe,' it must be different from any other place in this world that is not Europe* [emphasis added]."

What is true of Europe is also true of the United States. In Lukacs' view, "Not only the American Constitution but the very existence of the United States depended (and probably still depends) on the condition that the prevalent majority of its inhabitants spoke, and speak, English." This is not something that should be left to chance. If America wants to survive as a nation, if indeed it even is a nation in Lukacs' sense of the term, it must define and maintain itself as a people. Just whom should Americans mean when they use the pronoun "we"? Lukacs believes the native population of the U.S. will force the government to restrict immigration. "There can be no sovereignty without the control of one's land." This control naturally includes the right to determine who will be invited to live on one's land.

Human nature does not change, says Lukacs, but he cannot completely reconcile himself to nationalism, fearing as much as hoping that it will triumph. His fears are those of many well-meaning Americans who, like Lukacs, see the rise of a "new barbarism" and the decline of the country they love, yet wonder if they have the moral authority to take steps to save it. For this reason alone — the insights it provides into immigration reform — the book is worth reading.

Although it was surely not Lukacs' intention to write a book that mirrors the genuine dilemma of the many Americans who fear for their nation's future but who wonder if they have the right to exclude others, that is just what Lukacs has done. His personal doubts are the same as those which paralyze this country. Those who would end the paralysis would do well to read this engrossing and honest account of one of its causes. ■

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Ira Mehlman heads the Writer's Support Group at the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) in Washington, DC. He is a frequent contributor to the pages of The Social Contract.

Multiple Choices:
Paradoxes of the Coming Century

A Book Review by Ira Mehlman

PREPARING FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
By Paul Kennedy
New York: Random House, 1993
512 pp., $25

If Paul Kennedy had written *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* ten years ago, he would, no doubt, have been hailed as a great visionary. While still a worthwhile read in 1993, there is little that anyone who is prepared to plow through its 428 pages has not already seen in one form or another many times before. *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* is chock-full of interesting new facts and data, but while some of the lyrics may be new, I suspect that among the book-reading public, the tune is already quite familiar.

To begin with, *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* may be a slightly misleading title. One might suspect that it is some kind of how-to book, only on a grander scale. But unlike books that tell you how to invest your money, tune your engine, lose 20 pounds or meet members of the opposite sex, the advice this book offers is more like the dreaded kind you might get from your pilot: "Put your head between your legs and hang on."

Perhaps the greatest benefit *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* offers is that it puts the full spectrum of challenges that await us all in one place, between two covers. One can only admire the scope of the book as it explores issues of demography, culture, technology, environment, agriculture, economics and the interplay these various disciplines are likely to have with one another. Behind every promise of the 21st century lies a hidden danger and every potential pitfall holds the promise of some new breakthrough.

It is the detailed and meticulous exposition of the myriad paradoxes of the 21st century that exposes the book's most glaring weaknesses. While it seems Kennedy's intent was to produce a guide book to the coming century, time and again he leaves the reader stranded at every fork in the road.

The striking contrast between *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* and a book like Al Gore's *Earth in the Balance*, is that Gore not only shows the reader where the forks in the road are, he unequivocally states his ideas about which course ought to be taken. In time Gore will be proven a prophet or an alarmist. Kennedy, however, seems unsure, or unwilling, to take a strong position on any of the options that we will be faced with in the coming decades.

A recurring theme throughout the book is the pivotal role demographics will play in shaping the world order in the next century. Over and over again, Kennedy draws the connection between explosive international population growth and all other issues with which the world will have to deal. Yet, like the atheist in the fox hole, each time Kennedy builds a case to prove the deleterious effects of unchecked population growth, he inevitably finds some reason to doubt himself.

This is particularly true when he looks at conditions in the developed nations of North America, Europe and the Pacific Rim. Kennedy seems quite capable of going on for page after page detailing the horrors of overpopulation in the underdeveloped world, while continuing to worry about whether the economies of the developed countries will be able to survive without a growing population and lots of young workers. "While the demographic explosion (combined with reduced resources) is the greatest problem facing the developing regions, many developed nations confront the opposite problem of stagnant or even negative population growth," writes Kennedy. As a result, in the coming century the "developed nations [will] have to look after fast-increasing millions of persons

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older than sixty-five," with fewer working age people to support them.

"Perhaps the most intriguing ideas about the 21st century that are presented in this book are those that deal with the future viability of the nation-state."

Though with a clear lack of enthusiasm, Kennedy seems to lean toward immigration as a solution to what he perceives as the developed world's demographic dilemma: "it seems unlikely that there will not be great waves of migration in the twenty-first century," he says. But "large-scale immigration raises the fear of losing control of national boundaries and traditional sovereignty," Kennedy acknowledges.

In fact the concern is so great that Kennedy goes so far as to venture into territory that has gotten other observers into deep trouble: "[a]s the better-off families of the northern hemisphere individually decide that having only one or at the most two children is sufficient, they may not recognize that they are in a small way vacating future space (that is, jobs, parts of inner cities, shares of population, shares of market preferences) to faster-growing ethnic groups both inside and outside their national boundaries. But that, in fact, is what they are doing."

All of Kennedy's concern about whether the West can remain economically viable without either pro-natalist policies or large-scale immigration could be allayed if he'd simply read some of the other chapters in his own book. In chapters dealing with Japan's role in the 21st century and one on the robotics revolution, he maps out the most viable models for success in the post-industrial world. Japan, he notes, is one of the most rapidly aging societies on earth. However, "Not only did Japanese industry ease its labor shortages without destroying the social peace, it also avoided the path followed by German firms — or, for that matter, companies in New York and California — of importing large numbers of guest workers."

The Japanese have managed, quite successfully, to compensate for a changing demographic structure, by investing their capital (they have tons of it) where the cheap labor is, without importing the cheap labor itself. More importantly, Japan has invested heavily in the cheapest labor of all — robotics. In one table, Kennedy lays out the solution to the West's demographic dilemma (if it is a dilemma at all):

World Industrial Robot Population, 1988

Japan	176,000
Western Europe	48,000
USA	33,000
Rest of World	23,000
TOTAL	280,000

Equally important, Japan has trained the workers who used to do what robots now do, to perform the more sophisticated tasks required in a technological world. Given the sorry state of our own educational system, replacing unskilled workers with robots would create perhaps the supreme paradox of the 21st century: the machines that could greatly enhance our quality of life would also marginalize a large segment of our population. People will not have jobs and will not be able to afford the benefits of this technological revolution, unless there is an accompanying revolution in education.

Perhaps the most intriguing ideas about the 21st century that are presented in this book are those that deal with the future viability of the nation-state. Though Kennedy has a chapter devoted to precisely this topic, he actually presents it much more provocatively in a chapter that addresses the communications revolution and the rise of multi-national corporations.

While Karl Marx dreamed of "one world" controlled by the proletariat (a dream which ultimately failed), Kennedy draws a picture of "one world" controlled by the likes of IBM, Mitsubishi and other multinationals. Though the nation-state thoroughly dominates all aspects of modern life, it is a relatively new institution. While few of us can conceive of a world without nations and sovereign governments, it has to be asked whether these social institutions — first formulated in pre-Renaissance Europe — will be viable in an era of the "global village."

Kennedy observes that, "the main creators and controllers of technology have increasingly become large, multinational corporations with more global reach than global responsibility." Whereas the concept of citizenship and mutual responsibility

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between the individual and the state have been the dominant social dynamic for the past several centuries, relationships in a world dominated by multinational corporations are likely to be purely financial. Nation-states, even bad ones, have fates and identities inextricably linked to their populations. Citizens view their relationship to their nation-state as a lifelong part of their own identities. For better or worse, being a member of a nation-state is an important part of who they are.

The same kind of relationship can never be achieved between an employer and employee. The primary responsibility of a corporation is to produce a profit for its stockholders. Unlike a citizen who is not pulling his or her own weight, an employee that is not useful to a profit-making institution can easily be disposed of. The globalization of commerce, in which corporations play an increasingly dominant role, but have little or no national identities and loyalties, could give new meaning to the concept of "new world order." It is the kind of new order that worries Kennedy. "Far from producing a solution to the gap between the world's 'haves' and 'have-nots,' the changing structures of international business and investment may exacerbate them."

At its best, *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* can provoke the reader to begin thinking about some of the realities the nation and the world are likely to face in the next several decades. As Kennedy takes us through the myriad problems and Catch-22's that await us, it is easy to understand why he is reluctant to suggest any solutions, although you find yourself wishing he'd go out on a limb anyway. *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* is an important book, but, because it lacks the boldness to offer solutions to the problems it raises, it falls way short of being the seminal piece it appears Kennedy wanted it to be. ■

[Ed. Note: see the concluding paragraph of Otis Graham's review on page 299.]

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An Historian Looks at Polyethnicity

A Book Review by John Tanton

POLYETHNICITY AND NATIONAL UNITY
IN WORLD HISTORY
By William H. McNeill
University of Toronto Press, 1986
85 pp.

William McNeill is Professor of History at the University of Chicago, and a past president of the American Historical Association, to mention only two of his many credits. Perhaps his best-known books are *The Rise of the West* (1963) and *Plagues and Peoples* (1976). Because of his prominence and because he is Canadian by birth, McNeill was asked to inaugurate a series of memorial lectures commemorating the Canadian historian Donald Creighton who, we're informed in the introduction, was a Canadian nationalist. McNeill delivered a series of three lectures in 1985, which constitute the chapters of this slim but challenging volume.

"Military success based on the solidarity of homogeneity contained the seeds of its own reversal."

The first lecture, "Empire and Nation to 1750," seeks to make the case for "polyethnicity as normal in civilized societies, whereas the ideal of an ethnically unitary state was exceptional in theory and rarely approached in practice." Three phenomena accounted for this change from the "barbarous homogeneity to civilized polyethnicity." The first was simply the military success of some tribes: they conquered others and incorporated them into their domain. These newcomers often started out as slaves or as otherwise unequal, but gradually blended into the conquering community, diluting its homogeneity. Military success based on the solidarity of homogeneity contained the seeds of its own reversal.

The second factor was disease in the cities, both endemic and epidemic. As a result, most urban areas did not replace themselves demographically. To make up the shortfall, they had to import people from the countryside — initially those close at hand (and more similar ethnically), but then more distant (and more dissimilar). These elements tended to dilute the original stock (here McNeill draws on his *Plagues and Peoples*, which also generously repays the reading).

Finally, trade was another diversifying factor. This was often facilitated by setting up protected ethnic enclaves to enable trade, thus introducing another outside influence. The net result of these forces were empires — conglomerations of many peoples under central control, but politically unstable due to this diversity.

In the second lecture, "The Triumph of Nationalism, 1750-1920," McNeill sets forth what he sees as the conditions that gave rise to nation-states in northern and western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. According to McNeill, these European states were exceptional in world history in their ethnic unity. Four factors accounted for this:

First, the classical Greek and Roman model of the self-governing city-state was familiar to the educated classes, and held up as the ideal. Second, the development of a sufficiently large body of professional and educated people put a premium on the development of a standard language that "provided a powerful new basis for expanding and delimiting national boundaries and for communicating within the national group so defined."

"...the remarkable population growth that set in from about 1750 ... across most or all of the civilized world ... constituted a turning point in human history."

The third factor was the "remarkable population growth that set in from about 1750, not merely in France and England but across most or all of the civilized world ... which constituted a turning point

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in human history." This happened in part because of a change in the patterns of disease from *epidemics* (which killed off the mature, reproducing adults) to *endemics* (which killed off the more easily replaced children). This population surge had twin effects. It made it possible for the cities to replace their demographic shortfall with ethnically more similar populations from the nearby countryside (rather than importing ethnically different peoples from afar, as in the old days). And, as the now-surplus people of the countryside gravitated to the cities, "there was enough tinder concentrated in the towns" to fuel the revolutions of the era.

Lastly, there was the response of other European nations to the French military successes. They too raised large standing armies which, through drill and discipline, effaced differences among the troops. The care and feeding of these standing armies also called forth a national response.

The nationalism thus engendered "papered over local differences of varying magnitude by virtue of the commonality of a school-learned language and whatever commonality of historical experience could be discovered or invented by industrious, nationalistic historians," and "the myth of national brotherhood and ethnic unity mattered. It justified sacrifice in war; it sustained public peace at home; it strengthened the hand of government in everyday affairs."

"The long-term fate of American, French and British experiments in polyethnic living remains ... problematic..."

The concluding chapter is entitled "Reassertion of the Polyethnic Norm since 1920." Here, McNeill details the efforts after WWI to follow the Wilsonian principle of 'self-determination of peoples' by giving each ethnic group its own country in Eastern Europe. This failed; there was just too much admixture of ethnic groups within the redrawn borders. After WWII, in Germany, France and England, large numbers of 'different' people appeared: Turks, Muslims from north Africa, 'people of color' from the colonies. These nations, formerly fairly uniform, were going the way of the rest of the world and becoming polyethnic. The same type of changes started in the United States, Canada, and Australia.

Where does all this lead? McNeill answers:

> *The long-term fate of American, French and British experiments in polyethnic living remains just as problematic as is the future of the two-tiered society generated by the legal status of Gastarbeiter in Germany and Switzerland.*
>
> *Political resistance to intermingling of peoples and skills across state boundaries is therefore far from negligible, and may well increase in time to come as the difficulties of living in polyethnic societies become more widespread and apparent.*
>
> *Modern national states of the liberal tradition accepted foreigners as at least potential citizens; and women, too, achieved political rights, though only in the twentieth century. Whether these principles will survive the impact of an interacting world in which vast differences of skills, culture, wealth, and physical appearance exist, is one of the capital questions for the next century.*

Finally:

> *Canadian and American experience gives North America something of a head start in the awkward matter of getting used to living side by side with people of differing ethnic heritage. Europeans are only beginning to get used to looking across the Atlantic; but in matters of public policy towards ethnic minorities, they may have reason to do so in time to come.*

That last was written in 1985; one wonders what sort of an epilogue McNeill might write now. Would he still hold up the United States as an example for others to emulate?

McNeill's book should also raise for us the question of how much further it is wise for the United States to go in deliberately increasing its diversity through immigration. Given the troubles of managing polyethnicity that McNeill cites, is it a good idea to consicously invite such problems in? Those who make policy on these matters would benefit from reading this book. ■

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Carl Bajema is a professor of biology at Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI.

Tough Lovers *vs.* Bleeding Hearts

A Book Review by Carl Bajema

LIVING WITHIN LIMITS: ECOLOGY ECONOMICS, AND POPULATION TABOOS
By Garrett Hardin
New York: Oxford University Press
339 pp., $25.00

The American economist Kenneth Boulding contends that it is "almost criminal to teach people things they really do not need to know if this prevents them from learning things they do need to know." What are the truly important principles about how humans interact with their environment, and how can we develop the critical thinking skills necessary to apply them? Where should citizens turn to begin the necessary intellectual retooling required for gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the world around us and how we can make more humane choices in interacting with other human beings and the rest of the world? The best strategy is to read the works of Garrett Hardin who is internationally recognized for his ability to help people become more critical thinkers and more considerate of future generations.

Living Within Limits: Ecology, Economics, and Populations Taboos is full of ideas that we all need to know and use if we are going to succeed in resolving our population/resources/environment problems. The dominant political doctrines asserting that endless material growth is desirable and that there is a technological fix for every environmental problem — including population growth — are examined and demolished by Garrett Hardin.

What critical thinking strategies does Professor Hardin employ in developing his argument that we need to better understand the limits set by the earth's resources and the hard choices we must make to live within the limits of a finite world? Dr. Hardin has identified three classes of questions that must be answered when trying to solve a problem: (1) "The literate question: 'What are the right words?'" (2) "The numerate question: 'What are the relevant numbers?'" and (3) "The ecolate question: 'And then what'?"

Language is used both to promote thought and to prevent it. All too often, words such as "infinite," "inexhaustible," "non-negotiable," and "self-evident" are used to prevent the discussion of problems created by numbers and limits imposed by the environment. Garrett Hardin asks why we always talk about "shortages" rather than about "longages" — of demand or of people. Hardin points out that the only way that literate controversies over conflicting rights can be reconciled is by "making them quantitative — numerate — and adopting numerate standards of allocation" [p. 14].

We now live in fast-moving societies where quantities, ratios, rates and duration times all matter. In a moment of frustration Mark Twain is reported to have shouted, "There are lies, damned lies, and statistics!" In a world where people are very numerous and can use numbers in an effort to convince others to behave in certain ways, it needs to be emphasized that there are ecological limits to what can be done on the planet Earth.

Ecolate thinking must be nurtured and used in decision making if we are not to fall victim to the forces we unleash and are unwilling or unable to control. Ecolate thinking, asking and answering the question *and then what?* enables us to estimate the effects of the interactions of systems over time in finite environments.

The way we think about cause/effect relationships greatly affects our understanding of the world and the effects of our actions/inactions. All too often we think in terms of a single isolated cause and a single isolated effect. Ecologists have pointed out the fact that everything is related to everything else. While this is technically correct and valuable as a warning, it is virtually useless as a guide to action. While all things in the environment interact, they interact in different ways. This important ecological understanding serves as the basis for what is now widely known as Hardin's Law: *we can never do merely one thing*. Since we cannot do just one thing, we must always ask and attempt to answer the question *and then what?* when we try to estimate the

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benefits and costs of proposed courses of action/inaction on the individual as well as social levels.

Living Within Limits should be read by all decision makers because it contains one of the best discussions of how past cases of exponential growth can and have led to the collapse of economic and ecological systems. Garrett Hardin does far more than just discuss the ecological limits to exponential growth. He points out how the ecological process of selection favors behaviors that ultimately lead to human tragedy in an unmanaged or poorly managed commons — a political/economic system for distributing the costs and benefits of human actions/inactions.

"This unique but all-too-common combination of capitalism and socialism must be prevented if we are to achieve a sustainable relationship with our environment."

Professor Hardin warns us against the tragic consequences of the "PP-CC" political game that allows individuals, corporations and/or governments to "privatize profits" while "commonizing costs," such as depletion of resources, pollution and progeny. This unique but all-too-common combination of capitalism and socialism must be prevented if we are to achieve a sustainable relationship with our environment.

Living Within Limits is far more than a "long dissertation on the laws of nature that must be obeyed, namely: the properties of exponential growth; limits generally; the properties of usury, the significance of human unreliability; and the consequences of reproductive competition (including natural selection)" [p. 294]. The world needs more "tough lovers" who take the well-being of future generations into account when making decisions about what to do in the present. Garrett Hardin shows us how to overcome much of the short time span and selfish dimensions of traditional ethics. Professor Hardin has expanded the theologian Martin Buber's classic "I-Thou" frame of reference to "I-Thou and then what?"

Hardin applies his "tough love" ecological logic to decide what courses of action should be taken with respect to controlling population growth and immigration. The "cancer" of overpopulation cannot be cured by feeding it (with foreign aid) or by transporting some of its "cells" elsewhere (via emigration).

We are headed for disaster unless we take account of the ecological consequences of our actions/inactions. *Living Within Limits* provides us with the ecological and ethical logic we will have to use if we are to be successful in resolving our population/resources/environment problems. ■

Rights Talk

"Discourse about rights has become the principal language that we use in public settings to discuss weighty questions of right and wrong., but time and again it proves inadequate, or leads to a standoff of one right against another. The problem is not, however, as some contend, with the very notion of rights, or with our strong rights tradition. It is with a new version of rights discourse that has achieved dominance over the past thirty years. Our current rights talk is but one dialect in a universal language that has developed during the extraordinary era of attention to civil and human rights in the wake of World War II. It is set apart from rights discourse in other liberal democracies by its starkness and simplicity, its prodigality in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its exaggerated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities."

— Mary Ann Glendon, Professor of Law, Harvard University
in *Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse*
(New York: The Free Press, 1991), page x.

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During 1992, immigration reemerged as one of the most contentious issues debated on the American political Right. Associate editor Wayne Lutton draws our attention to a new study that identifies the various factions and competing ideologies and indicates the direction in which the immigration debate is moving.

The Conservative Crack-up

A Book Review by Wayne Lutton

THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT
By Paul Gottfried
New York: Twayne/Macmillan
214 pp., $26.95

Ironically, the fall of the Berlin Wall also marked the end of the American conservative movement that took form in the 1950s. Focused as it was on militant anti-Communism, it is not surprising that the often uncomfortable alliance that witnessed its greatest "success" during the Reagan Presidency has collapsed.

Paul Gottfried, a professor of the humanities at Elizabethtown College and a veteran of the intellectual wars on the Right, has written a highly readable and remarkably informative account of the disintegration of post-World War II conservatism. His study includes a review of the fortunes of the erstwhile Libertarian movement, which has been torn by fierce factional infighting. Now, various "libertarian" and "conservative" factions are finding common cause.

Readers of this journal will find his discussion of how sundry "conservative" elements treat the topic of immigration enlightening. The Catholic Right and many religious Fundamentalists who oppose abortion have tended to be pro-immigration, arguing that natives of Latin America should be especially encouraged to migrate here, since they are said to embrace "strong family values." Neo-conservatives, basically a collection of "Great Society" liberal Democrats (long centered around Norman Podhoretz and *Commentary* magazine) came to endorse bigger military budgets, support for Israel, and the armed export of "democracy." They, too, have consistently opposed efforts to restrict immigration. Ben Wattenberg, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is a representative spokesman for this camp.

Aside from those who support open immigration for various philosophical, political, or narrow economic reasons [viz.*The Wall Street Journal*], Gottfried reveals a more sinister side of the immigration debate. He points out that the Heritage Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank that has long influenced Republican policy makers, has received important financial underwriting from Far Eastern business and government interests. It comes as little surprise, then, that Heritage has aggressively championed "free trade" and increased Third World immigration. Heritage has vociferously promoted the anti-restrictionist views of Julian Simon and joined with professional Hispanic activists in opposing the key employer sanctions provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

The Heritage Foundation has not acted alone. As Dick Kirchten observed in *National Journal*, "immigration is a growth industry in the think tanks of the Right." Gottfried documents how conservative proponents of immigration reform have been the subject of malicious personal attacks as well as efforts to "de-fund" institutions and journals which air restrictionist views.

In his final chapter, "The Unraveling of the Conservative Movement," Gottfried considers the recent reemergence of support for immigration reform among elements of the "Right." These include "right-wing greens" — cultural traditionalists who combine a strong pro-environmentalist posture with calls for immigration restrictions — and the so-called Paleoconservatives — an alliance of Old Right traditionalists, libertarians, and neo-mercantilist nationalists who have joined together under the auspices of the John Randolph Club, and are often found in print in the pages of *Chronicles* magazine.

A major theme of *The Conservative Movement* is that "traditional political labels are becoming increasingly irrelevant." What is now taking place is a realignment of interests that transcend the old notions of what constitutes Left and Right. ■

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Otis L. Graham, Jr. is professor of history at the University of California - Santa Barbara, and editor of The Public Historian. *He has just revised his textbook on American History to include, for the first time in such a text, a strong emphasis on the population, resources and environmental components of what ends up as history.*

The Role of Population and the Environment in World History

A Book Review by Otis L. Graham, Jr.

A GREEN HISTORY OF THE WORLD
By Clive Ponting
New York: Viking/Pelican, 1993
448 pp. Paperback, $12.00

There aren't many world histories, since the massive erudition required to produce them is increasingly beyond historians' grasp. But most of those we have are chronicles of the rise and fall of civilizations, usually with ample attention to monarchs, dynasties, armies, and the other familiar themes of political history. Fernand Braudel is a large figure because he wrote trans-national histories with a focus on economics, climate, disease and demography — history, that is, with strong environmental awareness. Clive Ponting offers, in *A Green History of the World*, an historical tour of humanity's abuse of the environment as human numbers grew beyond carrying capacity from Mesopotamia to the Yucatan Peninsula to Easter Island.

Readers should not expect a series of case studies of high civilizations brought low by their bad environmental habits. Ponting begins by linking the end of Easter Island civilization to overpopulation and environmental abuse, and there are other such stories. But this is no systematic tour of civilizations weakened by their environmental blindness (a book we very much need). It is instead a 400-page sketch of the engagement of humans with their environment over two million years, bringing more depth to our perception of contemporary issues.

Homo erectus spread outside Africa 1.5 million years ago, *Homo sapiens* settled most of the globe by 10,000 years ago, and then came the "first transition" from hunter-gathering to agriculture, animal husbandry, and stupendous increases in population growth. Ponting ranges from China to Mesopotamia to Greece as he tells a global story of human population increase, deforestation, famine. Then comes the era of fossil fuels — our own phase of history. Humans everywhere must face the realities of global warming and ozone depletion as rampant human population growth continues to burden the environment.

This is an account of global crisis, and it is grim reading. Governmental and private efforts to intervene to produce different outcomes are given no space. Nor are thoughts about remedies: "[t]his book," which is "a grim warning to the world," "does not attempt to propose solutions." Ponting gives us 400 pages of societal self-destruction, and no advice on what to do about it. Perhaps his tapestry overwhelmed whatever remedial impulses he might have felt. The book situates us at the very micro-second end of a long evolutionary process. We have "cultural lag," still desiring growth without understanding that we have in this century entered the most stupendous disconnect from our past. Ponting's most difficult assignment was to convey this sense of the irrelevance of our working assumptions. It is a worthy attempt.

But how can one so skillfully frame the problem and abdicate the making of solutions? Ponting tells a story, principally, of repetitive overpopulation. How do we find remedies? The author is intellectually adventurous, but a moral coward. These are strong words, but those who describe crises without proposing remedies are hiding (usually) in academic neutrality. I hope that these blunt words will galvanize him and others toward an engagement more forthright than we find in *A Green History of the World.* [Ed. Note: see the concluding paragraph of Ira Mehlman's review on page 293.] ■

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Population Growth *vs.* Economic Development

Simple multiplication reveals that if the United States were to have a 4 percent population growth rate, more than 40 percent of its entire GNP would have to be devoted to providing for these new Americans. Existing Americans would have to take a sharp cut in their present standard of living if new Americans were to have a chance to become average Americans. It does not take a deep understanding of human nature to know that existing Americans would not be willing to make the necessary sacrifices. They say so every day by having small families.

The absolute investments necessary to give new citizens the existing standard of living differ from country to country, but the fractions of the GNP that must be devoted to this effort do not. In the Third World the funds to support such an effort simply aren't there, regardless of willingness. A 40 percent reduction in current consumption leaves both new and old citizens near starvation, with no resources left over to devote to improving their collective future.

What was to be done can be seen in Japan, the United States, and Germany. Over the past one hundred years, Japan averaged a 4 percent per year real growth rate while its population was growing 1.1 percent per year. This produced a 2.9 percent yearly rise in per capita income. Over the same one hundred years, the American growth rate averaged 3.3 percent per year while its population was growing 1.5 percent per year. (The growth rate of its native population was much lower.) The result was 1.8 percent per year growth in per capita incomes. Even though per capita growth in the United States has been substantially lower than that in Japan over the past one hundred years, Japan has still not caught up (where performance is measured by internal purchasing power) with the United States. Japan was simply very far behind one hundred years ago. In Germany growth averaged 3 percent per year over the last one hundred years, and the population grew 1 percent per year, leading to a 2 percent per year rise in standard of living.

The histories of the world's richest countries illustrate an iron law of economic development. No country can become rich without a century of good economic performance and a century of very slow population growth. Many of today's poor countries have population growth rates between 3 and 4 percent. If Japan, Germany, and the United States had had such rates of population increase, their standards of living today would be no higher than they were one hundred years ago.

— From *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe & America* by Lester Thurow (William Morrow & Company), pp. 206-207

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"GARRETT HARDIN has done it again!" Paul R. Ehrlich

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

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